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11. Introduction
This thesis is focused mainly in the application and discussion of term structure
models in order to link macroeconomic theory, debt policy and debt management
theory with term structure dynamics. Throughout the thesis term structure models are
discussed and calibrated using real European data. It will be shown how results are in
line with economic theory and bring some light to latest European developments.
One of many motivations for addressing macroeconomics to term structure dynamics
is that every time governments or the private sector issue new debt or roll over
existing debt, they are faced with questions such as: how much debt should be issued
and for which tenors or maturities? The answer should be: depending on their
macroeconomic risks. Thus, debt re-structuring decisions should take into account the
sensitivities of the yield curve as a result of macroeconomic shocks and be capable to
foresee (or at least be aware of) the effects that certain –and also some rather
extreme- macroeconomic scenarios would have on their costs of financing. Affine
term structure models should be used as a finance tool to assist strategic decision
making. The maturity structure of debt taking into account observable
macroeconomic risks cannot be ignored, as seen on recent developments on the
European sovereign debt crises, which resulted in calls for a unifying and transparent
debt management framework.
In this introductory chapter, which was published in Jakas (2012a), some
developments on affine terms structure models are discussed with focus –amongst
others– on debt policy. The intention is to discuss how affine terms structure models
can help shape debt policy and improve the issuers’ debt costs of financing and as a
result –hopefully- improve their credit worthiness.
The novelty of this work is twofold: Firstly, to establish the link between affine term
structure models with debt management theory. Secondly, as debt management theory
still lacks of a generalised framework for analysing different debt management
2strategies, this work intends to answer some questions by focusing on the link that
can be established by applying affine term structure models and show how these
models contribute to two main streams of debt management theory: I) the theory of
the price level as seen in the works of Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995,
1996), Dupor (1997) and Cochrane (2001) and, II) the optimal taxation approach as
seen in the works of Angeletos (2001), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) and Missale
(1997). Some attention is given to sovereign debt where markets move under certain
set of events from complete to incomplete information, generating information
asymmetries, and in the process of doing so they change from perfect to imperfect
market conditions and hence, exhibit multiple equilibria; the “good” and the “bad”
equilibrium. The work makes a few references about market frictions which exhibit
widening bid-offer spreads resulting in illiquidity, increases in the governments cost
of financing, roll-over risks, financial distress and even sovereign debt crises. This
work shows that the yield curve behaviour is a reflection of a government’s
macroeconomic risks and the risk of debt roll-over due to unfavourable markets
expectations on government’s policies concerning their future surpluses or fiscal
imbalances.
It is also shown how the existence of multiple equilibria can transform investors’ risk
perception on governments’ issuances from risk-free into risky and that this is
because they expect government to default, either via a regular default within the roll-
over process or via an increase in the price level. When this occurs, investors run on
government issuances in a desperate attempt to recuperate their investment, due to the
existence of information asymmetries they do not know where they are standing in
the queue to convert their investments into cash when credit markets crunch.
This thesis is organised as follows. The introduction would provide the reader a high-
level review of the literature outlining some of the major discussions about the
theoretical underpinnings and empirics seen on affine term structure models and debt
management. In addition, this chapter also makes reference to the latest developments
on the European sovereign crisis, the theory of the fragility of the Eurozone and links
to market dynamics. Though we cannot answer of all the questions we raise in this
3chapter we will try to address some of these in more detail in each of the preceding
chapters accordingly.
The chapter “Theory of a Term Structure Model Applied to European Data”
published in Jakas (2011) begins with the basic asset pricing equation which is
slightly adapted in order to account for various European macroeconomic variables
such as Unemployment, Consumer Confidence Index, Production Price Index and
ECB M3. In this chapter we aim to identify evidence of a term structure violating the
no-arbitrage condition and compare results to a hypothetical no-arbitrage model.
Subsequently we discuss the extent to which the theory is in line with the empirical
results. This chapter will present slight adjustments to the classical consumption
based asset pricing model by introducing in the utility function unemployment data
and survey data such as consumers’ confidence index. The incorporation of a
monetary aggregate will also be extensively discussed in this chapter and its inclusion
in the model appears to us to be robust enough. This will show that a few state space
variables such as European unemployment rate, the European Consumers’
Confidence Index, European Production Price Index (PPI) and a monetary aggregate
such as ECB M3 for Europe, it is possible to explain yield curve movements with
strikingly very good results. For instance, the unemployment rate and the consumer
confidence index exhibit a shift and a slope effect on the yield curve, thus the front-
end yields moving faster than the long-end resulting in steepening or flattening
effects. The production price index has a twist effect on the yield curve (flattening or
steepening of the curve) which results in lower-end yields shifting in opposite
directions to the long-end. The empirical work in this chapter shows that yields are
negatively correlated to money supply, as expected in classical IS-LM models. And
that money supply exhibits a slope effect, with the lower end of the curve shifting
faster than the longer end.
The chapter “Introductory Notes on Affine Term Structure Models: Continuous Time
Approach” provides a review of the foundations on affine term structure models,
comparing some of the analytical results from various authors particularly from
4Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010). The intention is to present some basic algebra
and show the reader on a step by step basis how to get to the no-arbitrage approach
specification. This chapter is of interest to academics and practitioners involved in
teaching or applying affine term structure models under the continuous time
approach, as most of the literature has proven to be very difficult to follow. The affine
term structure models developed in this chapter start with the basic pricing equation,
the pricing equation for asset returns and the holding period returns. The chapter also
explains the relationship of bond prices and Ito’s lemma and finally the fundamental
pricing equation for fixed income securities is obtained, as this expression is later
required for the definition of an affine term structure model. Discussions are linked to
prominent research such as Piazzesi (2010) and results are compared to those of
Cochrane (2005) and Duffie and Kan (1996). Here, we have learned that there are still
some conceptual differences in the literature which requires further attention which
goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
The chapter “Affine Term Structure Models applied to a Macro-Finance Model”
show how a macro-finance model can be used as the theoretical foundations for
calibrating the state space vector of an affine term structure model. Thus, this chapter
explores the use of macro-finance models in order to explain the links of
macroeconomics and the state vector used for calibrating a term structure model. It
will be shown that some of the findings in Chapter 4 can be applied to the models
discussed in chapter 5. Here it is worth mentioning that in order to link
macroeconomic policy to term structure dynamics the use of a macro-finance model
would help the researcher select state variables that are supported by economic
theory.
The chapter “Discrete Approach to Affine Term Structure Models Applied to German
and Greek Government Yields” published in Jakas (2012b) provides valuable
evidence from a European perspective of discrete affine models for risky and risk-free
assets. It is a first attempt to apply an affine model to compare two government bonds
which are denominated in a common currency but that at the same time enjoy
5different risk profiles. In this chapter some of the algebra and concepts seen in the
continuous time affine term structure literature are plugged into the discrete time
approach. Starting point for this paper has been the celebrated papers from Backus,
Foresi, Telmer (1996-98). In addition, some of the developments seen on the
continuous approach as documented in Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006) and Duffie
and Kan (1996) have been explored and adapted to the discrete time approach. This
chapter focused mainly on the multifactor cases of affine term structure models. The
results are encouraging and the models fit the observed yields as well as give
evidence of a reasonable predictive-ability. This chapter will show that governments
that exhibit a positive correlation of their yields to aggregate consumption growth
need to ensure low deficits and debt burdens during booming periods so that they can
still have capacity to issue new debt for the rainy days. From the Greek case this
essay shows that a deterioration of government’s deficit-to-GDP ratio results in a fall
in yields. This is mainly because the increase in spending helps to boom the economy.
However, this is more than offset by the deterioration of its debt-to-GDP ratio, thus a
deterioration of the latter ratio will more than offset any positive effects stemming
from any budget-deficit-induced counter-cyclical policies. This chapter will also
show that debt and deficit ratios can play a role in times of financial distress.
The chapter “The Yield Curve and Economic Fundamentals: A Continuous Time
Model” published in Jakas and Jakas (2013) is an attempt to explore the continuous
time approach to affine term structure models and calibrates the German government
yields with the same macroeconomic variables used in the discrete approach in
previous chapters. The intention is to show that affine term structure models can also
be used in order to test the extent to which yields are in line with fundamental
macroeconomic data and hence are part of a network of macroeconomic variables.
The chapter “Discrete Affine Term Structure Models Applied to the Government
Debt and Fiscal Imbalances” published in Jakas (2013a) is an attempt to use the affine
term structure models to the understanding of governments’ debt and fiscal
imbalances, providing a valuable toolkit for policy and decision makers and
6contributing to the fiscal theory of the price level, the optimum taxation approach,
debt management and fixed income portfolio strategies. It will be shown that it does
not matter if the theory of the price level is at work or not. Mainly because either
ways any deterioration of the cumulated surplus or deficit leads to higher financing
costs either via inflation or via increases in the credit spreads to the benchmark
curves. This chapter will also show that the front-end of the yield curve is where the
risk lies as seen for the Greek yield curve. Hence, if for a given government its yields
are not seen as a market benchmark and therefore exhibit increasing yields in times
when aggregate marginal utility is high and consumption growth is low, then the
government must avoid deficits and fund counter-cyclical policies with liquidity
reserves for this purpose. Reserves must be financed via the long-end of the curve, for
instance, 20- to 30-year maturity bonds. It will be shown that only those governments
who enjoy of the so-called risk-free status are “allowed” to issue in the front-end, as
an increase in the financing costs due to increases in total debt outstanding are
compensated –at least partially– by falls in the short-term rate. The novelty of this
essay is that will show that the mathematics underlying affine term structure models
can be very useful for the analysis of governments’ fiscal imbalances. Governments
which are more sensitive to macroeconomic risks affecting their fiscal imbalances are
likely to exhibit higher spreads if they run deficits, thus limiting their ability to
counter-cyclical policies in times when consumption growth is low and aggregate
marginal utility is high.
The chapter “The Term Structure, Latent Factors and Macroeconomic Data: A Local
Linear Level Model” published in Jakas (2013b) is a contribution to some of the term
structure literature seen in Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Diebold, Rudebusch and
Aruoba (2006) this research combines 1) the use of state space techniques via a
Kalman (1960) filter in order to identify an unobserved state or latent factors
depicting the slope, the level and a seasonal component to an observation equation
linking those state factors to observable yields and, 2) the use of affine model
calibrated with latent factors obtained in 1). In addition, this section also shows how
macro-variables influence these unobserved components via OLS regressions linking
7latent factors and macroeconomic data. It will be shown that results confirm the views
of Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and, provide strong evidence of
macroeconomic effects on yields however and, weaker evidence of yield curve effects
on the macroeconomy. This essay will also explore the possibility of breaking the
yield curve in two: the money market and the capital market yield curves. It will be
shown that by doing so results improve significantly compared to those seen in the
no-arbitrage experiences. The essay show that both, the local level model as well as
the no-arbitrage term structure model perform quite well in explaining yield curve
movements. However, similar to most of current literature and in line with previous
chapters the explanatory power diminishes under the no-arbitrage approach as
maturities become larger.
Finally a conclusion is presented under chapter “Conclusion and Final Remarks”. The
reader should know that this thesis is manly a set of papers or essays which have been
published either in an international, peer-reviewed journal or handbooks, so that each
of the essays or chapters provide their own conclusions, and towards the end of the
thesis the main conclusions of the thesis is presented, which summarises the most
important findings of preceding chapters. Throughout the thesis, it would appear that
the author is reproducing specifications which have been already mentioned in
previous chapters. This is mostly for the readers’ convenience, so that the reader does
not need to navigate back and forth in the thesis to follow the notation or let the
reader the possibility skip chapters and go to the chapter of interest.
With respect to this introductory chapter, it has been organised as follows; Section I
reviews affine term structure model literature, with reference to its main theoretical
contributions and summarising some of the main academic research streams. In
section II, evidence on affine term structure models is presented and some of its main
findings are being briefly discussed. Section III, outlines the relevance of
understanding the yield curve as part of a network of macroeconomic variables,
focused is given on its contribution to debt management and strategic financial
management. Section IV introduces main two streams of literature within the debt
management theory; 1) the theory of the price level as seen in the works of Leeper
8(1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995, 1996), Dupor (1997) and Cochrane (2001).
And 2) the theory of the optimal taxation approach as seen in the works of Angeletos
(2001), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) and Missale (1997). Finally, section V
introduces to the concepts of “good” and “bad” equilibrium and links them with
markets imperfections.
Section I. Affine term structure models a brief introduction
So far the literature has exhibit at least two groups that have increasingly diverged:
the mathematical finance and the macroeconomic literature.
With respect to the mathematical finance literature, it could be said that most of it has
been mainly concentrated on a different objective: to construct a consistent theory for
the valuation of interest rate dependent derivatives or assets, which ignores that
financial markets are a part in a network of dynamic interactions on an economy’s
macroeconomic variables. An example of this can be seen in Heath-Jarrow-Morton
(1992), Vasicek (1977) or Cox-Ingersol-Ross (1985 a, b).
With respect to macroeconomic literature, traditional classical theories on the term
structure such as in Meiselman (1962), Malkiel (1966), Hicks (1946), Lutz (1940),
Culbertson (1957) have not suffice to link macroeconomic theory and the term
structure of interests. An attempt to improve this can be seen on Michaelsen (1963)
and -not so recently- in Turnovsky (1989).
None of the theoretical approaches mentioned above, have developed a generalised
explanation of the term structure and its dynamics due to changes in macroeconomic
variables. In fact, so far the economic theory still fails to unify the theoretical
underpinnings that explain –under a general framework– the existence of a term
structure, its shape, and its shape movements, the steepening, flattening, parallel shifts
and twists.
9Even though there is still no general theory of macroeconomics and the term structure
of interests, the literature has made dramatic progress which have its foundations in
the so-called consumption based asset pricing theory as seen on seminal papers from
Rubenstein (1976), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979) which in its advanced version
has crystallised into the celebrated affine term structure models, which has been
extensively documented in Piazzesi (2010).
Consumption based asset pricing models despite being theoretically robust, they have
performed poorly empirically as seen in the controversial works of Mehra and
Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Singleton (1983) therefore, most of the literature has
been mainly focused in the equity and bond premium puzzles. In addition, the
literature has also been primarily confined to the study of utility functions e.g. as in
Epstein and Zin (1989), which introduces the so-called recursive preferences to the
classical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, this is extensively
documented in e.g. Guvenen and Lustig (2007).
Consumption based asset pricing models have developed the theoretical property that
asset returns are a function of aggregate marginal utility growth and therefore, can be
easily linked to observable macroeconomic variables or indicators, and so have given
birth to the so-called factor pricing as well as the affine term structure models. This
introductory chapter will focus on affine term structure models and will review a few
research developments on this topic.
It would be useful to start by recalling the basic asset pricing equation as in, for
instance, Cochrane (2001), which shows that asset prices are a function of expected
future aggregate marginal utility growth, which has been reproduced below following
Cochrane’s (2001) notation,
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For Pt being the present value at time t, of an asset paying off xt+1, Et is the
expectations operator. βthe subjective discount factor and u´(c t+1) / u´(ct) being the
aggregate marginal utility growth.
Recalling the basic pricing equation and assuming a 1 year zero coupon bond which
pays out 1 monetary unit at maturity, the investor’s first order condition for Et
conditional to an information set at time t, would yield something like:
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Which for convenience it will be transformed to:
   ttNt ImEy 1log  (2)
Equation (2) basically shows that the stochastic discount factor is the inverse of the
observable yields. The stochastic discount factor is subject to a set of information It
comprising the state of the economy at time t.
Assuming a log utility function u(ct) with a constant relative risk aversion holds as
shown in (3) below;

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1
t
t
c
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For ct being the level of consumption in time t. Now we need to adapt this by taking
into account that yields and consumption are part of a network of macroeconomic
variables, e.g. by saying that consumption is a function of It which comprises the state
of the economy at time t such that It belongs to a set of information I so that
  ttt xfIcE 1 (4)
For which x t will exhibit the following behaviour
ttt uxx  1 (5)
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xt is a state space vector with macroeconomic data which could include information
such as unemployment, consumer confidence index, production price index and
monetary aggregate, etc.
So recalling (1) for logarithmic utility function and log prices )(Ntp , nominal yields
can be specified as:
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Transforming (6) for all into their natural logarithms, and assuming normality we
obtain:
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Now from a recursive perspective we need to analyse the lambda coefficients that we
expect for different maturities. Hence, let us assume there is a sequence of weights λi
assumed to converge to a constant value as maturity increases. The only point of this
is to adjust the values to observable data.
We present a recursion, including the behaviour of coefficients λi above and assuming
a recursion that starts for N = 1 to N under normality,
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Finally, concerning the affine term structure model, most of the recent literature
however, has been too focused on the “continues-versus-discrete” debate, or
discussions on the estimation methods, which has been mainly confined to maximum
likelihood (ML) versus generalised method of moments (GMM) debate.
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“There are situations in which it is better to trade some small efficiency gains for the
robustness of simpler procedures or more easily interpretable moments; OLS can be
better than GLS” [Cochrane, (2001) page 293].
It is not scope of this thesis to enter in this debate and the use of the estimation
procedures will depend rather on practicalities depending on the tools and methods
readily available. Said all that, for empirical analysis, equations (1) to (8) can be
summarised together into a space state system similar to Piazzesi (2010). These
specifications are put together with an observation equation which links observable
yields to the state space vector and a state equation which describes the dynamics of
the state as follows:
   NttNt xNBNAy  ')( (9)
ttt uxx  1 (10)
For xt being the state space vector with macroeconomic data used in (4) and already
explained in (5). Coefficients A(N) and B(N)' depend on yields’ maturities N. The
reader should notice that “ ' “ denotes for the transpose of a vector or matrix.εt(N) and
ut are measurement errors and for the sake of simplicity are assumed to be normally
distributed and i.i.d. Equations (9) and (10) if set under the violation of the no-
arbitrage condition, would imply that parameters A(N) and B(N)' can be estimated by
means of OLS, for A(N) being a vector of intercepts and B(N)' a coefficient matrix.
However, under the no-arbitrage condition this is less straight forward.
A representative investor will try to anticipate changes in bond yields and this will be
done by observing interdependencies of these bond yields with macroeconomic
variables. Moreover, macroeconomic risks are the drivers of changes in yields
because yields are part of a network of economic variables and because
macroeconomic risks also affect governments’ current and future surpluses.
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Macroeconomic risks also affect markets expectations on yields because they also
reflect markets expectations on governments expected future primary surpluses.
Affine term structure models refer to models that explain changes in asset
values due to changes in macroeconomic variables, see for example Piazzesi (2010).
Hence, if changes in macroeconomic variables are the foundations for changes in
asset prices, the resulting sensitivities of these explanatory variables reflect a kind of
“beta” coefficient to a certain macroeconomic risk. For example, a change in
unemployment can result in more than proportional changes in government yields,
thus reflecting the risk that the holder of a government issuance has as a result of a
shock to the unemployment variable of the economy of concern. Equation (6) shows a
simple affine term structure model for a yield curve with N different maturities. For
instance, a government bond which should act as a hedge in times of low
consumption growth will exhibit a negative B(N) with respect to changes in
unemployment rate. Hence, an increase in unemployment rate should exhibit a fall in
government bond yields because an increase in unemployment will result in a fall in
future consumption growth, as described in equation (1).
However, the above only works as long as the government security is seen as
a risk-free asset. If the government fails to address the macroeconomic risks affecting
its surplus, it will result in reverting from its issuance from risk-free to risky. This is
because it will imply a change in the sign of the B(N)' term. Thus using the example
above, the negative B(N)' term will become positive, as an increase in unemployment
will result in a deterioration of government’s deficit and thus an increase in the size of
its debt with even further deterioration of its deficit. Hence, an increase in the
unemployment rate would instead result in an increase in the bond yields with the
subsequent deterioration in the value of the asset. Unless the government is able to
address the macroeconomic risks affecting its deficits/surpluses, there is no reason to
believe that the investors will still be willing to lend for a low return. Government
securities which change from the “good” equilibrium to the “bad” equilibrium will
experience a change in the sign of their B(N)' term. In fact, if investors believe that
Government securities will change from “good” equilibrium to the “bad” equilibrium,
they will run on the government’s debt, as investors will believe that the market will
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do so, and they do not know where they are standing on the queue to convert their
bonds into cash. Thus, this further increase yields even above their fundamental
values and attracts speculative attacks on weaker budgetary sovereigns. Moreover,
those investors not being able –or not willing to sell at a low price– to avoid realising
losses will engage in shorting similar sovereigns which exhibit similar behaviour in
order to hedge their investment. In the process of doing to they spread contagion to
other sovereign issuances, even if these actions are fundamentally not justified. All
this gives rise to self-fulfilling prophecies and herding behaviour or bandwagon
effects typical of bank runs or credit crises as documented in Jakas (2010). Empirical
evidence of multiple equilibria in the European sovereign debt crisis is found in
Bierne and Fratscher (2013). These authors show that a deterioration of in countries’
fundamentals and fundamentals contagion are the main explanation on the rise of
spreads during the crisis and they also show that empirical models with economic
fundamentals do a poor job in explaining sovereign risk in the pre-crisis period for
European economies, which they suggest that the market pricing of sovereign risk
may not have been fully reflecting fundamentals prior to the crisis. Empirical
evidence of self-fulfilling liquidity crises in the Eurozone can be found in De Grauwe
and Ji (2013). These authors show that government bond markets in the Eurozone are
more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling prophecies than in stand-alone
countries that are able to monetise their budgetary deficits. This empirical analysis is
based on the so-called theory of fragility of the Eurozone, published in De Grauwe
(2011a,b). One of the main outcomes of this theory is that the mere absence of a
guarantee that all sovereign issuers will always have liquidity to attend their debt
servicing obligations creates fragility in a monetary union, as members are
susceptible to movements of distrust and they conclude arguing that if investors fear
some payment difficulty, they will have an incentive to sell sovereign issuances.
Section II. Empirical Evidence on Affine Term Structure Models
Empirical evidence on affine term structure models is extensively documented in
Piazzesi (2010). Most of the evidence is confined to the use of US and CRSP data.
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Little or virtually no research has been performed based on real data used by real
market participants such as Reuters or Bloomberg sources, which are the primary
sources used by traders and fund managers. In addition, most of the evidence has
been limited to US data only and little reference to the Euro-Zone. Looking into the
works from Hördahl and Oreste (2010) they mainly confine their work to a joint
model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics to estimate inflation risk
premia. While it is true that they look not only to US data but also to euro data, their
focus is not to model the European benchmark term structure but the inflation risk
premia. Other celebrated ECB working papers such as in Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin
(2007) are confined to show that micro founded dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models with nominal rigidities can be successful in replicating features of
bond yield data, however the work is based all on US data from the Federal Bank of
Saint Louis. e.g. to be more precise they use PCECC96 for consumption and
PCECTPI for prices. Amisano and Tristani (2007) focus on inflation not on term
structure. Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin (2004) confines the work solely to German
data and does not calibrate with European aggregated macroeconomic data in order to
analyse from a euro-zone perspective. And there are many more previous to the
creation of the euro which are not worth mentioning here, as we confine our work to a
Eurozone perspective using real data from the euro-area.
Empirical evidence is mainly confined to discussion what short or long yields are to
be used as proxies. However, little is said about what factors should be used to enter
into as proxies for the state variables describing the economy at each moment in time.
Good results have been observed in cross-sectional fits. However, the yield
coefficients in this prediction do not include the no-arbitrage restrictions.
Empirical results for unconditional first moments have shown that yields of bonds
with longer maturities are on average higher than those of bonds with shorter
maturities, which shows that the yield curve is on average upward sloping which is
easy to generate with an affine term structure model. However, the factors which
show persistence, such as inflation, contribute to one of the main problems associated
to affine models.
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Section III. Why is relevant to understand the yield curve as part of a network of
macroeconomic variables?
First, understanding the yield curve is important from a practitioners’ perspective, as
the yield curve is used as benchmark for pricing a universe of assets, derivatives,
structures or plain vanilla assets. Investors and banks would apply a spread on a
particular benchmark curve, e.g. German government yield curve, to value an asset.
At the same time the mere spreads they are applying reflect their expectations on the
variability of the assets’ earnings as a function of the economy’s expected future
performance. For example, a corporate bond issued by a company which has its
earnings more or less correlated to an economy’s consumption growth, is expected to
exhibit widening spreads in times of economic distress, hence when aggregate
marginal utility growth high. Authors such as Piazzesi (2010), Fama and Bliss (1987),
Campbell and Schiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) assert that
understanding the yield curve is important for forecasting, as long-maturity yields are
expected values of average risk-adjusted future short yields and as a consequence
they would contain information about economic agents’ expectations about the future
of the economy. Moreover, yields will contain information about real variables as
seen in the works of Harvey (1988), Estrella and Hadouvelis (1991), Hamilton and
Kim (2002), Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2002) as well as nominal variables such as
inflation as seen in the works of Mishkin (1990) and Fama (1990).
Second, financial intermediaries or investors analyse the sensitivities of their portfolio
of assets as a function of movements in the yield curve. Thus, they are interested in
understanding how much profit or loss could result from a particular portfolio of
assets as a result of a downward shift in the benchmark curve. This analysis gives
them a quick review of the interest rate risk exposure they have on a portfolio. They
would possibly run a certain number of scenarios using historical data to determine
sensitivities. However, the yield curve is part of a network of macroeconomic
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variables and affine term-structure models help rephrase this: how much profit or loss
results from a portfolio of assets as a result of a change in a predefined set of
macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment, production price index, consumer
confidence index and/or a particular monetary aggregate? Thus, if the economy is
heading towards recession, management can observe how portfolios are adapting
their strategy to avoid financial distress. Affine term structure models can help
monitor strategy and shape strategic investment decision making.
Third, understanding the yield curve is important for governments and firms, as yield
curve behaviour will determine their debt financing costs (DFC) and their ability to
access additional financing in times of financial distress.
To try and depict this in a better way, let us assume that for particular market segment
it is possible to derive a market yield curve by applying a an observable spread above
an observable benchmark curve, which for the sake of simplicity in this example it
would be the government yield curve. If spreads are constant with respect to the
maturities and with respect to time, an increase in the government yield curve would,
ceteris paribus, increase the segment’s cost of financing in the same proportion.
Hence, an increase in the government yield curve in 1 basis point (bsp), all other
variables being equal, would increase the firm’s cost of financing by 1 bsp.
However, the above depicted relationship could be observed differently, it could well
be the case that corporate yields on certain market segments exhibit a more-than-
proportional relationship to changes in the benchmark curve. In fact, this could
actually vary depending on the maturities, possibly being the front end more volatile
than the longer end and the longer the maturities the greater the magnifying effect.
Therefore, if the yield curve is a dependent variable part of a network of
macroeconomic variables, it is of interest for both private as well as public debt
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management, policy makers or business leaders to understand these relationships, as
macroeconomic variables have an effect on private and public debt cost of financing.
Fourth, another point to take into account is that governments or central banks could
actively manage the yield curve to achieve some kind of optimum results in terms of
financial resource allocation to the wider economy or improve budget deficits. The
outcome of this depends largely in how changes in the total government debt
outstanding for different maturities can influence movements in the yield curve. What
are possible policy prescriptions? Is it necessary for a government to have a Debt
Policy in place or is it irrelevant? Is a transparent government debt management
policy relevant to investors? and if so could it be used as part of a stabilisation
strategy?
Fifth, can active yield curve management result in some kind of collateral damage?
Thus, governments, by undertaking an active yield curve management strategy in
order to optimise their cost of financing could however result in undesired effects to
the wider economy, particularly if important economic sectors are very sensitive to
government yield curve movements. In other words, active yield curve management
can have beneficial effects from government’s cost of financing perspective however
it could result in improving certain sectors in detriment of others or simply creating
financial incentives which might result being not optimum for the economy as a
whole in the long run.
For example, an increase in money supply in the lower end of the curve with the
subsequent fall in interest rates could result in a non-optimal reallocation of financial
resources and subsequent reduction in the diversification of the economy’s production
factors. Thus a subsequent fall in interest rates could result in reallocating financial
resources to banks, or to boost the construction, real estate and housing sector, as
more individuals are able to have access to funding at a lower interest rate. This could
possibly result in a so-called bandwagon effect or herding behaviour, as soaring
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house prices attract even more funding for speculative purposes which in turn
increase house prices even further and so on until the bubble bursts.
Sixth, another aspect of understanding the yield curve from a macroeconomic
perspective is that gives the practitioner the chance to analyse the sensitivity or
elasticity of the macroeconomic variables on government cost of financing. The
beauty of this approach is that it can also be applied to corporate debt management.
To draw this more precisely, let us assume that unemployment data exhibits a more
than proportional effect on government yields in the lower end of the curve and no
effect in the long end. This would mean that governments, whose yield curves are
very sensitive to unemployment data and exhibit a very volatile unemployment rate,
should analyse their refinancing costs when issuing new debt with longer term
maturities. As in times when bad news arrives for future consumption growth, the
effects that this would have on their re-financing costs –should they need to roll over
debt- could result in being rather unfavourable if they issue short term debt instead.
Governments face the risk of a decrease in their tax revenues due to output shocks.
Thus an unexpected fall in GDP could result in a decrease in government tax
revenues, as businesses and individuals experience a fall in their taxable income. For
example, an increase in unemployment results in a decrease in expected aggregate
consumption and expected aggregate investment. As a result there is not only a
decrease in expected tax revenues but also an increase in expected government
spending, which further deteriorates government finances.
This moves us to an interesting area: what are the macroeconomic risks associated
with a particular government curve compare to other government curves. For
example, is the German government curve more sensitive to, e.g. unemployment data
or consumer confidence index, compare to the US or the UK, and for which
maturities? How should a Government’s debt policy look like under a certain set of
macroeconomic risks? What are the macroeconomic factors that should be tackled by
policy makers in order to prevent certain macroeconomic risks influencing negatively
on their expected future re-financing requirements?
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Seventh, Governments face time inconsistencies in the process of issuing debt. In an
optimal scenario, governments would not need to increase total debt outstanding and
the roll of new debt would only be used to pay back the old maturing one. However,
governments issue debt as a consequence of an increase in budget deficits in order to
compensate for the fall in private consumption in times of economic crises. In other
words, governments engage in counter-cyclical interventions in order to smooth the
decrease in aggregate consumption growth. In the process of doing so they avoid
increasing taxes and alternatively increase long term debt. The increase of long term
debt has the property of acting as a hedge for distortionary taxation and innovations in
aggregate consumption growth. Another benefit is that allows governments to trade
current inflation for future inflation and spread the effects stemming from surplus
shocks across maturities. However, the theory of the price level shows that if the
government engages in such a policy will need to convince investors that current
deficit is only temporary and that the government still has the ability to generate
funds in order to repay debt servicing.
This is simple, why would you lend someone any money if you don’t believe that
repayment is a rather likely scenario? The less likely it becomes to investors that
government actions signal a probable repayment of the debt –in real terms- the less
keen they will be on investing in government debt, unless they are compensated for
this risk.
The problem is that in times of financial distress, hence when financial resources are
more valuable the stronger become these conditions to countries exhibiting less
credible financial capacity. Is in these very moments when governments need to
repay maturing debt and re-issue new one at a higher cost, as the financial markets do
not believe that the governments will have the ability or political will of engaging in
sometimes unpopular measures, particularly for those whose macroeconomic risks
have been a pending subject. Here again is where the papers of De Grauwe (2011a,b),
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) become relevant.
Generally, in times of financial distress, those governments which have kept an
acceptable budgetary surplus will be able to benefit from low yields, as in times of
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low consumption growth government bonds are valued most and thus exhibit low
interest rate levels. However, for the case of risky assets the opposite occurs, as in
times of economic distress there is no appetite for investors for risky assets as they
pay-off poorly. Only under a “compensation” for the risk-taking, are investors going
to be willing to take this risk into their balance sheets. In order to be successful,
government ministers of finance should asked themselves: what if financial crises
took place in this very moment, with the subsequent fall in consumption growth with
a severe increase in unemployment rates? What is the outlook for the government
expected future surplus? Has the government the capacity to smooth consumption
whilst maintain low costs of financing? Or has the government not done the
homework all these years and will now face financial distress? How are tax-revenues
going to be affected by a severe fall in GDP growth? How are yields going to move
as a consequence of innovations on these macroeconomic variables? Are the new
issuances still going to be attractive to the markets at a low price and for how long?
The answer to all this is: depending on how macroeconomic risks affect their
expected future surpluses and their cost of financing.
Eighth, in times of financial distress if investors perceive that governments are prone
to fail to address macroeconomic risks affecting their surplus, they are left with no
other choice but to adjust their portfolios accordingly. The reason is that the country’s
inherent macroeconomic risks affect the yield curve because they affect also
governments’ expected future surpluses. The deterioration of sovereign spreads is a
signal of the market so that governments address these issues in order to restore
confidence. In the process of doing so, they will need to cut down on government
spending with the subsequent negative effects on growth. For example, Government
spending comprises in Europe way more than 40% of total GDP and in times when
bad news for aggregate consumption growth arrives, private expenditure is unlikely to
grow enough to compensate for the fall in government spending.
The problem of not understanding this link is magnified by the fact that government
securities have the property of acting as hedging instruments for times of low
consumption growth, hence in times of financial distress. This is because they
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perform better in times when aggregate marginal utility is valued most. When
governments fail to address their macroeconomic risks they give way to the
possibility of a run on their issuances, which has a magnifying effect in times when
bad news for consumption growth arrives.
This is because under the “good” equilibrium Government securities are only optimal
when inflation is low and the probability of deterioration in its present value is
virtually zero. However, if there is asymmetric information and there are doubts about
the capacity or ability of the government to manage its inherent macroeconomic risks
and hence ensure its ability to generate funds via either tax revenues, issuing new
debt at a low cost or adjust deficits in the future, will result in investors categorising
the debt as risky. An investment that was once seen as a risk-free asset and that –
unexpectedly– turns out to be riskier, forces the representative investor to re-assess
portfolio and adjust accordingly, with the subsequent effects on the yield curve which
are prone to be long-lasting. If governments issue in a currency they do not control, a
deterioration of their fiscal imbalances has a consequence on their spreads. Mostly
due to liquidity issues, as the government cannot guarantee payment in a currency not
controlled by its central bank.
Section IV. Public Debt Policy: a brief introduction
Some recent work on term structure and debt management policy can be seen in
Cochrane (2001), Angeletos (2001), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) and Missale
(1997).
Cochrane (2001) analyses the effects of long-term debt and optimal policy in the
fiscal theory. In his work, the maturity of the debt matters, as it determines how news
about current deficit implies current inflation or future inflation. In fact, governments
could trade-off between current and future inflation by issuing long term debt. Thus,
if primary surplus remains constant and there is an increase in total debt outstanding,
an increase in the price level is expected. In fact, in this model the effect of debt on
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the price level is attenuated for longer maturities and as the maturity shortens. An
important contribution is that surpluses are strongly negatively correlated with
changes in the total value of the debt and that long term debt allows governments to
offset surplus shocks as they come. The entire analysis in the fiscal theory stems from
the idea that primary surplus must equal bond redemptions plus net repurchases and
that the real value of outstanding debt equals the present value of real surpluses. In
other words, there is a sequence of price levels for a given sequence of debt policy
and surpluses.
Governments face the risk of a decrease in their tax revenues due to output shocks.
Thus an unexpected fall in GDP could result in a decrease in government tax
revenues, as businesses and individuals experience a fall in their taxable income. For
example, an increase in unemployment results in a decrease in expected aggregate
consumption and expected aggregate investment. As a result there is not only a
decrease in expected tax revenues but also an increase in expected government
spending, which further deteriorates expectations on government finances.
The fiscal theory of the price level was first developed by Leeper (1991), Sims
(1994), Woodford (1995, 1996) and Dupor (1997) and says that the price level is
determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses,
in simple terms, the present value of outstanding debt equals the present value of real
surpluses. The theory also reads that current surpluses must equal redemptions plus
net repurchases, thus as in Cochrane (1998) review of the theory suggested
The present value identity:
 y
sB
1
B is total debt outstanding, s government primary surplus, for πis the price level and
y the real interest rate. Assuming that the real interest rate remains constant, an
increase in the government surplus would, ceteris paribus, result in a decrease in the
price level.
The flow identity:
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For Bt-1 being a bond outstanding at the end of the period t-1 and redeemed in t. Bt is
the net repurchases or net new issues depending on the surplus/deficit at t. A negative
surplus (or a deficit) would imply an increase in new debt outstanding and a positive
surplus would imply a decrease in total debt outstanding.
The present value identity
Starting with the present value identity, making it formally and accounting for several
periods yields:
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For  01


tTN
tB denote a zero coupon bond outstanding at the end of period t-1 that
matures in N. Notice that in this case )(N is the discount factor and
)1(
1
)(
)(
N
t
N
y
. Now by combining this with the affine term structure literature it can be said that
)(N
ty is affine as derived from equations (1) to (10). πt denotes the price level and st
the real primary surplus, and the real primary surplus can also be said to be affine:
   NttNt xNBNAs  ')( (12)
From equations (1) to (12) it has been determined how macroeconomic variables
depicted in the state-space vector x t affect, both the yield curve and expected future
primary surpluses, as shown in Jakas (2013a). In fact (11) shows that an expected
deterioration in government finances as a result of macroeconomic shocks would,
ceteris paribus, increase the price level. The increase in the price level is expected to
result in a subsequent increase in nominal yields to compensate investors for their
loss in purchasing power due to a decrease in the discount factor. If the adverse
effects of macroeconomic shocks are expected to remain permanent, it would also
have the effect of further increasing government’s cost of financing, which will
further deteriorate the net present value of future surpluses.
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By including what we have already learned in section 1, equation (11) can be
rearranged by replacingβ(N) from a consumption asset pricing framework as follows:
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Notice that in (13) inflation has been detached from the stochastic discount factor
mt+N but only for the purpose of analysing the price level in isolation. In fact, from an
affine term structure model It reflects all macroeconomic information at that point in
time including inflation.
The flow identity
Cochrane’s review of the theory of the price level suggests an analytical framework
which focuses mostly on the effects of the flow identity against shocks which can be
dissipated by issuing long term debt. However, his work does not link the flow
identity to a well-known risk: the-so called “debt-roll over” risk. The debt roll over
risk refers to the risk of an increase in the debt cost of financing during the process of
rolling over maturing debt, hence repaying maturing debt by issuing new one. The
increase in the cost of financing is usually as a consequence of unfavourable market
movements at a particular moment in time. This will be analysed in detail later. For
the time being it will be enough just to modify the present value identity in equation
(11) a bit, which boils down to:
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Now, from (14) current surpluses must equal redemptions plus net repurchases. From
(11) and (14) it is possible to read that unfavourable surplus shocks can force
governments to increase debt issuance in order to pay redemptions. Intuitively, from
(11) we read that unfavourable scenarios affecting (14) are likely to increase the cost
of financing via increases in the price level. Therefore, governments, in order to be
able to smooth innovations on their surpluses need to have resources for times when
consumption growth is low, so that they can compensate for the fall in private sector
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consumption and still be able to attend budgetary obligations without resulting in a
deterioration in the country’s welfare. Failure to do so the question is not if default is
probable or not, the question is how is default to occur.
Analysing these results by means of the classical consumption asset pricing
framework it is necessary to determine tow premises; A) the assumption that
governments would target a certain size of surplus/deficit and B) central banks follow
an inflation targeting framework restricted to output growth. The consumption asset
pricing framework yields that: under the normality assumption, an expected
deterioration in government finances would result in a decrease in expected future
consumption growth and thus an increase in aggregate marginal utility growth with
the subsequent increase in the stochastic discount factor and hence a fall in yields for
risk free assets, which are negatively correlated with consumption growth. The
negative effects are likely to be via fiscal adjustments, as governments would need to
reduce spending in the future because current deficits have to be compensated –
ideally- with future surpluses. This is rather a timing issue, as fiscal consolidation
should take part during economic booms. The premise is that government securities
for non-core countries are risk free only if remained within certain degree of
surplus/deficit fiscal discipline. The other aspect is that central banks will be inflation
focused. These two theories can be easily brought together under certain premises.
For example, by denoting Gt as government spending and τt as the tax rate which
depends on output Yt, and including the expectations operator it could be possible to
rearrange (14) so that the flow identity becomes:
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And the present value identity accounting for several periods is now:
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Now we need to differentiate the effects in the front end versus the effects in the long
end of the yield curve. This can be done by recalling once more the inflation targeting
framework, because we know that an increase in the price level due to a deterioration
of the primary surplus is expected to increase yields in the front end of the curve due
to central bank anchoring inflation expectations but also due to an increase in debt-
roll over risk. As those issues from governments under current financial distress will
observe an increase in their yields simply because investors are not sure if the
government will be able to roll debt over successfully and hence be able to repay the
maturing bonds by issuing new ones. This is mainly because countries central bank
are solely inflation focused and do not act as lender of last resort for governments.
This gives place to a so-called “fragility” of the Eurozone.
There has been a growing literature trying to link between the debt management and
debt policy with fiscal theory. An example of these are seen in Faraglia, Marcet and
Scott (2008), as well as Angeletos (2001) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). These
works show the argument that the composition of government debt should be chosen
to that fluctuations in the market value of debt is offset by changes in expected future
deficits. Most of the discussion is centralised on the so-called complete versus
incomplete market approach to debt management. Discussions here are that the
incomplete market approach needs to be incorporated into the theory, allowing for
important frictions such as transaction costs and liquidity effects to determine price
levels and optimal fiscal policy prescriptions.
Angeletos (2001) explores the optimal debt policy under the assumption of non-state-
contingent debt for the cases of incomplete as well as for complete markets. This was
motivated by the fact that the literature until then had explored only under the
assumption of state-contingent debt, as seen on seminal work such as Lucas and
Stokey (1983) who assumes that debt is state-contingent in Arrow-Debreu complete
markets. This is also seen in the works of Chari, Christiano & Kehoe (1991 and 1994)
as well as in Chari and Kehoe (1999). Angeletos argument is on the basis that state-
contingent debt assumption is rather unrealistic. In Angeletos work the complete
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markets paradigm of optimal fiscal policy holds even for non-state-contingent debt
and that the maturity structure should be managed in advance, in order to hedge
against fiscal innovations, as this type of shocks result in an increase in real interest
rates and the maturity structure could be used to smooth this type of shocks.
Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) revised these works including some recent research
such as in Buera and Nicolini (2004). Their conclusion is that the Angeletos (2001)
and Buera and Nicolini (2004) complete market approach to debt management results
in implausible and unstable recommendations for optimal debt portfolios. The theory
of debt management has to focus not only in providing insurance against fiscal
innovations but also supplement with recognitions of capital market imperfections.
Debt management from an optimal taxation approach is reviewed by Missale (1997),
in this review of the literature is shown that the aim of this approach is to issue low
yielding debt instruments when times of low consumption growth and hence in times
of recession when tax revenues are lower and government spending higher than
expected. This approach shows that governments are not forced to increase taxes on
labour income when innovations on consumption and government spending occur.
Once more going back to the seminal paper of Lucas and Stokey (1983) in a model of
state-contingent securities they show that negative indexation of debt returns to
government spending shocks supports an efficient tax allocation from high to low
spending states and vice versa. However this approach does not address the effects
that the required risk premia will have on the governments’ cost of financing. In state-
contingent securities, an investor will expect now yields to pay less in times of low
consumption growth and pay more in times when aggregate marginal utility growth is
low with the subsequent increase in the risk premia.
An interesting view is the one taken by the so-called overlapping generations’ model,
as seen in Stiglitz (1983), Fischer (1983), Peled (1985), Pagano (1988) and Gale
(1990). Main findings are that long term debt enables intergenerational risk-sharing.
This works when innovations to consumption growth result in a negative productivity
shock which is insured by the elder generations.
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The need to link affine term structure models to fiscal theory of the price level and the
optimal taxation approach is because governments need to place new debt when bad
times arrive and the gains from surprising the market with systematic increases in
their budget deficits, unexpected tax increases or increasing the price level is likely to
be short lived and the costs of disappointing the representative investor long-lasting.
Barro (1995) shows how focused should be placed in the maturity of the debt
structure with the intention to match surpluses to repayments in order to reduce the
“roll-over” risk. Hence, in times when yields are high the government’s inter-
temporal budget deteriorates if new debt needs to be rolled-over or issued. This is
because macroeconomic shocks affecting the yield curve also have an effect on
government revenues and spending.
Section V. In progress for a novel theory
This section studies an optimal debt policy for a stochastic representative agent
economy, where government surplus is endogenous and stochastic function of a set of
macroeconomic variables, and financed either by taxes or public debt. This section
explores the case of non-contingent debt similar to Angeletos (2001), however it
differs from Angeletos’ research as it includes the possibility for governments to trade
current inflation for future inflation by issuing long term debt as in Cochrane (2001).
Therefore, the important contribution of this section to current research is that the
analysis is based for debt markets exhibiting multiple equilibria and thus being able to
move under certain states/events from a state of complete with complete information,
to a state of incomplete information with information asymmetries.
The intention is to give possibility for both, a “good” equilibria and a “bad” equilibria
under which for a given set of states or events it is possible to account for market
frictions such as transaction costs, widening and tightening of bid-offer spreads and
hence account for illiquidity but also account for a complete halt in trading known as
sovereign debt crisis. This happens when those who are long bonds do not wish to sell
so that they can avoid realising a loss and those who are short are only willing to buy
at prices which are too low for those holding long positions. This situation can stay as
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long as those who are long are still able to access funding and those who are short are
still able to borrow from other market participants at an optimum rate (repo rate or
bond borrow fee rate). However, these unfavourable market scenarios are expected to
result in an increase in the yields, particularly in the front end of the curve, with the
subsequent increase in the cost of financing, and this is magnified in the times of debt
roll-over and expected low consumption growth as well as expected future surplus
shocks.
It will be shown how government securities which are originally risk-free can become
risky assets when some of the equations shown from (11) to (16) become inequalities
due to market imperfections and information asymmetries.
To be more precise, let us assume that a representative investor does not know what
the surplus at time t is going to be and makes its expectations on a set of information
It. In addition, letΩ(It ) be a number of possible states in any single period; it could be
denoted ω0 = 0 for the initial state and Ω={1,…, Ω}, and a transition probability
function Φω,ω’ for moving from state ω to state ω’. Finally it can be denoted ωt-1≡
(ω0, …, ωt -1) and subset of Ωt-1 as the history at date t.
It could be possible to define the “good” and “bad” equilibrium by adapting (14). E.g.
in the good equilibrium, markets’ expectations are that governments will solvent
enough in order to pay redemptions:
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The “bad” equilibrium otherwise.
In addition, we could denote two types of prices PitBid and PjtAsk, for “bid” being the
prices at which the i-th investor would be willing to buy and “ask” the prices at which
the j-th investor would be willing to sell. For i ≠ j always. Notice that PitBid≤PjtAsk can
be assumed to hold always for a single investor but does not hold across investors
hence there is a probability that PBid = PAsk at which a transaction will take place.
There will be no trading if the probability p(PBid = PAsk) = 0. An if the bid-offer
spread defined as Ζt(PtAsk – PtBid) increases, then the probability p(PBid = PAsk) → 0. 
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Also notice that as bid-offer spread widens yields will irremediably increase with the
subsequent increase not only in the debt cost of financing but also increase in the debt
roll-over risk. Unequivocally, the bid-offer spread is a measure of transaction costs as
well as illiquidity.
From a present value identity point of view the “good” equilibrium will be if
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The “bad” equilibrium would be otherwise.
The theoretical analysis shown in (18) can be summarised under the affine term
structure model framework and be used as a general framework for debt policy and
debt management strategies. The aim is to integrate the latest developments on the
affine term structure literature into the theory of debt management for a model of
optimal fiscal policy. This work can be of interest to academics, economists, policy
makers as well as for practitioners particularly for the investment banking, insurance
and fund management industry. The intention is to contribute to a unifying theory of
the term structure of interest in relation to macroeconomic policy, and to present
empirical evidence using financial markets and macroeconomic data.
Section VI. Links to The Theory of Fragility of the Euro from De Grauwe (2013a,b)
In this thesis will link equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) to De Grauwe (2013a,b)
theory of the fragility of the Euro. This theory will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 4 under proposition 4. The theory of the fragility shows that shocks to the
above mentioned equations result in multiple equilibria mainly because of the
absence of a guarantee that enough funds will be available from the central bank to
member countries. The assumption here is that there is a cost and benefit of
defaulting on the debt and that investors account for this risk. In De Grauwe’s theory
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of the fragility shows that the benefit of defaulting in that the government can reduce
the interest burden on total debt outstanding and by doing so it will have to apply less
unpopular austerity, hence will have to reduce spending or increase taxes by less than
without default. This means that the state variables to calibrate the bonds will change,
depending on the outcome of this theory. If the government’s cost of defaulting is
larger than the benefit of defaulting, as the case of Germany bonds, the state space
vector will contain state variables which describe activity (unemployment and
consumer confidence indices), monetary aggregates (M3) and the price level (e.g.
PPI). However, if the government’s benefit of a default is larger than the cost of
defaulting on the debt then the state space vector will contain state variables which
describe the level of solvency of the country, hence the state variables used for
calibrating risky government bond assets will be the debt-to-GDP ratio, surplus-to-
GDP ratio and unemployment rates.
Figure 1-1 below show that there are mainly three groups of yields in the Euro-Zone:
1) one group is Greece, which exhibit yields which are clearly very sensitive to
movements in the Debt-to-GDP ratio; 2) Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, which
have suffered from intermediate solvency shocks which lead to spreads widening
during periods of multiple equilibria. Taking the Spanish yields as a representative
member of this group and comparing it with the Greek case below, it can be seen that
markets have had very different views of the two set of countries. 3) The last group
would be of those countries which have experienced rather small solvency shocks,
e.g. Germany, Netherland, France, Luxembourg and Belgium.
In general, the reader should notice that these shocks generate a structural break from
2008 and onwards, embracing the beginning of a new era for the Eurozone.
Figure 1-1. Yields and debt ratios from GIIPS Countries and Germany.
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Figure 1-2 depicts the Surplus-to-GDP ratio of GIIPS countries and Germany. Here
again, it can be seen that the levels observed for Greece are significant. However,
Spain gets very close to Greek levels towards the end of the period, what makes the
difference for the markets is that Spain has a much smaller Debt-to-GDP ratio
compared to Greece, as shown in figures 1-3.
Figure 1-2. Surplus as a % of GDP from GIIPS Countries and Germany.
This confirms the views of De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and De Grauwe (2011a,b), as it
can be seen in figure 1-3, how the sensitivity of the yields to solvency shocks will be
different depending on the initial debt level. Spain for instance, remains within the
50-70 per cent of Debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas Greece starts with debt levels between
80-90 per cent and grows to levels way above the 150 per cent of Debt-to-GDP ratio.
These results suggest that there is some incentive for governments to pursue a target
of Debt-to-GDP ratio, as failure to do so it could result in an intermediate or large
solvency shock, which in turn could further increase the cost of financing (see figure
1-4).
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Figure 1-3. The Case of Spain versus Greece Problem.
Figure 1-4 shows the existence of a structural change which appears to become more
evident since 2008. Since 2008 all GIIPSs countries exhibit a deterioration of the
Debt-to-GDP ratio and an increase in yields. A completely different picture is seen in
Germany; 1) the debt ratio grows at a steady level with no apparent structural break;
2) Yields decrease and, 3) debt ratio remains at 55-75 per cent range, thus remains at
low levels. Chapter 5 will calibrate German and Greek government bonds according
to discussions in this chapter and in chapter 4.
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Figure 1-4. 2Year Bond Yields versus Debt-to-GDP Ratios GIIP countries and Germany.
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Section VII. Links of the Fragility of the Eurozone to Illiquid Markets
This section shows how a liquid bond can become illiquid as a consequence of
solvency shocks on the government issuer. The liquidity supply curve depicts the
combination of prices and volumes at which a financial intermediate or an investor is
willing to exchange liquid for illiquid assets. Notice that by doing so the investor is
taking on the balance sheet a risky asset in exchange for liquidity. The model also
assumes that the price for liquidity is the bid-offer spread. If supply remains constant
and liquidity demand increases, the bid-offer spreads become wider, as shown in in
quadrants 1 and 2 (red highlighted). Figure 1-5 explains how shocks in the liquidity
demand will be different depending on the initial liquidity level of the market. For
instance, liquidity shocks in quadrant 1 have rather low effects on the bid-offer
spread, in contrast to liquidity shock in quadrant 2, where small liquidity shocks have
more than proportional increases in the bid-offer spread.
Figure 1-5. Market Dynamics and Illiquid Markets
Figure 1-6 show the effects of simultaneous shocks: 1) in the liquidity supply and 2)
in the liquidity demand. Here, this can result in a halt in trading with markets
breaking down as those who wish to sell cannot find any buyers and those willing to
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In normal market conditions, when liquidity supply is elastic, an increase in demand would, ceteris
paribus, have a less than proportional increase in the bid offer spread.
However and, as liquidity supply becomes inelastic, any increase in the demand for liquidity can only be
fulfilled at a price which increases more than proportionally.
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buy cannot find any sellers. This stems mostly out of discussion from equations (17)
and (18) of this chapter.
Figure 1-6. Contraction in the Supply of Liquidity.
Figure 1-7 shows that there is an apparent relationship between turnover and bid-offer
spreads. Here we analyse 50 bonds found in Bloomberg. It can be seen that the
greater the turnover the tighter the bid-offer spread. However, when turnover is low
the number of transactions exhibiting wider bid-offer spreads is higher. As
governments observe a solvency shock that is perceived by the markets to be
intermediate or large, it is more likely that there will be a fall in the liquidity supply
resulting in higher yields and in wider bid-offer spreads, as in discussion in figures 1-
5 and 1-6. The logical consequence is a decrease in turnover and eventually a halt in
trading as liquidity deteriorates.
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B
As liquidity supply contracts, the price for liquid assets becomes more expensive. Once liquidity contracts
further, there is a halt in trading, as supply does not meet demand any more, hence markets are not perfect and
positions become stale.
Those being long liquidity are reluctant to invest, as risk aversion arises and those with liquidity shortages
decide not to borrow as the price is too high.
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Figure 1-7. Final or closing bid-ask (bid-offer) spreads.
This thesis will not undertake research on bid-offer spreads and yields. However, this
is an area of interest and until now the use of bid-offer spreads as state variables for
calibrating an affine term structure model has not been performed. Here we would
like to indicate that this is a topic for future research which can have significant
follow-up potential.
In the next chapter, we will regress via OLS European yields using a state vector of
macroeconomic variables.
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There is a statistical relationship between bid-
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become larger, which possibly contributes to
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2. Theory of a Term Structure Model Applied to European Data
(violating the no-arbitrage condition)
Section I. Introduction
This essay is motivated by the fact that consumption based asset pricing models
despite being robust theoretically, they perform poorly empirically.
To overcome this, the model has been rearranged slightly replacing the usual
consumption data by unemployment data and a consumer confidence index to better
account for expectations. By doing so the model remains as a consumption based
model with all its theoretical properties. Another aspect is that the price level has
been added into the aggregate marginal utility function. Finally, the model also
includes the effects of changes in monetary aggregates on asset prices. An no-
arbitrage model is derived in this paper, using a state space system with an
observation equation which links observable yields to these macroeconomic variables
and a state equation which describes the dynamics of these variables. Expected
aggregate marginal utility growth is modelled using unemployment figures, consumer
confidence index and production price index. Money supply is modelled using
monetary aggregate M3. This essay is published in Jakas (2011).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In section II we recall the basic prising
equation to remind the reader how this looks like from a yield perspective. In section
III we discuss our model and show how unemployment, consumer confidence index
and the price level enter the aggregate marginal utility function and how money
supply is added to the basic pricing equation. Section IV outlines the empirical
process and we show how we go about testing our model. Sections V and VI we
discuss the data and present the results. Section VII we present some of the related
literature and in section VIII we conclude and present our final remarks.
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Section II. The Basic Asset Pricing Equation
The literature extensively documented the poor empirical results on consumption
based asset pricing models. A useful summary can be seen on Guvenen and Lustig
(2007) and Cochrane (2001).
It would be useful to start by recalling the basic asset pricing equation presented in
(1), which for the reader’s convenience will be reproduced below
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For Pt being the present value at time t, of an asset paying off xt+1, Et is the
expectations operator. βthe subjective discount factor and u´(c t+1) / u´(ct) being the
aggregate marginal utility growth which encapsulates investor’s first order condition
with respect to consumption and thus together with βcomprises the inter-temporal
marginal rate of substitution (Rubinstein, 1976; Lucas, 1978; Breeden, 1979).
According to the evidence, it appears that aggregate marginal utility growth using
solely consumption data appears to have poor explanatory power on asset prices. For
example, the arithmetical expectation of consumption growth as in (1) does not
necessarily mean that it encapsulates all information about consumers’ expectations
and their behaviour.
The intention is to deal with this problem, so it will be assumed that expected
aggregate marginal utility growth is a function of current unemployment plus another
variable which encapsulates consumers’ expectations. In addition, the new aggregate
marginal utility growth will be adjusted for the price level and for changes in
monetary aggregates.
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Recalling the basic pricing equation and assuming a 1 year zero coupon bond which
pays out 1 monetary unit at maturity, the investor’s first order condition for Et
conditional to an information set at time t, would yield:
   
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cu
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For y t
(N) representing the bond yields with maturity N at time t and It being agents’
information set at time t. Which for convenience it will be transformed to equation (2)
from chapter 1 which for the reader’s convenience it is reproduced again below:
   Nttt yImE  1log (2)
Equation (2) basically shows that the stochastic discount factor is the inverse of the
observable yields.
Section III. The Model
In an attempt to depict the idea that aggregate marginal utility growth is determined
by consumers’ confidence, unemployment, the price level and a monetary aggregate,
we would then propose the following identity:
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For consumption being:
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For Ut representing the unemployment rate, which should not get confused with the
utility function which is noted in this essay as u(c t). w is the nominal wage level,
which for the sake of simplicity it will be assumed to be constant but it does not have
to be that way. etC represents consumers’ expectations on their future consumption
growth determined by the consumer confidence index, Пt is the price level and stM
represents a monetary aggregate to account for money supply, for this case M3 (M4
for the UK equivalent). For our analysis it will be assumed that preferences follow a
log utility function with constant relative risk aversion as specified in the introductory
chapter in equation (3), which again for the reader’s convenience we reproduced
below as follows:
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Conditions (3) to (5) have the following implications:
1. We will start describing what we believe the effects of Ut – unemployment – have on
the yield curve. Unemployment is expected to have a negative relationship to risk-
free assets’ returns. And this is because an increase in unemployment results in a
decrease in expected future consumption growth and therefore, results in an increase
in aggregate marginal utility with the subsequent increase in the discount factor for
assets which are uncorrelated with consumption growth. From (3) we can see that an
increase in aggregate marginal utility results in an increase in the discount factor for
risk-free assets, and as a consequence, yields are expected to fall.
2. The improvements in consumers’ expectations about the future of the economy
should have a positive relationship to government yields. An improvement in
consumers’ expectations about the future results in an increase in expected future
consumption growth and therefore, results in a decrease in aggregate marginal utility
with the subsequent decrease in the discount factor for assets which are uncorrelated
with consumption growth such as government bonds. An improvement in consumers’
expectations results in a decrease in the discount factor for risk-free assets and as a
consequence risk-free assets’ yields are expected to rise.
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3. Points (1) and (2) have been relatively straight forward. However, the effects of the
price level on the yield curve are rather ambiguous. Hence, these effects are governed
by: a) two effects which move in opposite directions. Thus, the effect of the price
level on expected aggregate marginal utility growth and the effect of central banks
reaction as a consequence of increases in the price level. And b) these effects will be
determined by the segment or maturity we are at in the curve, as central banks have
only greater influence on the lower end of the curve, thus the money market curve
and lesser effects in the longer end, the capital markets curve. To describe this idea
better: an increase in the price level is expected to have a negative effect in expected
future consumption growth and is expected to increase future aggregate marginal
utility with the subsequent increase in the discount factor for assets which are
uncorrelated with consumption growth such as government bonds. As in Piazzesi
(2006), it is assumed throughout the paper that unfavourable change in the price level
is always bad news for consumption. Therefore an increase in the price level is
expected to result in a fall in e.g. government bond yields. However if the central
bank responses to increases in the price level is to increase interest rates, then yields
are expected to be positively correlated with the price level but only in the lower end
of the curve. Simply because central banks are more efficient in influencing the
money market curve than the capital markets. The effect throughout the curve will
depend on the elasticity of substitution between money and capital market
instruments. Thus, for those parts of the curve where money markets are perfect
substitutes of capital markets, i.e. presumably up to the 2 to 3 year maturities, changes
in the yield curve are expected to be more influenced by monetary policy reaction to
changes in the price level rather than changes in expected aggregate marginal utility
growth. The elasticity of substitution is expected to dissipate as maturity increases
and money market instruments elasticity of substitution become inelastic. As
elasticity of substitution between money markets and capital markets become more
inelastic the longer the maturities, the yield curve is governed rather by changes in
expected aggregate marginal utility growth than by central banks policy reaction to
expected changes in the price level.
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4. By adjusting the stochastic discount factor to a monetary aggregate indicator we
intend to account for these effects described in Turnovsky (1989). Assuming that the
price level remains unchanged, an expansionary monetary policy will result in
increases in asset prices with the subsequent fall in yields, as a consequence of an
increase in real money balances. For central banks, to be able to apply an
expansionary monetary policy they need to either, relax reserves requirements,
increase money supply via open market operations, acquire government debt
securities and therefore inject additional quantity of money in the financial system, all
this drives to asset price increases particularly government bonds. An increase in real
money balances increases the quantity of money available for speculative purposes,
which results in rising asset prices. Risk-free assets such as government bonds are
expected to be affected up to the level that the elasticity of substitution between
money markets and capital markets allows it to. On the longer end of the government
curve, movements in monetary aggregates are expected to dissipate. This is because
in our model monetary aggregates do not enter into the aggregate marginal utility
function and therefore, have little effects on risk-free assets which are expected to act
as hedges during bad times, when consumption growth is expected to be low. In this
model, if an expansionary monetary policy results in an increase in consumption, due
to a rise in real money balances, this would have no effect on asset prices, as these
increases are assumed to be offset by increases in the consumer price levels. In fact,
with this model we are able to show that if the price level is independent to increases
in monetary aggregates, it would mean that an expansionary monetary policy affect
asset prices.
The model now asserts that if the price level is expected to remain unchanged and
there is an expected increase in money supply, asset prices are expected to rise. This
is because there is an increase in real money balances which results in a decrease in
yields. However this could be seen from a different perspective: if the quantity of
money increases, and this increase results in increases in real money balances for
speculative purposes rather than for increases in consumption growth, money could
be seen as to have lost value against other assets (particularly risky assets) as the
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quantity of money has increased at a greater rate than the quantity of risky assets. The
paradigm here is that the price level will not always necessarily increase due to
increases in the quantity of money and as long as the increase in the quantity of
money has no effect in consumption growth, there is no reason to believe that could
have an effect in the price level measured by consumer price indices. Therefore,
money has lost value against other assets, whilst maintaining its purchasing power
against consumption goods.
The idea that money supply is a determinant of asset prices is not new, see for
example Kindleberger (1978) and Allen and Gale (2000). In recent cases, asset prices
have risen due to for what it appears to have been an expansion in credit, e.g.
following financial liberalisation. Another example is the rise in real estate and stock
prices that occurred in Japan in the late 1980’s. Once the BoJ decided to tackle
inflation with sharp increases in interest rates – with the subsequent reduction in
money supply by imposing reserves requirements –, asset prices fell dramatically.
Similar effects were observed in Scandinavian countries.
These examples suggest a relationship between credit or money supply and the rise in
asset prices.
Therefore, in the wake of these events it seems plausible to take monetary aggregates
into account. So recalling (1) and (5) and accounting for a logarithmic utility function
and log prices, nominal yields can be specified as:
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Transforming (6) for all state space components discussed from (3) to (5) into their
natural logarithms, and assuming normality we obtain:
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For stm 1 , 1 tu , etc 1 and 1 t being the rate of change in monetary supply,
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Equation (7) shows how an increase in the volatility results in falling yields for a risk-
free asset, which is supposed to hedge in times of low consumption growth. This can
be seen in the last term. Hence, if any components comprising the marginal utility
growth become more volatile and result in a higher volatility for expected future
consumption growth, risk-free assets are expected to experience a fall in yields as a
result of the precautionary savings effect seen on the variance term from (7).
Notice that changes in the price level can be positive or negative depending on the
level of substitution between money market and capital market instruments. So
adapting equation (7) to discussions in the introductory chapter 1 equation (8) and
accounting for an elasticity of substitution our model would boil down to,
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The elasticity of substitutionεt+i who affects the price level coefficient term under (1 -
ε(N) ) measures the degree of substitution between two instrument types: the money
market instruments and capital market instruments (e.g. 2 year maturity repos and 2
year government securities). As maturities become longer, the elasticity of
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substitution becomes inelastic so that the sign changes as εt+i gets closer to 0. If
elasticity equals 1, instruments become perfect substitutes (perfectly elastic) and the
price level is neutral because the effect of the central bank reaction to changes in the
price level is exactly off-set by the effect resulting from shocks from the aggregate
utility function. If elasticity is greater than 1, elasticity is said to be very elastic and
therefore, the curve movements will be mainly govern by central bank policy and less
by aggregate marginal utility growth.
Why are we differentiating only for the case of the price level? Because of central
banks open market operations. For the cases of unemployment and consumer
confidence we assume that there is rather no effective intervention adding extra
shocks into the model. Now for the case of the price level it is virtually impossible to
ignore money market shocks resulting from these interventions and spreading
throughout the curve.
Clearly, as maturity increases, the variance of the discount factor is expected to fall
by a rate of 1/(2N) as shown in (8). Another aspect from (7) and (8) is that a volatile
monetary policy is expected to have negative effect on risk-free-assets’ yields.
Recalling that risk-free assets act as a hedge for consumption growth, it could be
understood from this that a volatile monetary policy could have a negative effect on
consumption growth, and as a result risk-free asset yields are expected to fall with the
subsequent increase in risk-free asset prices.
One of the shortcomings seen in (7) and (8) is the assumption of investors’
homoscedastic expectations. This is only for convenience, as it does not necessarily
have to be this way.
Section IV. The Empirics
For empirical analysis, equations (3) to (8) can be summarised together into a state
space system similar to Piazzesi (2010). These specifications are put together with an
observation equation which links observable yields to the state vector and a state
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equation which describes the dynamics of the state as discussed in equations (9) and
(10) of preceding chapter section 1. However, in this essay we violate the no-
arbitrage condition as yields are separately regressed to a vector of state variables. A
no-arbitrage version of an affine model will be estimated at a later point.
Section V. The Data
This empirical work is based on monthly European macroeconomic data particularly
from the ECB and Eurostat available in Bloomberg. EONIA, Euribor and German
government yields have been obtained from Bloomberg. Most of the data series is
only available since 1998. This makes this analysis difficult, hence for lack of longer
time series. The data points for the macroeconomic data are assumed to be released at
every end of month. The day of the month at which the data is released is not relevant
on a monthly basis analysis. We have tested this and results remain unaffected. The
period considered is from January 1999 until July 2008. This results in 114
observations and 9 regressions for each of the yields comprising EONIA for the
overnight rate, Euribor 3 months, Euribor 6 months and the German government
securities for 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 years.
Section VI. Empirical Results
Table 2-1 below shows the regression results from chapter 1 equation [9]. Strikingly,
almost all coefficients are significantly different from zero and the model also appears
to perform well in predicting interest rates and yields. R-Squared falls as maturities
increases. On average, we observed an upward sloping yield curve starting with an
average overnight rate of the period of 3.06% up to 4.66% for a 30 year German
government bond. Results also show that the lower end of the curve is far more
volatile than the longer end. The lower end exhibiting a standard deviation of 1.20
compare to 0.61 and 0.63 for 15 and 30 year government bonds. Most importantly,
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the majority of the coefficients confirm our expectations as in [7] and [8] as well as
discussions in section 3 points 1) to 4).
Figure 2-1 shows the observed versus the estimated values for EONIA rate, the
Euribor three months, as well as German Government bonds 5 years and 30 years
respectively (GBRD 5Yr and GBRD 10Yr). The model predicts fairly well the lower
end of the curve and, with less accuracy but still with success, the longer end. Notice,
that we are not using the lagged value of any endogenous variable to obtain these
yields hence, we are inferring these values purely from our macro data via OLS. This
is important, because most of the models until now have included and AR(1) with a
lag of the endogenous variable, this gave these authors good results for obvious
reasons.
Figure 2-2 shows the coefficients from the explanatory variables plotted as a function
of the maturities. Notice how the coefficients for the consumer confidence index and
monetary aggregate M3 dissipate away as maturity increases. In fact, coefficients
become less significant for the longer end of the curve, as seen in table 1. Thus, as the
time horizon increases, the effects of changes in consumer confidence and the
quantity of money have lower predictive power. This makes sense, as not many of us
make consumption decisions under an investment horizon greater than 10 years.
Similarly, monetary shocks fall dramatically during the first 5 years maturities
confirming that monetary aggregates will have only effects on the lower end of the
curve.
The price level, which is in this case measured by the Production Price Index, exhibits
a positive relationship to yields in the lower end of the curve. Not surprisingly, this
relationship reverts as maturities become longer. This is in line with our discussion as
in [7] and [8] as well as in section 3 points 3) to 4). Notice how the five year maturity
is not affected by the price level at all. Again, as maturities greater than the 5 years
are less affected by monetary policy shocks and more influenced by movements in
aggregate marginal utility growth. Below the 5 years maturities, changes in the price
level are positively correlated to yields. This is because asset prices are here rather
influenced by monetary policy shocks than changes in aggregate marginal utility
growth.
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Table 2-1. EONIA, Euribor Rates, and the German Government Yield Curve as Proxies for the Term Structure of Interest Rates.
51
This could also mean simply that interest rates or yields in the lower end of the curve
are rather influenced by central bank policy responses to this particular index (PPI).
Yields or interest rates on the longer end exhibit a negative relationship to current
price level data, because the market knows that central bank will increase interest
rates and as result expected future changes in the price level will fall with the
subsequent decrease in yields. This is important, because contrary to the controversial
results presented by Cook and Hahn (1989) this evidence predicts that increases in the
central bank policy rates as a consequence of a contractionary monetary policy would
immediately lower long-term nominal interest rates. In general, the effects of the
price level on the term structure of interest rates appears to us, at least for the period
analysed, to be in line with discussions outlined under section 3, points 3 and 4.
The monetary aggregate M3, the price level and unemployment account for the main
drivers moving the lower end of the curve. However, only the price level and
unemployment are persistent and their effects do not die away with longer maturities.
A reason why these variables are persistent can be explained by unemployment and
shocks in the price level having a persistent effect on aggregate consumption and
investors being averse to persistence, as Piazzesi (2006) asserts, aversion to
persistence generates concerns on future consumption when bad news arrives.
In general, our model predictions become poorer as maturity increases as seen in
lower correlation coefficients as well as by increasing residual sum of squares,
despite the fact that the standard deviation of the dependent variables decreases with
longer maturities. The model, would on average, predict an upward sloping yield
curve, as shown for higher observed mean of dependent variables. This is because the
price level and unemployment coefficients are persistent throughout the yield curve
and under normality these two effects account for an upward sloping yield curve,
whereas consumer confidence and monetary aggregate shocks die away as maturities
become longer.1
1 Due to the existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity issues (see Table 1) autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity consistent regressions were performed. Results do not differ to those already
presented in Table I, therefore have been omitted here.
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Figure 2-1. Comparison of benchmark model using OLS versus observed values .
Figure 2-2. Estimated OLS for B(N)/N coefficients using equation (11).
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Figures 2-3 and 2-4 we analyse the impulse response function after running a VAR
using 2 lags and 25 steps (each step represents an interval of 1 month) on the EONIA
and the 5 Yr German Government bond yields. For example, it can we seen that an
increase in the orthogonalised shock to the exogenous variable production prices (i.e.
the proxy for the price level shown in the graph under the variable name
D.pptxemu_ix) causes a short series of increases in the EONIA (shown in the graph
under the variable name D.eonia_ix) that dies out in less than 5 months. Not
surprisingly, the same increase in the orthogonalised shock to the price level –instead-
generates a short series of decreases in the 5year Government bond yields that,
similarly, dies out in less than 5 months. It can also be seen that ECB money supply
M3 (D.Lecmsm3_ix) and EU unemployment have greater effect on the 5year German
Government bond yields than on the EONIA rate. This is very important because it
means that now we know that for a given macroeconomic environment, the yield
curve is either expected to flatten, steepen or to twist which hence, has implications
from a public debt policy as well as from a trading strategy point of view. As this can
help reduce governments’ debt roll-over risk, as well as shape sovereign debt
portfolio trading or investment strategies.
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Figure 2-3 Impulse response analysis on the EONIA rate
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Figure 2-4. Impulse response analysis on the 5 year German government bond
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So far most of the empirical literature has been focused on testing Taylor-Rules for the
US Federal Reserve, as for example in Hamalainen (2004). See also Battini and Haldane
(1999) and Clarida et al (1999, 2002).
Figures 2-5 and 2-6 repeats the regressions with robust standard errors and we update our
data until September 2012, hence increasing our sample to 154 months. We also test
these macro-factors with other European government bond yields. All countries, with the
exception of Greece exhibit upwards sloping yields curves. In all cases yield volatility
falls as maturities increase. Greece and Portugal exhibit the largest sensitivities to these
macro-factors. For the cases of Spain and Italy, the variance is mostly explained by
natural logs of PPI and M3, whereas Germany instead is more sensitive to
unemployment. Spanish and Italian government bond yields are positively correlated to
unemployment for the long maturities only, indicating that these are risky assets, as they
perform better when unemployment is low. Greek and Portuguese government bond
yields are all risky, as all these yields exhibit a positive correlation to unemployment rate.
Coefficients on PPI are positive for all bond yields, with the exception of the medium and
long term German yields. R2 shows that macro-factors for GIIPSs countries have less
predictive ability compared to German and money market yields.
Table 2-2. OLS model: Yields versus Macro-Factors for Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal.
Germany 2 Y 5 Y 10 Y 15 Y 20 Y 30 Y
LnU t -8.2575
(.3662)
-6.3314
(.3792)
-4.2146
(.3244)
-4.0705
(.3213)
-3.7366
(.3134)
-3.3468
(.3285)
LnPPI t 4.517
(1.354)
-2.8580
(1.447)
-4.2146
(1.2668)
-4.6346
(1.3310)
-5.9063
(1.2731)
-5.9705
(1.3056)
LnM3 t -3.5281
(.5592)
-.9371
(.5821)
-.20975
(.5022)
-.3995
(.5388)
.1215
(.5128)
.1572
(.5259)
LnCC t 3.4493
(.4797)
2.7454
(.4978)
1.6208
(.4365)
0.1131
(.4553)
-.09345
(.4375)
0.3061
(.4484)
Intercept 15.804
(2.658)
26.4275
(2.8097)
31.5144
(2.5159)
37.5344
(2.6241)
39.1804
(2.5907)
39.3726
(2.5481)
R2 0.9427 0.9125 .9451 .8408 .8292 .8465
ˆ 2.6872 3.2254 3.8008 4.0759 4.2675 4.3236
ˆ 1.3998 1.1973 0.9721 0.8916 0.8510 0.9029
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Spain 2 Y 5 Y 10 Y 15 Y 20 Y 30 Y
LnU t -2.375
(.4454)
0.3867
(.4300)
-2.3333
(.3488)
3.1515
(.3455)
n.a. 3.3694
(.3106)
LnPPI t 24.656
(1.196)
22.137
(1.8489)
18.9491
(1.2668)
19.1706
(1.4037)
n.a. 16.735
(1.4037)
LnM3 t -9.5350
(.7769)
-8.6828
(.7264)
-7.6973
(.4919)
-7.6908
(.5623)
n.a. -6.9484
(.5013)
LnCC t 3.0376
(.5756)
1.678
(.6276)
.2907
(.5342)
0.055
(.5417)
n.a. -0.0332
(.4475)
Intercept -34.662
(3.947)
-29.8792
(4.1756)
-21.3006
(3.6651)
-22.3675
(3.7099)
n.a. -18.007
(3.1046)
R2 0.7635 0.5976 0.4963 .4836 n.a. .4926
ˆ 3.255 3.9208 4.5482 4.8146 n.a. 5.0596
ˆ 1.0045 .8392 .7699 0.8258 n.a. 0.7652
Greece 2 Y 5 Y 10 Y 15 Y 20 Y 30 Y
LnU t 149.63
(35.06)
52.68
(7.95)
34.46
(2.9212)
29.71
(2.4887)
25.2688
(2.531)
23.1213
(2.0416)
LnPPI t 829.58
(189.5)
253.92
(42.32)
147.264
(14.35)
126.7891
(11.60)
109.234(1
0.283)
98.2778
(8.7094)
LnM3 t -299.21
(71.06)
-87.85
(15.96)
-49.71
(5.5155)
-43.108
(4.4520)
-37.73
(3.9321)
-34.45
(3.3385)
LnCC t -92.746
(34.24)
-17.561
(8.2475)
-6.7507
(3.579)
-7.1850
(3.0282)
-7.066
(2.6487)
-7.0496
(2.3771)
Intercept -1085.5
(247.8)
-425.21
(52.875)
-278.81
(19.906)
-230.42
(18.0696)
-189.12
(16.114)
-161.57
(15.2501)
R2 0.5367 0.6749 0.7956 0.79583 0.7817 0.7815
ˆ 11.569 7.209 7.4403 7.2641 7.105 6.9819
ˆ 32.394 9.5734 6.5938 6.6595 4.8946 4.3406
Italy 2 Y 5 Y 10 Y 15 Y 20 Y 30 Y
LnU t -3.5628
(.5012)
-.6426
(.4467)
1.0464
(.3287)
1.7208
(.3242)
1.8713
(.3360)
1.8974
(.2885)
LnPPI t 26.663
(2.469)
24.06
(2.184)
18.084
(1.621)
17.2779
(1.6415)
16.8346
(1.7081)
14.5199
(1.4644)
LnM3 t -10.69
(.9519)
-9.8192
(.8587)
-7.6051
(.6619)
-6.9058
(.6461)
-7.0617
(.6764)
-6.3079
(.5859)
LnCC t 1.0679
(.7132)
-0.3194
(.6959)
-1.1171
(.5377)
-1.0678
(.5504)
-1.7275
(.5659)
-1.5602
(.4856)
Intercept -22.26
(4.591)
-17.4717
(4.394)
-8.9168
(3.436)
-8.1509
(3.468)
-6.5630
(3.5236)
-3.2141
(3.184)
R2 0.7153 0.5515 0.4434 0.4008 0.3857 0.3823
ˆ 3.2746 3.9702 4.635 4.9386 5.1059 5.2279
ˆ 1.0723 .8756 0.6979 0.6934 0.7239 0.6559
Portugal 2 Y 5 Y 10 Y 15 Y 20 Y 30 Y
LnU t 9.5601
(1.965)
12.889
(1.6710)
11.209
(1.0046)
11.3535
(1.0494)
n.a. 7.9871
(0.6038)
LnPPI t 84.443
(10.47)
81.004
(8.778)
58.49
(5.0182)
57.47
(5.3640)
n.a. 39.91
(2.771)
LnM3 t -29.166
(.6301)
-27.97
(3.386)
-20.47
(1.9418)
-19.93
(1.9418)
n.a. -14.06
(1.0667)
LnCC t .6301
(2.682)
-.6086
(2.3436)
-.9122
(1.3952)
-.7776
(1.4371)
n.a. -.001
(0.8017)
Intercept -151.62
(17.36)
-147.41
(14.02)
-104.29
(8.4566)
-105.16
(8.5927)
n.a. -72.151
(5.322)
R2 0.5991 0.7004 0.7498 0.7378 n.a. 0.7388
ˆ 4.401 5.055 5.4058 5.5496 n.a. 5.3793
ˆ 3.2836 3.174 2.3348 2.3620 n.a. 1.6126
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Table 2-3. OLS, Robust for Money Market Yields vs. Macroeconomic Data (Dec 1999 to Sep 2012)
Money
Market
Eonia 1 Week 2 Week Eur3M Eur6M
LnU t -10.003
(.1642)
-8.6905
(.1957)
-8.6454
(.1872)
-10.7142
(.2805)
-10.0962
(.3048)
LnPPI t 14.418
(.6887)
13.991
(.9589)
13.909
(.9435)
16.941
(.9933)
16.964
(1.1167)
LnM3 t -7.5101
(.2913)
-6.7280
(.4129)
-6.6755
(.4071)
-7.6538
(.4242)
-7.3139
(.47845)
LnCC t -.1352
(.2660)
-.2691
(.3424)
-.0534
(.3274)
-.5882
(.4454)
.04398
(.4955)
Intercept 24.881
(1.874)
17.741
(2.3910)
16.5903
(2.3351)
18.3189
(2.5269)
11.1226
(2.7609)
R2 0.9756 0.9427 .9451 .9529 .9388
ˆ 2.4389 2.5534 2.5515 2.7140 2.8233
ˆ 1.434 1.2155 1.2176 1.3983 1.3330
Section VII. Related literature
So far most of the empirical literature has been focused on testing Taylor-Rules for the
US Federal Reserve, as for example in Hamalainen (2004). See also Battini and Haldane
(1999) and Clarida et al (1999, 2002).
Bernanke (2002) analyses the use broader set of information instead of the usual Taylor-
Rules framework for analysing monetary policy, as most of the empirical literature has
been mainly confined to a limited amount of information, merely output and the price
level.
Studies on empirical reaction functions of the ECB can be seen in Hayo and Hofmann
(2003), Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003), Gerlach-Kirsten (2003) and Gerlach and
Schnabel (1999). Most of these works lack of investigation of real ECB policy reaction
function. Fendel (2007) studies the ECB reaction function using monthly data based
merely on a Taylor-Rule framework. In his work, the ECB reaction function is confined
to the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA) representing the overnight policy
rate, the Harmonised Index for Consumer Prices (HICP) as the inflation for Euro-Zone
and output proxy taken from the Industrial Production Index for the Euro Area. The
EONIA is not the Policy Rate (PR) however it would be expected to fluctuate around the
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PR. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that it would not be optimum otherwise and
hence, the ECB will have enough incentives to ensure that the EONIA fluctuates around
its PR and ensure effectiveness of its monetary policy.
Hence, resent studies have been focused in analysing monetary policy by including the
central bank reaction function in a small empirical macro model of inflation and output,
most of it US data (see, for example also, Rudebusch, 2000, Rudebusch and Svensson,
1999 as well as Mc Callum, 19949). Ang and Piazzesi (2003) show how macro-variables
add to the understanding of yield curve movements. In fact, from a European perspective,
the ECB (as well as the majority of central banks) is likely to analyse a significant
number of time series not only confined to the above mentioned ones. This essay
analyses a variety of macroeconomic data releases for the Euro-Zone and examines their
effect on the EONIA rate via a reaction function for the ECB. The macroeconomic data
analysed here is not confined only to the inflation and output. We also include additional
variables such as unemployment as well as consumer confidence indices, the price level
and central bank monetary aggregates as suggested by Christiano and Rostagno (2001),
King (2002) and Nelson (2003)
Section VIII. Conclusions and Final Remarks
This paper presents slight adjustments to the classical consumption based asset pricing
models by introducing unemployment data and survey data such as consumers’
confidence index. The incorporation of a monetary aggregate has also been extensively
discussed in this paper and its inclusion in the model appears to us to be robust enough.
This paper has also tested empirically an affine term structure model which has been
adapted to the above mentioned data. We have shown that using current theoretical
developments and a few state space variables such as European unemployment data, the
European Consumers’ Confidence Index, European Production Price Index (PPI) and a
monetary aggregate such as ECB M3 for Europe, it is possible to explain yield curve
movements with strikingly very good results, particularly for the German bond yields.
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With respect to the German bond yields, unemployment and consumer confidence index
have exhibited a shift and a slope effect on the yield curve, for front-end yields moving
faster than in the long end. Production price index has a twist effect on the yield curve
(flattening or steepening of the curve) which results in lower-end yields shifting in
opposite directions to the long end. This empirical work shows that yields are negatively
correlated to money supply, as expected in classical IS-LM models. And that money
supply exhibits a slope effect, with the lower end of the curve shifting faster than the
longer end. In the light of these results, we suggest that further analysis is needed to
understand what other variables or mechanisms are governing the longer end of the
curve, as for the lower end our results show that the variables used have very high
predictive ability already. In addition, we also suggest further research on cross-sectional
data across non-EU countries. In this essay we have used macroeconomic data to explain
yield curve movements and we show that GIIPS yields are more sensitive to
macroeconomic shocks compared to the German benchmark. In fact, we see that most of
the GIIPS bond yields –in contrast to the German benchmark- exhibit positive
coefficients for the unemployment rate. Indicating that governments’ cost of financing
will be penalised when unemployment increases. This means that these governments
cannot undertake counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus by issuing new debt in times of low
consumption growth and high unemployment.
61
3. Introductory Notes on Affine Term Structure Models: Continuous
Time Approach
Section I. Introduction and Motivation
The intention of this essay is mainly to detail some theoretical aspects as well as some of
the algebra discussed in affine term structure models which are usually missing in most
of the literature. This chapter can be of particular interest for those requiring an
introductory session on affine term structure models or as lecture notes for an
introductory course in continuous time affine term structure literature. Thus authors take
for granted that the reader is already familiar with the notation and most of the literature
gives the impression that it has been written only for a particular audience. Here, the
basic asset pricing equation is discussed, as well as the marginal rate of substitution, the
notation of the constant relative risk aversion, the holding period returns and the
relationship between consumption asset pricing models and affine term structure models
are all discussed and hence, this essay links these with detail algebra for the analytical
solution under Vasicek (1976) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). Also results are
compared to those seen in Cochrane (2005, pp. 368-379), Duffie and Kan (1996)
Singleton (2006, pp. 311-334) and Piazzesi (2010, pp.691-758), as these are examples of
authoritative literature in this topic. This essay comprises the foundation work from the
paper published in Jakas and Jakas (2013) which will presented in chapter 6.
This paper is organised as follows: section II discusses the basic asset pricing equation, in
section III it is shown how the pricing equation for returns is obtained from the stochastic
discount factor, section IV links discussions from sections II and III to the holding period
return. Section V we show the solution under the Vasicek (1977) process and section VI
links asset returns to a state space system with an observation equation. In a similar
fashion section VII develops the pricing equations under the Cox et al (1985) process.
Section VIII a more generalised version under a multifactor setup is specified which
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accounts for a k-vector of state variables and accounts for the possibility of combining the
two processes explained in sections V and VII.
Section II. The Basic Asset Pricing Equation
The aim of this section is to discuss the relationship between the basic asset pricing
equation, the marginal rate of substitution, the stochastic discount factor and yields.
It would be useful to start by recalling the basic asset pricing equation as, e.g. in
Cochrane (2005, page 4), which shows that asset prices are a function of expected future
aggregate marginal utility growth, which boils down to:
 
 







  11 t
tc
tc
tt Rcu
cu
EP  (1)
For Pt being the present value at time t, of an asset paying-off Rt+1, Et is the expectations
operator. Βthe subjective discount factor and uc(ct+1)/uc(ct) being the aggregate marginal
utility growth, defined as the quotient of the first derivatives of the utility function u(ct)
with respect to ct+1 and c t, which in (1) the uc(ct+1) is used in order to notate for ∂u(ct+1)/
∂c t+1.
Assuming a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
u(ct) = ct(1-γ) /(1-γ)
it would result in
uc(ct) = c t-γso that uc(ct+1)/uc(ct) = (ct+1 / ct )-γ.
The literature often identifies from (1) two main components, the stochastic pay-offs Rt+1
and the so-called stochastic discount factor mt+1 which is usually presented as follows
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 
tc
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cu
m 11

 (2)
Notice that (2) could be rewritten under expectations and define the discount factor as
(3)
For yt (N) the yield for a zero coupon bond with maturity N in time t. For the time being
and without loss of generality it will be assumed that N = 1 and hence, for convenience
(3) will be transformed to:
   1log  tNt mEy (4)
Now following Rubinstein (1976) and Lucas (1978) (4) could be rewritten as
   ttNt ImEy 1log  (4.a)
Where It denotes the representative agent’s information set on time t upon which
expectations are conditioned in determining the yields. In other words, (4) can be
interpreted as a set of yields that are contingent on the realizations of the variables in the
information set It observed at time t. Now all is needed is just to specify the functional
form for (4).
A note on continuous time perspective of the stochastic discount factor:
The stochastic discount factor from a continuous time perspective will be tracked from a
level perspective instead of a growth perspective. This is only because uc(ct+1)/uc(ct) does
not behave well when dt is small.
   
 Ny
tc
tc
tt
N
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cu
cu
EmE  

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

 11 
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So tracking the level instead of the growth of the aggregate marginal utility would mean
that (2) will rather be like in (2.a) below
tct cu (2.a)
This is simply because it is easier to integrate
 dscuP
s
stctt 



0

Than to integrate
 




0s tc
stc
t dscu
cu
P
Equation (2.a) will be revisited later, as it will be needed for the analytical solution on the
Vasicek affine term structure model.
Section III. The Basic Pricing Equation for Asset Returns
In this section it is shown how the basic pricing equation for asset returns is obtained, for
more details the reader can refer either to Cochrane’s Asset Pricing (2005), pages 25 or
Singleton’s Empirical Dynamic Asset Pricing (2006), page 8.
Equation (4) basically shows that the log-stochastic discount factor for a bond paying off
1 unit at maturity is the inverse of the observable yields.
The stochastic discount factor is not observable, however the yields are. So if the above
holds true, the stochastic discount factor can be estimated from observable yields.
Now summarising by substituting (2) in (1) yields
 11  tttt RmEP (5)
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Using the definition of covariance2 on (5) and assuming that the asset pays-off 1
monetary unit at maturity would imply that
  )()(cov1 1111   ttttttt REmERm (6)
Knowing that Rft+1 = 1 / Et [mt+1], 3 replacing on (6) and rearranging yields the expected
return of an asset which is the risk-free rate plus a risk adjustment.
 111 cov)(   tttfftt RmRRRE (7)
Rearranging (7) into continuous time perspective can be presented something like that4:
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For rtf being log(Rft+1). Notice that here is noted dΛt instead but simply because of the
comments made on the note for equation (2.a). Equation (8) will be revisited later but
before it is still necessary to understand the relationship between (8) and the holding
period return. This is because (8) neither says anything about the data generating process
or how returns behave as a stochastic process and it neither explains how returns change
as a consequence of changes from one maturity to the next.
Section IV. The Holding Period Return (hpr)
In this section main concern focuses on the relationship between the basic equation for
asset returns and the so-called holding period return. The aim is to introduce a stochastic
process and apply Ito’s Lemma to obtain the fundamental differential equation for bonds.
2 )()()()cov( yExExyExy  :       111111cov   tttttt REmERmERm
3 This can be easily seen in (3) by taking Rt+1 out of the expectations operator and replacing it for Rft+1 and
by assuming that Pt = 1.
4 See J. Cochrane, Asset Pricing, Revised Edition, Chapter I, pages 25-29 for more details.
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First the holding period return is defined. Secondly, the hpr is combined with the basic
equation for asset returns already discussed in section III. Finally, the fundamental
differential equation for bonds is derived by introducing Ito’s Lemma. The fundamental
differential equation for bonds is needed in order to solve via ordinary differential
equation the yields from (4.a) for different maturities. This will be presented in section V
where this is applied to Vasicek’s stochastic process and in section VII for the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross (1985a,b) case.
The concept of the holding period return hpr can be defined as the change in the price of
a bond being bought at t = 0 with maturity, let’s say N =1, and held to t = 1 which is
when N = 0. So that hpr can be specified as
   
 tNP
tNPttNNP
hpr
,
,,  (9)
This is solved via a series for a function of two variables so that
        t
t
tNPN
N
tNPtNPttNNP 

 ,,,, (10)
Substituting (10) into (9) results
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,
1,
,
1 (11)
Now because in the limit the assumption is that ∆t, ∂t and ∆N → dt, and, if hpr is
represented as a function of changes in t, so that substituting accordingly, hence ∆N, ∆t
and ∂t by dt gives the equation for the holding period return as follows:
 
   
 tNP
tNP
dt
N
tNP
tNP
hpr
,
,,
,
1 
 (12)
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So now that the holding period return specified in (12) as well as the basic pricing
equation (8) have been obtained all is need is to put them together which results in the
fundamental pricing equation applied to fixed income securities, which satisfies
 
   
   
  







 





t
t
t
f
tt
d
tNP
tNdP
Edtr
N
tNP
tNPtNP
tNdP
E
,
,,
,
1
,
, (13)
From what has been learned from (12), and adapted to (8) the reader should notice –for
notation’s sake– that Pt is now noted as P(N,t) from here onwards.
Introducing a stochastic process and Ito’s Lemma to the fundamental pricing equation for
fixed income securities
Now (13) will be rearranged by making an assumption for a stochastic process for
dP(N,t) and, Itos’ Lemma.
It will be assumed that all time dependence stems for state variable x and assume that x
behaves according to the following stochastic process, this is the univariate
case under Vasicek thus,
dzdtdx xx   (14)
And for µx being a drift of a mean, σx is the standard deviation and dz a Brownian motion.
The intention is to specify a stochastic process for dP(N,t) so that revisiting Ito’s Lemma,
and for the reader not familiar with the detail, it has been summarised as:
 22
2
2
1
dx
x
P
dx
x
P
dP 

 (15)
And replacing dx for a Vasicek process discussed in (14)
   2
2
2
2
1 dzdt
x
Pdzdt
x
PdP xxxx  


 (16)
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And applying Ito to (16), hence dt, dz and dz2= dt and that dt ∙dz and dt2 = 0, so that
rearranging and resolving yields
dz
x
P
dt
x
P
x
P
dP xxx  







 22
2
2
1 (17)
Substituting (17) into the fundamental pricing equation applied to fixed income securities
as in (13), but before doing that it is convenient to rearrange (13) by collecting the term
on the right with the first term on the left hand side of the equation, so that:
 
 
 
   
  0,
,
1
,
,
,
, 


 






 dtr
N
tNP
tNPtNP
tNdPd
tNP
tNdPE ft
t
t
t (18)
And now here comes again another assumption, because it is not known how the
stochastic discount factor behaves, thus it will be assumed in a similar fashion to Duffie
and Kan (1996), that:
dzxdtd 
  (19)
Rearranging (18) a bit and substituting as in (19) boils down to:
 
    
  0,
,
11
,
, 


 




   dtrN
tNP
tNP
dzxdt
tNP
tNdPE ftt  (20)
Now substituting as per Ito see from (17) into (20) results in
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 
   
 
 
 
 
0
,
,
1
1
,
,
2
1,
,
1
2
2
2



 




































dtr
N
tNP
tNP
dzxdt
dz
x
tNP
dt
x
tNP
x
tNP
tNP
E
f
t
x
xx
t 


(21)
Once more if the reader remembers that dt, dz and dz2= dt and that E[dz2], dt ∙dz and dt2
= 0, so that resolving yields
 
     
 
  0,
,
1
,,
2
1,
,
1 2
2
2



 
























dtr
N
tNP
tNP
dt
x
tNPdt
x
tNP
x
tNP
tNP
E
f
t
xxxt 
(22)
Notice that now the term ∂P(N,t)/∂x*σxdz seen in (21) disappears in (22) because Et[dz2]
= 0.
Multiplying (22) by P(N,t) and eliminating dt the fundamental differential equation for
bonds is obtained:
          



  xftxx x
tNP
tNPr
N
tNP
x
tNP
x
tNP ,
,
,,
2
1, 2
2
2
(23)
Now all is needed is to guess a functional form for P(N, t) and solve the above partial
differential equation.
Section V. Univariate Case Under Vasicek
Similar to Piazzesi (2010), Cochrane (2001) and Singleton (2006) it is assumed
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    txNBNAt exNP , (24)
Which can also be specified as:
    tt xNBNAxNP ,ln (24.a)
Given the guess (24), the derivatives that appear in (23) are as shown below, notice that
this essay follows a similar notation to that seen in Cochrane (2005);
 
   
t
t
t
x
N
NB
N
NA
N
xNP
xNP 




 ,
,
1
Substituting the above derivatives into (24) yields:
       

  xfttxx NBtNPrxN
NB
N
NA
NBNB ,
2
1 22 (25)
Algebraically, is not nice to have rtf and x t at the same time. However, by leveraging from
Taylor (1993), hence that due to either market or policy responses rtf is also a function of
macroeconomic variables it will be assumed, again as in Piazzesi (2010), Cochrane
(2005) or Singleton (2006) that the risk-free rate of return is a function of macroeconomic
variables, thus;
t
f
t xr 10  (26)
 
  NB
x
xNP
xNP t
t
t


 ,
,
1
 
  22
2 ,
,
1
NB
x
xNP
xNP t
t
t



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Notice that so far it has been assumed a one factor model here, so in this case there is 1
factor that encapsulates all macroeconomic behaviour influencing the yield curve. A
multi factor will be analysed later in section VIII.
So now that is known (26) this can be plugged into (25) so that
   
    





xt
txx
NBtNPx
x
N
NB
N
NA
NBNB
,
2
1
10
22
(27)
Setting the boundary condition P(0, x) = 1 which is when A(0) = 0 and B(0) = 0, so that
eA(0)+B(0)x = 1 thus,
     

  xttxx NBxxN
NB
N
NA
NBNB 10
22
2
1
(28)
Now, in (14) it has been shown how dx is expected to behave stochastically, however it
has not been specified further on how µx is represented following Vasicek, which the
process would rather look like
  dzdtxxdx xt   (29)
Notice that: µx = E[dx]. 5
In which case, substituting (29) into (28) and rearranging boils down to
   
  





xtt
xt
NBxx
N
NB
N
NA
NBxxNB
10
22
2
1
(30)
5      dzEdtxxEdxE xt   →   txxdxE 
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This has to hold for all x t so that the terms multiplying xt and the constant terms are zero.
    0222
1  

xx xNBNBN
NA
(31)
  1
 NB
N
NB (32)
Equations (31) and (32) can be solved by simple integration. The reader should notice
that a change of variable is required for v = ‒ B(N)ϕ ‒ γ1. Starting with (32) and then
substituting when solving (31).
So for simplicity’s sake it will be started with (32),
  NNBNB  1
1
 (33)
Which solving the integral yields

 NB
NB 
 





1
1
0
ln (34)
Hence,
  

  110 
NeB
NB (35)
Since B(0) = 0, therefore, the solution is
  11  NeNB 


(36)
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Assuming the reader wishes to obtain Cochrane’s (2001) page 370 solution, all is needed
is to multiply by (-1), as in his model the term multiplying B(N) is negative, you also
need to remember that γ1 = 1 and ‒ γ0 = 0, as for Cochrane’s solution, rf= xt, so that (36)
would be;
  NeNB 
 11 .
Which is exactly Cochrane’s solution.
Now integrating equation (31), but first substituting from (36) accordingly, hence:
      012
2
1 11
2
1 



  


 


 




x
N
x
N xee
N
NA (37)
And rearranging:
      0122
2
1
2
121
2




  

  NxNNx exee
N
NA
(38)
Which after grouping terms of equal power it can be written as
  
  NxNxx
xx
ee
x
x
N
NA











2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
0
1
2
2
1
2
2
2





 


(39)
Since A(0) = 0, this equation can be easily integrated thus the following has been
obtained;
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      
 1
4
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
3
2
1
2
2
1
0
1
2
2
1
2




 


 


Nx
Nxxxx
e
e
x
N
x
NA












(40)
I will rearrange the last term on (40) and rework first as follows:
   
2
12 1




  NeNB 


Which rearranging and collecting terms, reads
    12 22
2
112   NeNBNB 




And substituting in (40) yields
  
    


 


 



 


NBNBNB
x
N
x
NA
xxx
xx












12
2
2
1
2
0
1
2
2
1
2
2
4
2
(41)
Now if the reader is aiming to Cochrane’s (2001) solution, this can be obtained by
substituting γ1 = 1 and ‒ γ0 = 0, as for Cochrane, rf= xt and re-arranging and collecting
terms, results in:
     
 




 



 


  
NBNB
NB
x
N
x
NA
x
xxxx












12
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
(42)
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      


   NBNBNBNBNxNNA xxxx 






 1
2
42
2
2
2
2
2
2
(43)
      NBNBNBNBNxNNA xxxxx 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
242 








   (44)
And step by step:
      NBNBNBNBNxNNA xxxxx 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
242 








  
     NBNBNBNxNNA xxxx 2
2
2
2
2
2
242 






  
     2
2
2
2
42
NBNBN
x
NBNNA xxx





  
results in
    2
2
2
2
42
NBNBN
x
NA xxx 




 




   (45)
Now the reader must remember again that in Cochrane’s presentation the second term
shown in (24) is instead negative, hence B(N) has a “-“, so taking this into account and
rearranging slightly yields:
   NBNxNBNA xxx 





  2
2
2
2
24 




 (46)
Which is exactly as in Cochrane, page 371.
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Section VI. Linking Now to a State Space System with an Observation Equation
Now recalling (3) and applying logarithms to obtain the yields,
(47)
Which also means that the present value of a bond is
(48)
Now recalling the guess in (24) and substituting in (48)
    txNBNAexNP , (49)
Applying logarithms to (48) and (49) and equating both terms and rearranging boils
down to
  
t
N
t xN
NB
N
NAy  (50)
For
 
N
NA
Na  (51)
 
N
NB
Nb  (52)
Recalling our assumption in (29) means that yields follow an affine model which is a
state space system with an observation equation linking observable yields to the state
vector and a state equation describing the dynamics of the observation and the state:
   tNt xNbNay  (53)
  tttt xxxx    11 (54)
   NtNytt emE  1
   NtNyetNP ,
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As discussed, equation (54) is simply the discrete version of (29), e.g. rearranged is a
AR(1) would yield,
  ttt xxx   1
Section VII. Univariate Case under Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) model
Same as with Vasicek, it will start with the fundamental pricing equation for bonds (13)
but instead of plugging process (29) which is the Vasicek process, the CIR process will
be plugged, which are defined as
dzxdtdx txx   (55)
dzxxdtd t
  (56)
But first as what it has been learned from Ito,
   22
2
2
1 dzxdt
x
Pdzxdt
x
PdP txxtxx  


 (57)
And because of what is known from Ito, hence that dt, dz and dz2= dt and that that E[dz2],
dt∙dz and dt2 = 0, rearranging (57) and resolving yields
dzx
x
Pdtx
x
P
x
PdP txtxx  







 2
2
2
2
1 (58)
Substituting (56) and (58) into (13) and rearranging yields;
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 
       
 
 
0
,
,
1
1
,,
2
1,
,
1 2
2
2



 






















dtr
N
tNP
tNP
dzxdtxdzx
x
tNP
dtx
x
tNP
x
tNP
tNP
E
f
t
tttxtxxt 
(59)
Once more if the reader remember that dt, dz and dz2= dt and that E[dz2], dt∙dz and dt2 =
0, resolving yields the fundamental equation for bonds under CIR model, and this is how
is done
 
     
 
 
0
,
,
1
,,
2
1,
,
1 2
2
2



 























dtr
N
tNP
tNP
dt
x
tNPdt
x
tNP
x
tNP
tNP
E
f
t
xxxt 
(60)
Notice that now the term ∂P/∂x*σx√xtdz disappears because Et [dz2] = 0.
Multiplying (60) by P(N,t) and eliminating dt it is possible to obtain the fundamental
differential equation for bonds under CIR
    txfttxx xx
P
tNPr
N
tNP
x
x
P
x
P





  ,,
2
1 2
2
2
(61)
Equation (61) differs from (23) on that two terms are now multiplied by xt.
Now all is needed to do here is guess a functional form for P(N, t) and solve the above
partial differential equation.
Similar to what we did in Vasicek model we do the following guess:
    txNBNAt exNP , (62)
Which can also be as
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    tt xNBNAxNP ,ln (62.a)
Given the guess (62), the derivatives that appear in (61) are as follows:
 
   
txN
NB
N
NA
N
tNP
tNP 


 ,
,
1
Substituting the above derivatives into (61) yields:
       0,
2
1 22 

  tNPrxN
NB
N
NA
xNBxNBNB ftttxtxx  (63)
And for the risk free rate being:
t
f
t xr 10  (64)
Same as in previous section, the reader should remember that so far it is assumed a one
factor model here, so in this case there is 1 factor that encapsulates all macroeconomic
behaviour influencing the yield curve. A multi factor will be analysed in the next section.
So now that specification (64) is known, it can be plugged into (63) so that
  
     0,
2
1
10
22



 
tNPxx
N
NB
N
NA
xNBxNBNB
tt
txtxx


(65)
 
  NB
x
tNP
tNP


 ,
,
1
 
  22
2 ,
,
1 NB
x
tNP
tNP



80
Setting the boundary condition P(0, x) = 1 which is when
A(0) = 0 and B(0) = 0, so that eA(0)+B(0 )x = 1
Now, in (55) it has been specified how dx is expected to behave stochastically, however it
has not been specified further on how the mean µx is supposed to be represented
following CIR, thus the process would rather look like
  dzxdtxxdx tx  (66)
In which case, substituting (66) into (65) and rearranging boils down to
  
   0
2
1
10
22






 tttx
txt
xx
N
NB
N
NAxNB
xNBxxNB


(67)
This has to hold for all x so that the terms multiplying x and the constant terms are zero.
   221 2
1
NBNB
N
NB
xx  

 (68)
  0 
 NBx
N
NA (69)
Equations (68) and (69) will be solved by simple integration. A hint for the reader: (68) is
quite bombastic to solve. So it will start with (68) and then substitute to solve (69).
So here it goes first with equation (68) which rearranging and integrating yields;
  
 NNB
NBNB xx




22
1 2
1
1

(70)
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Which could be resolve as follows
   NNBNcBNbBa  2
1
(71)
For a = 1; b = (ø +σxσΛ) and c = 1/2σx2, which crystallises to:
 N
bac
bNcB
bac







 
2
1
2 4
2tan
4
2
(72)
(72) is not helpful because 24 bac is a complex number, and can only be resolve by
understanding that the square root is imaginary so that
ibacibac  22 44 (73)
And this makes that if
 






ix
ix
iix
1
1
ln
2
1
tan 1 (74)
Hence,




















i
bNcB
i
i
bNcBi
iix
2
1
21
ln
2
1
tan 1 (75)
So now substituting (75) and (73) in (72), eliminating i and substituting back b=(ø+σx
σΛ) and c = 1/2σx2, yields
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 
 
 
 
































xx
xx
xx
xx
NB
NB
NB
NB
N
2
2
2
2
ln
1
1
1
ln
1
(76)
for
 222   xx
Taking logarithms and collecting terms for B(N), and going step by step boils down to
       xxxxN NBNBe 22 (77)
     022     xxxNxNN NBeNBee (78)
     022     xxNxxNN eNBNBee (79)
       0111 2     xNxNN eNBee (80)
       NBeee xNxNN 2111     (81)
    
  NBe
ee
x
N
x
NN






21
11




(82)
    
  NBe
ee
x
N
x
NN

 


21
11




(83)
    
  NBe
ee
x
N
x
NN





21
11




(84)
    
  NBe
e
x
N
x
N






21
1




(85)
Remember that the solution will have to be for B(N=0) = 0, so we do not need a constant
because at N=0; the term 1 - e-ζN equals zero. Now it will integrate (69), by first
substituting results from (85) and rearranging, thus
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       Ne
exNA
N
N
x
x 


 

  


02 1
1 




(85)
To make it easier to operate it will denoted
  
2
x
xxa

  (86)
    Ne
e
aNA N
N





 

 

01
1 

(87)
It will resolve by parts, hence6
   





  NNeaNA
N
0
12log2 
 (88)
Remember that the solution will have to be for A(N=0) = 0, so this can be achieved by
subtracting 1 from the term e-ςN +1, in addition, as I did with Vasicek if the one factor is
the risk-free rate of return rf than γ0 and γ1 are 0 and 1 respectively.
   .2log2 
 Ne
aNA
N  (89)
6 I resolved this one by entering (1-exp(-bx))*(exp(-bx)+1)^-1 in the http://www.freemathhelp.com integral
calculator.
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Section VIII. Multifactor Affine Models
A more generalised setting of affine class of term structure models would be to allow for
multiple factors and to account for the Vasicek as well as for the CIR stochastic processes
explained in the previous chapters. Here, it will follow similar notation to Cochrane
(2005) which was initially developed by Duffie and Kan (1996) and Dai and Singleton
(2000). It will also compare their results with those of Piazzesi (2010). Which they differ
in 1 thing: Piazzesi does not account for the discount factor.
Due to the fact that it deals with multiple factors setup, the notation falls under the usual
matrix algebra. It recalls then equations (19), (26) and (29) and transforms them into
matrices in order to account for more than one variable as follows:
  dzdtxxdx xt   (90)
t
f
t xr '0  (91)
dzdtrd f '
  (92)
tx xs (93)
 tiiti xssxs '10  (94)
Equation (90) describes the stochastic process of the state variables. This is the usual
mean reversing process whereby dx is likely to be negative if xt is above its mean and, is
likely to be positive if x is below its mean. x t and its mean are both k-dimensional vectors.
is a k × k matrix of diagonal elements iwhich represent the speed of adjustment at
which each of x i elements reverse to their means. σx is a diagonal k × k matrix
comprising the volatility of the state variables. dz is a k-vector of shocks moving xt away
from its mean and with dzi elements being normally distributed with mean zero and
variance dt.
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Equation [91] describes the short rate as a function of the state variables. Notice that it
has been denoted by prime “ ' “ for the transpose of the k-dimensional vector γ. The sign
of each of the γi elements should depend on the theory and should be estimated
empirically. The same accounts for the γ0 constant term. Piazzesi (2010) sets these to 0
and 1 for γ0 and γi respectively.
Equation (92) is the discount factor as a function of the short rate and hence as a function
of the state variables and a random error termσΛdz. Notice that the sign here are negative
but this is because a similar notation as in Cochrane (2005) has been used, because at the
end the sign will depend on the empirical result from (91), whereσΛis a k-dimensional
vector describing the sensitivities of the discount factor responding to k-shocks. Same as
in (90) dz is a k-vector of shocks with dzi elements being normally distributed with mean
zero and variance dt.
Equation (93) and (94) describe the volatilities of the state variables. s(x) is a diagonal k
× k matrix with elements si(x). Notice that by doing so we can generalise for both
Vasicek and the CIR cases. Because the Vasicek is a Gaussian process and CIR is a
square root process. With (94) it can accounted for both cases, thus s1i = 0 and s0i = 1 for
the Vasicek case, whereby the variance parameters in Σare free. Alternatively, if the
intention is to account for the CIR case, then it is possible to set s1i = 1 and s0i = 0.
Piazzesi (2010) and the celebrated paper from Duffie and Kan (1996) as well as Dai and
Singleton (2000) remember us of the conditions required to obtain a unique solution to
the stochastic differential equations, and these comprise the Feller and the Lipschitz
conditions, for which the author suggests the reader to refer to Piazzesi (2010) page 706
for some examples on how this works.
Procedure will be exactly as for the univariate Vasicek and CIR. First it will take the
basic asset pricing equation from (13) and rewrite it in (95). Then Ito’s lemma to our
guess in (24) will be applied, which for convenience is now (96), thus that prices are
linear functions of the state variables
 
   
   
  







 





t
t
t
f
tt
d
tNP
tNdPEdtr
N
tNP
tNPtNP
tNdPE
,
,,
,
1
,
, (95)
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    txNBNAexNP ',  (96)
Applying Ito’s lemma to obtain dP(N,t)/ P(N,t).
 
   
 
 
 
dx
x
tNP
dx
tNP
dx
x
tNP
tNPtNP
tNdP
2
2 ,
'
2
1
,
1,
,
1
,
,


 (97)
Given the guess (96), the derivatives that appear in (97) are as follows:
 
 
txN
NB
N
NA
N
P
tNP 


 '
,
1
Breaking (95) into three parts when substituting for the basic pricing equation for bonds,
so starting with left term on (95) so that
 
    


 



dxNBNBdxdxNBE
tNP
tNdP
E tt ''2
1
'
,
,
(98)
Substituting dx for (90)
 
 
   
     













dzdtxxNBNBdzdtxx
dzdtxxNB
E
tNP
tNdP
E
xx
x
tt 

''
2
1
'
,
,
(99)
Once more if we remember that dt, dz and dz2= dt and that E[dz2], dt ∙dz and dt2 = 0,
resolving yields
 
     dzNBNBdzEdtxxNBtNP
tNdP
E xxtt  '''2
1
'
,
, 



(100)
 
  NB
x
tNP
tNP


 ,
,
1
  ',
1
2
2
NBNB
x
P
tNP



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Now to organise the last term on (100) a bit nicer, it will be used the fact that Tr[AB] =
Tr[BA] for square matrices and because the last term is a scalar, thus
      dzNBNBdzETrdzNBNBdzE xxtxxt  ''''' 
  NBdzdzNBETr xxt ''' 
    NBdzdzENBTr xtx ''' 
   
N
i
iix dzENB
22' (101)
A not so elegant way of resolving this one would be if instead: Et(dzidzj) = 0 and Et(σiσj)
= 0 implying,
 
   
   
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
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
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
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
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



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











Ni
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Nx
x
NNN
N
NxxNii
xx
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NBNBNBNB
NBNBNBNB
dzdz
dzNBNBdz




......
...
.........
...
......
'''
1
:
1:
11111
1111111
:1:1
Which would give us the same as (101). By plugging (93) and (94) into (101) results in
equation (102) below. Notice that the intention is to isolate Σfrom s(xt) in order to obtain
a specification which is closer to that of Piazzesi (2010) rather than to that of
Cochrane’s (2001), which boils down to:
       
N
i
iiixxt dtxssNBdzNBNBdzE 10
2 ''''  (102)
Plugging it back (102) into (100) yields
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     


 N
i
iii
t
t
t dtxssNBdtxxNBP
dP
E 10
2 ''
2
1' (103)
Solving now for the first term on the right of equation (95) which it has been
rewritten below for convenience,
 
  dtr
N
tNP
tNP
f
t 


 

 ,
,
1
and by plugging the corresponding derivatives and replace for the risk free rate of
return as follows;
The derivatives:
 
txN
NB
N
NA



 '
And the equation describing the risk free rate
t
f
t xr '0  
So that (95) now will look something like:
 
dtxx
N
NB
N
NA
tt 


 


'
'
0  (104)
So now going for the last term on equation (95), for which in order not to re-invent the
wheel it will be combined with results from (99) with (91) and (92) yields
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
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Above almost every term gets eliminated as, once more, if we remember that dt, dz and
dz2= dt and that E[dz2], dt∙dz and dt2 = 0, resolving yields
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Now organising (105) knowing that dzdz′ →dt and σx is a diagonal k × k matrix
comprising the volatility of the state variables with elements Σi(s0i+s1 i'x t). So that by
isolating (s0i+s1i 'xt) fromΣi and applying the fact that Et(σiσj) = 0 (105) boils down to
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By gathering all the parts together, thus equation (103), (104) and (106), and eliminating
dt term yields
    
     





 




N
i
tiiitt
N
i
tiiit
xssNBxx
N
NB
N
NA
xssNBxxNB
100
10
2
'''
'
''
2
1
'


And again as performed for the univariate Vasicek and CIR cases, the terms on the
constant and each xi must separately be zero. Here it will be aiming first for the ∂A(N)/∂N
which results in
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Now rearranging for ∂A(N)/∂N term results in,
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And now going for ∂B(N)/∂N, simply taking the terms which are multiplying xt and the
transpose, then solving:
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Taking the transpose and dividing by xt,
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And rearranging to obtain ∂B(N)/∂N boils down to
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To solve the above ODE a MATLAB “ode45” is used as in Piazzesi (2010).
Comparing (107) and (108) with Piazzesi (2010) we see that her model does not account
for the terms:
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Why? Simply because Piazzesi (2010) does not account for the discount factor dΛ/Λ and 
the reason why this is not accounted for lies on the fact that her specification of (106) is
zero, and therefore the term containing dΛ/Λ is instantaneously eliminated and therefore
only (103) and (104) feed into ∂A(N)/∂N and ∂B(N)/∂N. Finally, the signs shown on the
terms for computing ∂A(N)/∂N and ∂B(N)/∂N in Piazzesi (2010) differ to those from
Cochrane (2005), but this is mainly due to the guess on (24) and (95) where in Cochrane
the term B(N) is negative because his guess is P(N,xt) = exp[A(N) - B(N)x t].
Section IX. Conclusions and final remarks
We have documented some algebra and shown step by step how we get to the affine term
structure models starting with the basic pricing equation, the pricing equation for asset
returns, the holding period returns, Ito’s lemma and finally obtained the fundamental
pricing equation for fixed income securities which is required under the affine term
structure model. We have also documented some of the differences in the notation
between authoritative literature such as Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010). Our
findings show that Piazzesi (2010) does not account for the discount factor dΛ/Λ in 
contrast to Cochrane (2005). In addition, Piazzesi (2010) sets 0 and 1 to 0 and 1
respectively but by doing so coefficients of state variables on the short rate are lost and
this is what we are actually trying to capture. The differences between Piazzesi (2010)
and Cochrane (2005) result in different ways of facing numerical solutions, which go
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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4. Affine Term Structure Models applied to a Macro-Finance Model
Section I. Introduction
This essay explores the use of discrete time affine term structure models applied to a
macro-finance model7 which links asset pricing theory, Taylor rules and debt dynamics in
order to study the optimal term structure, and hence contribute to fiscal stabilisation
policies and the optimal taxation approach. This chapter makes use of affine term
structure models in a similar set up as seen in the celebrated papers from Backus, Foresi
and Telmer (1998 and 1996) and Backus, Telmer and Wu (1999). The model used applies
the multifactor cases under Vasicek (1977) taking into account some of the developments
seen in the latest affine term structure research such as Duffie and Kan (1996), Piazzesi
(2010) and Singleton (2006).
With respect to the optimal taxation approach, this paper is a contribution to some of the
developments achieved in Missale (1997), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008), Angeletos
(2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). This essay comprises the foundations for the
works published in Jakas (2012) and Jakas and Jakas (2013).
This paper is organised as follows: Section II, presents some introductory notes on
discrete multi-factor affine terms structure models; section III introduces the main
features of the present macro-finance model; section IV introduces the consumer’s
preferences; section V presents the central bank policy; section VI introduces the
government problem and; section VII presents some final remarks linking with next
chapter which calibrates the macro-finance model discussed.
7 This section was motivated by remarks given by Prof. Dr. Kenneth Singleton, for which the author of this
essay is very grateful.
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Section II. Some introductory notes
This section is an introductory piece for those not familiar with discrete affine term
structure models and some of the features have already been discussed in previous
chapters, however for convenience to the reader we have rewritten them again below .
As seen in most recent affine term structure literature log prices can be specified as a
linear function of a state vector 1tx as follows:
     11 'ln   tNt xNBNAP (1)
For A(N) being a scalar, B(N)' a 1×k vector of coefficients and 1tx a k×1 vector of state
variables. Note that the transpose of a vector or matrix is specified with a “ ' ”. Equation
(1) is only a guess, as the functional form is not known. However, the literature appears
to have generally accepted this as seen in Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006), Cochrane
(2005), as well as in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1996) and (1998) and seminal papers of
Duffie and Kan (1996).
There is a mathematical link between log prices and yields. A possible specification
could be
  
N
PE
y
N
tN
t
ln (2)
From the guess shown in (1) it is possible to find a closed solution and estimate the
parameters A(N) and B(N)'. These parameters are obtained by linking observable yields to
an observation equation describing the behaviour of a space state vector. This can be
done by combining equations (2) at t+1 with (1) which boils down to
   
11
'
  tNt xN
NB
N
NAy (3)
Thus the short rate could be specified as follows:
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     111 '11   tt xNBNAy (4)
Empirically, equation (4) would look like

110
1
1 '   tt xy  (5)
The stochastic discount factor 1tm is related to one-period bond yields (or the short rate)
inversely as follows,
  11 ln  tt mEy (6)
Now it is necessary to specify the stochastic process for xt+1 as well as for the stochastic
discount factor shown in (6). A good starting point is to use the pricing kernel à la
Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) which here is combined with the Vasicek (1977). A
possible specification would be like:
  11   txttt xxxx  (7)
  1)1(1 'ln   ttt λym  (8)
Equation (7) describes the stochastic process of the independent state variables. This is
the usual mean reversing process whereby 1 tx is likely to be negative if tx is above x
and, is likely to be positive if tx is below its mean x . tx and x are both k-dimensional
vectors. Φ is a kk  matrix of diagonal elements Φi which represent the speed of
adjustment at which each of tix , elements reverse to their means. x is a diagonal kk 
matrix comprising the volatility of the state variables. 1t is a k-vector of shocks moving
tx away from x and with 1, ti elements being normally distributed with mean zero and
variance 1.
Equation (8) is the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998),
however here with somehow a different setting, as (8) was originally the univariate
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Vasicek (1977) case. In this essay we transform this specification and adapt it for the
multifactor case of a k-dimensional vector of state variables as in Jakas (2012). Same as
in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998)δis specified as follows:
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Clearly, specification (9) is fortuitous, the only aim is to normalise the stochastic discount
factor so that it becomes the inverse of the short rate. Notice that by substituting [9] in [8]
results in the following conditional means and variance:
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And assuming E[lnx] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x), which yields
  )1(1ln tt ymE 
Section III. A Macro-Finance Dynamic Model
In this section, a macro-finance model is introduced in order to link consumption based
asset pricing theory as seen in the celebrated papers from Rubinstein (1976), Lucas
(1978) and Breeden (1979), with inflation targeting Taylor (1993) rules partially inspired
by some of the developments seen in Rudebusch and Wu (2008) and Sims (2000 and
2005). In addition, the intention is also to link with some of the recent achievements seen
in the fiscal theory of debt sustainability mostly from Biacchiocchi and Missale (2005),
Missale (1997) and, Missale, Giavazzi and Benigno (1997), and Bohn (1988, 1990 and
1998). In this section the starting point will be to first describe consumers’ preferences;
secondly, focus will be given to a model on central bank policy reaction function with
inflation targeting rules however this essay will not depart from the so called “New
Keynesian Phillips curve” proposed by Calvo (1983) and Roberts (1995) and assume that
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the central bank intends to enforce an upper bound on the price level (Sims, 2000);
thirdly, the chapter will also present link to debt dynamics and fiscal sustainability
foundations to yield curve movements; finally, it will be shown that these relationships
can be summarised in a set of measurement equations were the different variables
entering these equations are stacked in a state vector to calibrate the observed yield
curves and obtain parameters NNA and NNB ' as discussed in (3).
Section IV. Consumer preferences
Proposition 1 If consumer preferences follow a log utility function with constant relative
risk aversion where consumption is a function of unemployment and consumer
confidence index, any increase in unemployment or decrease in consumer confidence will
result in an increase in aggregate marginal utility growth with the subsequent increase in
the discount factor and hence a fall in the short-rate )1(ty as follows;
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

 e
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Where 01  , as shown in (10) and 02  , 2 and 1denote the reaction parameters of
the investors on changes in the unemployment rate and consumer confidence index.
Equation (10) is derived as follows; starting with the assumption that consumers follow a
log utility function with constant relative risk aversion as in (11) and (12) below
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Where natural log consumption is negatively correlated to the unemployment rate and
positively correlated to consumer confidence, so that
tc
e
ttt CbUbac  lnlnln 210 (13)
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Whereby a0, b1 and b2 are parameters and lnUt and lnCte denote the natural logarithms of
unemployment rate and consumers’ expectations via a consumer confidence index.
It has also been assumed that investors first order condition holds so that
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Recalling that the stochastic discount factor is related to the short rate and hence would
imply (14) can be expressed as follows:
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Operating under (15) and distributing the natural logarithms results in
ttt ccm lnlnlnln 11    (16)
For simplicity’s sake and without loss of generality initial consumption is normalised so
that 1tc and hence 0ln tc , as for all initial value of 0tc is known at time t, thus (16)
would boil down to
11 lnlnln   tt cm  (17)
Substituting tcln with the guess shown in (13), results in
 tcettt CbUbam   lnlnlnln 2101 (18)
With following conditional mean and variance
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  ettt CbUbamE lnlnlnln 2101   (19)
  21ln ctmVar  (20)
So that under log-normality
   22101 2
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Grouping the constant terms and the terms multiplying the variables yields
    ettct CbUbamE lnln2
1lnln 21
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In order to bring this to a simple regression term it could be specified as follows
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Notice that the terms  20 2
1
ln ca   , 1b and 2b are assumed to be constant. So
this means that combining (12) with (13) and (21) it is possible to derive the following
measurement or observation equation:
e
t tt
CUy lnln 210
)1(  
The above measurement equation suggests, for example, that an increase in
unemployment is expected to result in a decrease in the short rate or risk free rate, as any
increase in unemployment results in an increase in aggregate marginal utility growth with
the subsequent decrease in short-term yields, as long as the underlying assets are risk
free. On the contrary, increases in consumer confidence result in an increase in )1(
t
y .
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Section V. Central Bank Policy
Proposition 2 If the central bank applies a pure Taylor targeting, the policy rule can be
of the form
ttUy t  lnln 210
)1(  (23)
Where α1<0 and α2>0, as described in (23) and denotes the reaction parameters of the
central bank as a consequence of changes in the unemployment and the inflation rates.
In this work the author follows here some of the ideas seen in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a) combining with the works of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) which
is an interest rate rule model variant of one published in Sims (2000).
However, the intention is not to depart much from the so called “New Keynesian Phillips
curve” proposed by Calvo (1983) and Roberts (1995), and assume that the central bank
intends to enforce an upper bound on the inflation (Sims, 2000) as well as the
unemployment rates, but at the same time need to ensure that the net worth of the
reserves –which back the value of its money issues– do not become negative. The
constraint is that if reserves net worth becomes negative the central bank will only be
able to overcome this with fiscal backing, thus via distortionary taxation. Therefore,
assuming that fiscal backing is not an option and that the central bank need to ensure the
value of its reserves are not worth less than the money issued we retain a so-called
“deflationary demonetisation”. Thus, current inflationπt will look something like the so-
called “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” using unemployment rate as a measure of output
gap,
  ttttt uEU   1210 ln (24)
πt being the inflation rate in t, lnUt and  1ttE  being the natural logarithms of
unemployment rate and expected inflation in time t for t+1. Finally, σπ being the
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deviation and ut would include the usual properties of normal behaviour mean zero and
variance equal to 1.
It will be assumed that the objective of monetary policy is to minimise the expected value
of a loss function of the form
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Whereβt is the discount factor in period t so that the loss L for each period is
     2*122*11 lnlnlnln    ttt EUUEL (26)
For ø1 and ø2 being the sensitivities of central bank losses due to deviations of expected
unemployment and expected inflation to their targets lnU* and lnπ*. In addition, the
model argues for a central bank which has the dual objective of unemployment and
inflation targeting. The model incorporates unemployment as target rather than the usual
output gap.
Any shocks governing (25) will require optimal responses for state-contingent paths
depending on E[lnUt+1] and E[lnπt+1] that minimise (26) subject to the constraint
described in (24). Therefore, the Lagrangian for this problem, looking forward for any
date, would result in
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Differentiating (27) with respect to inflation and unemployment result in the following
pairs of first order conditions:
   0lnln 1*11   tt UUE (28)
   0lnln 1*12   tttE  (29)
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Assuming that all λt are constant throughout time, so that on the long run λt→λ. The
model also assumes that the central bank has been –on average– successful in targeting
unemployment and inflation, implying that lnU* =μlnU and lnπ* =μlnπso that the long run
value for unemployment and inflation targets have remained constant for the period and
equal their means. In addition, and for simplicity’s sake and without loss of generality it
could be assumed that λψ= ø0 which would imply the following central bank policy rule;
      trttUttft fEUEr     ln12ln110 lnln (30)
Assuming that the above target variables follow a stochastic behaviour:
  1lnln1 lnlnln   tUtUtt UUU  (31)
  1lnln1 lnlnln   tttt   (32)
ForσlnU and σlnπbeing the deviation for the natural logs of inflation and unemployment
and εt+1 would include the usual properties of normal behaviour mean zero and variance
equal to 1.
Assuming normality (31) and (32) would look like:
     2lnlnln1 2
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     2lnlnln1 2
1lnlnln    tttE (34)
Replacing (33) and (34) in (30)
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying tUln and tln yields
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For which it will denoted as follows, by rearranging the constant terms with the terms
multiplying the variables
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   111 (37.b)
  ln22 1 (37.c)
So this means that combining (30) with (36) and according to what has been learned from
(7), it is possible to reproduce the following measurement or observation equation:
ttUy t  lnln 210
)1(  (38)
Section VI. The Government Problem
In this section some of the ideas seen in Bartolini and Cottarelli (1994) and Blanchard
and Weil (1992) are presented and combined some of the research seen in the celebrated
papers from Bohn (1998), Giavazzi and Missale (2004), Bacchiocchi and Missale (2005)
and inspired by the research from Escolano (2010).
This section will describe how government’s public debt dynamics, fiscal sustainability,
and cyclical adjustments of budgetary aggregates play a role in yield curve dynamics.
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Proposition 3 If the government chooses a composition of debt and budget to stabilise
the debt and overall balance to GDP ratios, constraint to a chosen level of
unemployment, in order to minimise a government loss function, so that any increases in
the government’s loss results in a deterioration of private sector’s expected future
consumption growth, so that the short rate would depict the following relationship
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For lndt being the government’s natural log of total debt outstanding to GDP ratio, lnst
being the natural log of government’s overall surplus to GDP ratio and lnUt being the
natural logarithm of unemployment rate. Where β1>0 , β2 <0 and β3 > 0 denote the
coefficients of changes in the short rate as a consequence of shocks in the debt and
balance ratios to GDP, as well as shocks in the unemployment rate.
We will start defining the debt and the overall government balance as a ratio to GDP, so
that

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For lndt and lnst are assumed to be governed by the following dynamics
  tttt sdyd lnln1ln 1)1(   (42)
Notice that (42) is intuitive, hence if surplus st decreases and GDP remains constant, new
debt is issued in order to repay debt servicing plus finance overall deficits. Notice that
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because it is not possible to estimate natural logarithms for negative numbers the
following rule applies: the lnst term is positive when st< 0 (for the case of deficits) and is
negative for st< 0 (for the case of surplus). So that if st< 0 then the lnst is positive and
hence the lndt increases; and if st> 0 then the lnst is negative and hence the lndt decreases.
Rearranging terms so that we can depict this as a function of the 1 period yield or short
rate boils down to
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t
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
 (43)
As in Bacchiocchi and Missale (2005) it will assumed that the government minimises a
quadratic loss function, whereby the government chooses the composition of the debt to
stabilise the debt and the overall government’s surplus ratios however with the purpose of
reducing the financing costs described in (43). If a deterioration in surplus to GDP ratio
(hence, deficit to GDP ratio increases) is more than compensated by an increase in the
debt to GDP ratio, then yields are expected in rise. In addition, we include the
unemployment rate as a government target, as any stabilisation policy on (43) could have
an effect on unemployment. Notice that if the deviations are above the target these
become increasingly costly.
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For m' being a 21 vector of parameters of elements mi and w being a 12 vector of
parameters of elements wi. Minimising (44) yields:
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Notice that in (45) I made I equal a 12 vector of elements equal to 1. Substituting (43) in
(45) and operating the constant terms boils down to
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In equation (46) m is a scalar equal to mi + mj resulting from multiplying Im' .
Rearranging (46) and collecting the constant terms, and the terms multiplying the
variables and assuming that any variable at t-1 is known so it can grouped as a constant
term so that proposed changes in (46) are as follows
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It will be depicted that the short rate will be positively related to (47). This is plausible as
a deterioration of government’s financial position would result in higher yields in order to
compensate investors for higher risks. This is based on the idea that any increase in
government losses will be only compensated by additional increases in distortionary
taxation or inflation, thus lower expected future consumption.
The link between equation (47) and government short rate will be as follows:
tt Ly ln10
)1(   (48)
Equation (48) assumes that a deterioration of government losses results in an increase in
yields.
Combining equation (47) with (48) boils down to
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In order to link the theoretical discussion from above to an empirical formulae, we will
denote as follows by rearranging the constant terms including dt-1 (as this is a known
value at time t), so that a possible approximation could be specified as follows,
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So this means that combining (43) with (44) we can reproduce the following
measurement equation:
 











t
t
t
u
s
d
y
t
ln
ln
ln
3210
)1(  (59)
Section VII. The Theory of the Fragility of the Eurozone
Proposition 4 If the theory of the fragility of the Eurozone from De Grauwe (2011a,b)
and Kopf(2011) holds, investors will not expect the sovereign to default, if and only if
government solvency shocks are small and the cost of default is larger than the benefit of
default. In which case equations (10) and (23) are relevant and equation (51) is left out
of the model. In contrast, if a government solvency shock is large, there are two equally
possible equilibria in which case the government bond becomes risky and equation (39)
will have an effect on yields and equations (10) and (23) are subdued.
Here we link the theory of the fragility of the Eurozone from De Grauwe (2011a,b) and
Kopf (2011) with discussions from chapter 1.
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Figure 4-1. The Theory of the Fragility of the Eurozone from De Grauwe (2011a,b) and Kopf (2011)
Figure 4-1 above describes the theory of the fragility of the Eurozone, which is a model
of multiple equilibria. According to De Grauwe (2011a,b), Kopf (2011), Gros (2012) and
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) there are three possible equilibria. The starting point of their
analysis is that governments have a cost C and benefit B of defaulting and that a
representative investor takes this into account when pricing the debt. The idea is that if
governments experience a surplus shock as a consequence of an economic recession, this
shock will translate in a solvency shock S’. A government that experiences a solvency
shock and is not able to monetise deficits is usually forced to undertake unpopular
austerity measures in order attend debt servicing. Along these lines the greater the shock
the greater the austerity required. Another aspect of the model is that the benefit of
default on whether the default is expected or not, is depicted in two benefit curves BU and
BE. BU represents the benefit of a default that investors do not expect to happen and, BE
represents the benefit of a default that investors do expect to happen. The benefit curves
are upward sloping, as when the shocks become larger, the benefit of default increases.
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) show that though they depict a non-linear relationship between
solvency shocks and benefits, they also argue that this does not have to be that way.
Another aspect of the model is that the steepness of the curve will largely depend on: the
initial debt, the efficiency of the tax system and the size of the external debt. The greater
the initial debt level the steeper the curve will be. In fact increases in the debt level will
result in the curve becoming steeper and the government benefits of default will become
B
Solvency Shock
S1 S2S’
BE BU
D
N
CEs(BE,1)
Es’(BU,S’)
Es’(BE,S’)
Es’(BU,2)
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more sensitive to solvency shocks. Likewise, if the tax system becomes inefficient, the
curve will become steeper, and hence more sensitive to solvency shocks. In a similar
way, as the external debt becomes larger, the curve not only becomes steeper due to
increases in the debt burden but also because there will be less domestic resistance
against default, making default even more attractive.
In a nutshell, the model can be summarised as follows:
1) The solvency shock is small. This implies that S’< S1, where both curves BU < C
and BE < C. In this case, the cost of default is always greater than the benefit of
default. When the cost of default is greater than the benefit of default investors do
not expect the government to default. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and De Grauwe
(2013a, b) argue that his would be the cases for Germany or the Netherlands.
2) The solvency shock is intermediate. This implies that S1< S’≤S2. In this case,
the model shows that there are two possible equilibriums, hence D and N (to
default and not to default). According to De Grauwe (2011a, b) this will largely
depend on which of the two equilibriums prevails, which will mostly depend on
investors’ expectations, as both equilibriums are equally possible. In this case
curves BU < C and BE > C . De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and De Grauwe (2013a, b)
argue that his would be the cases for Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal.
3) The solvency shock is large. This implies that S2 < S’. In this case, the cost of
default is smaller than the benefit of default. When the cost of default is lower
than the benefit of default investors expect the government to default where both
curves BU > C and BE > C . De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and De Grauwe (2013a, b)
argue that his would be the case of Greece.
We propose that when the solvency shock is small, state space variables entering the
model are those obtained from propositions 1 and 2, as the coefficients of the state
variables described in propositions 3 will be insignificant or significantly close to zero. If,
on the contrary, solvency shocks are intermediate or large, the state space variables
entering the model should be those described in propositions 3, as the coefficients of the
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state variables described under propositions 1 and 2 will be subdued and we assume that
they will either be insignificant or significantly close to zero.
This could be specified as follows:
CBB EU , and 1' SS  then the state vector  ttett UCx ln;ln;ln: 
xt = CBCB UE  ; and 21 ' SSS  then vector  ttttett sdUCx ln;ln;ln;ln;ln:  (60)
CBB EU , and 2' SS  then the state vector  tttt Usdx ln;ln;ln:
Equation (60) specifies that when solvency shocks are small, the state space vector will
be governed by the factors described in propositions 1 and 3. If the solvency shock is
intermediate, the state space vector will be governed by variables which include
propositions 1, 2 and 3. However, when the solvency shock is large, as for the case of
Greece, the state space vector will be calibrated with the factors discussed in proposition
3 only.
Section VIII. Conclusion and Final Remarks
Equations (10) to (51) constitute a small macroeconomic model with its own dynamics.
Equations (10), (23) and (39) are the measurement equations which can be stacked in a
state space vector xt assuming it follows a Vasicek (1977) process, already discussed in
(7) and (8). In chapter five German and Greek government yields are calibrated using
some of the theory discussed in this macro-finance model. Thus, to be more precise affine
models in German government securities are calibrated as in proposition 1 and taking
some modifications to proposition 2 arguing that central banks would influence monetary
aggregates such as M3 as a consequence of open market operations and reacting to
movements in the price level instead of inflation as discussed in Sims (2000 and 2005)
and works of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001). This is mostly for convenience
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as by using these state variables results improve significantly. Greek Government bonds
will be calibrated using proposition 3. This is mostly in order to remain in line with our
results in the survey conducted in chapter five. Another reason for doing so is that current
developments show that when an asset becomes riskier, investors are looking into the
solvency profile of the issuer rather than inflation and monetary policy, as the Greek
government cannot finance its self by influencing the path of inflation and central bank
monetary aggregates. So it will be concluded that if the bond is risk-free (solvency
shocks for issuer are small), such as money market instruments and German government
bonds the state vector will comprise the natural logarithms of unemployment rate, natural
logarithms of consumer confidence index (as in proposition 1); natural logarithms of
monetary aggregate levels and natural logarithms of the price level (modified proposition
2). If the bond is risky (solvency shocks for issuer are large), the model will calibrate
with the natural logarithms of unemployment rate, natural logarithms of government
surplus to GDP ratio and natural logarithms of total government debt to GDP ratio
(proposition 3).
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5. Discrete Approach to Affine Term Structure Models Applied to
German and Greek Government Yields
Section I. Introduction
This essay documents some algebra and concepts seen in the continuous time affine term
structure literature and plugs them into the discrete time approach. The paper’s starting
point is the celebrated papers from Backus, Foresi, Telmer (1996-98) and incorporates
the developments seen on the continuous time approach as documented in Piazzesi
(2010), Cochrane (2005), Singleton (2006) and Le, Singleton and Dai (2010).
Subsequently, the models are calibrated using the Interbank as well as German and Greek
government yields.
This research concentrates on the multifactor cases of affine term structure models, as the
weaknesses seen on the one factor models under Vasicek (1977) and CIR (1985) are
already sufficiently documented in Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998).
Most of the empirical evidence on affine term structure literature has been mainly
confined to US data. This research fits a discrete time affine term structure model using
European macroeconomic data for German and Greek yields. Other macroeconomic data
used are Greek unemployment as well as Greek debt and deficit to GDP ratios for the
Greek yield curve. Focus is also given to discussion of results with special attention to
economic policy, as well as portfolio management implications. This is in line with
discussions in chapter 4, propositions 3 and 4 as well as with latest research seen in De
Grauwe (2011a, b), De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Gros (2012) and Beirne and Fratzscher
(2013). We show that for a government that enjoys a risk-free status, hence a government
that experiences small liquidity shocks, such as the German government, the state
variables for calibrating the bond yields can be the unemployment rate, consumer
confidence index, the price level and the monetary aggregate M3. On the contrary, if the
government does not enjoy the risk-free status, such as the Greek government, hence the
government suffers from large liquidity shocks, the state variables for calibrating the
112
bond yields can be the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government surplus-to-GDP ratio and the
unemployment rate.
This essay has been published under Jakas (2012) and is organised as follows, section 2
introduces some of the notation with reference to latest developments seen in Piazzesi
(2010) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Cochrane (2005), Singleton (2006) and Duffie and
Kan (1996). In section 3, the Vasicek (1977) model is discussed under the multifactor
setup. Section 4 presents the CIR (1985) which is adapted to fit the affine model. Section
5 presents a generalised version of affine term structure models a la Duffie and Kan
(1996) but on a discrete version. Section 6 calibrates the models and main results are
discussed and presented using interbank and German government yields. In section 7 we
calibrate the Greek bonds and discuss some of the results. Finally, section 8 conclusion
and final remarks are summarised.
Section II. Recalling some basic concepts and introducing new ones
Recalling from previous chapters that it is denoted y t(N) for the yield of a zero coupon
bond with maturity N in time t. For the time being and without loss of generality it will be
assumed that N = 1 and hence, for convenience, the 1 period yields can be specified as a
function of the stochastic discount factor as follows:
   1ln  tNt mEy . (1)
The right hand side of (1) refers to the stochastic discount factor. Specifications on
equation (1) are referred to as pricing kernel by the dynamic asset pricing literature.
The present value of a bond is specified as follows:
    NttNt PmEPE 111  
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For which the natural log notation will be used, thus implying
      NttNt PmP 111 lnlnln   (2)
For ln[Pt(N+1)] being the natural log present value of a bond in time t with maturity N+1,
which will equate the addition between of the log stochastic discount factor and the
redemption value of the bond in t+1.
A notation common seen in Piazzesi (2010) as well as in Singleton (2006) and Cochrane
(2005) is that the short rate is a linear function of state variables, thus,
t
f
t xr '10  (3)
Equation (3) is not accounted for in any of the Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998) and
(1996) and Backus, Telmer and Wu (1999). For those not familiar with the notation rt
f
denote the short rate, γ0 is a scalar constant term, γ1' is a 1 × k vector of coefficients
describing how the short rate responds to shocks on independent state variables xt. Finally
xt is a k × 1 vector. Notice that “ ' ” is used to denote for the transpose of a vector or a
matrix.
The results obtained from the multifactor version documented in Backus, Foresi and
Telmer (1998) work very well for an average yield curve but require some changes,
should the researcher wish to understand movements in the yield curve, i.e. steepening,
flattening and/or twists as a result of changes in the state variables, simply because under
their settings the state variables are on average zero so that at the end the yield curve
depends on parameter A(N) only.
Another aspect which is accounted for in the literature is the behaviour of the state
variables. This has two components: 1) the specification of the mean reversing process
and 2) the specification of the random error term. The novelty of this work also lies in
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plugging Piazzesi (2010) and Cochrane (2005) into the Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1996) and
(1998). Results differ mainly because authors have different specifications and different
assumptions about the mean reversing process as well as the specification of the random
error term and the stochastic discount factor.
Another common aspect seen in the affine term structure literature is that log prices are
linear functions of state variables. A possible specification could be:
    11 'ln   tNt xNBNAP . (4)
This is only a guess, as the functional form of (4) is not known. However, the literature
appears to agree on this, as seen on Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006), Cochrane (2005),
as well as in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1996) and (1998) and seminal papers of Duffie and
Kan (1996).
From our guess in (4) we wish to find a closed solution and estimate the parameters A(N)
and B(N)'. Once we have these parameters all we need to do is to plug them into the
following yield curve and taking into account for several maturities (4) would now boil
down to
   
11
'
  tNt xN
NB
N
NAy . (5)
In the next sections the multi-factor models are discussed, for different stochastic
processes governing the behaviour of the state variables and the discount factor as
accounted under the Vasicek (1977), Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) and generalized affine
term structure models a la Duffie-Kan (1996) asset classes.
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Section III. Multifactor Affine Term Structure under Vasicek
A good starting point is to use the pricing kernel a la Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) which
here is combined with the Vasicek (1977) process a la Piazzesi (2010). A possible
specification would be like:
  11   txttt xxxx  (6)
  11 'ln   tftt λrm  (7)
Equation (6) is the classical mean reversing process whereby xt+1 and its mean being both
a k × 1 vector of independent state variables and xt being its 1 period lag.σx is a diagonal
k × k matrix of standard deviations of the state variables.εt+1 is a k × 1 vector of random
error terms with classical normal assumptions of mean zero and variance 1.
Equation (7) is the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998),
however here with somehow a different setting, as (7) was originally the univariate
Vasicek (1977) case. In this essay we transform this specification and adapt it for the
multifactor case of a k-dimensional vector of state variables. In addition the short rate rtf
is replaced by (3) which will bring this closer to the Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010)
results. Same as in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998)δis specified as follows:
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Specification for (8) is fortuitous, the only aim is to normalise the stochastic discount
factor so that it becomes the inverse of the short rate. Notice that with (8), now (7) has the
following conditional means and variance:
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And assuming E[ln x] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x), which yields
  ftt rmE 1ln
Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) multifactor under the Vasicek (1977) case set the xt to zero
and δis replaced by the mean of the short rate. Here it will not be required to do this
because the short rate follows as described in (3). This will make possible to generate any
yield curve at any point in time, whereas Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) could only
produce an average yield curve, instead our model can generate any yield curve and study
the risk premium λi in time series fashion, should we wish to do so.
Here it is shown how to get there. Starting first with equation (2) and substituting the
right hand term for (7) and (4) which boils down to:
     111 ''ln   ttftNt xNBNAλrP  (9)
The intention is to compute the present value recursively using what it is known from (2)
for some guess of coefficients from (4). Since P(N)t+1 = 1 and A(N=0) = B(N=0)'=0,
which means this can be solve recursively, as for 1 period would imply A(N=1) = γ0 and
B(N=1)' = γ1' which means that equals the short rate as described in (3). Now for any set
of state variables the resulting yield curve can be computed. As this author is trying to
compute the coefficients for maturity N, all is needed is to use (2) to compute the present
value of an N+1 maturity bond.
As discussed earlier modifications to the Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) version are added
by replacing δfor (8), rtf for (3) and replacing xt+1 for the Vasicek (1977) process
described in (6).
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The constant terms and the terms multiplying xt andεt+1 are grouped, so that at the end it
would look something like this
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The reader should remember what is known from (2), so that the conditional moments on
(11) can satisfy,
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and
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Recalling that the implied present value of a fixed income security yields
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Substituting (12) and (13) into (14) yields
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt and lining up with (4) yields,
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All is needed is to replace (16) and (17) into (5) and solve numerically by fitting the
curve to the observed yields by adjusting λ’s for a given choice of maturities. All other
parameters are obtained from observations. Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) estimated the
λ’s for two factor model and fit the mean yields for maturities 60 and 120 months. For
each of the λ’s it is possible to adjust the parameters to a desired maturity, the greater the
number of λ’s, the better the fit will be, as it would be possible to fit for more maturities
resulting in a better fit of the parameters A(N) and B(N) to the observed curvature. This
choice is rather arbitrary, as there is no more rule than the size of the autocorrelation
coefficients. Hence, λ’s from state variables which show greater persistence –thus with a
greater degree of autocorrelation- are used to fit longer maturities and λ’s linked to
variables with a low autocorrelation coefficient are used for fitting shorter maturities, as
they exhibit less persistence.
An important difference is that under the Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) setup (17) was
equated to zero, as the means of x t were equal to zero. Intuitively, parameters γ0 and γ1i
under Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) are 0 and 1 respectively. Here these parameters are
free and obtained empirically for which it will be shown that parameters γ0 ≠ 0 and γ1i ≠ 1 
and the signs for parameters B(N)i from (5) depend on γ1i.
119
Section IV. Multifactor Affine Term Structure under Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
As in previous chapter the starting point is the pricing kernel a la Backus-Foresi-Telmer
(1998) which combined with the CIR (1985) process a la Piazzesi (2010) yields:
  11   ttxttt xxxxx  (18)
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Equation (18) is the CIR mean reversing process whereby xt+1 and its mean being both a k
× 1 vector of independent state variables and xt being its 1 period lag.σx is a diagonal k ×
k matrix of standard deviations of the state variables. εt+1 is a k × 1 vector of random
error terms with classical normal assumptions of mean zero and variance 1.
Equation (19) is the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998),
however here with somehow a different setting, as (19) was originally a univariate CIR
(1985) case and here this specification is adapted for the multifactor case, as similar to
the Vasicek (1977) discussed in previous section. Again, the short rate rtf is replaced by
(3) which will bring this closer to the Duffie and Kan (1996), Piazzesi (2010), Cochrane
(2005) and Singleton (2006) results.
The selection of the coefficient in (19) obeys the only purpose of normalising the
stochastic discount factor so that it equates the inverse of the short rate, so that equation
(19) results with the following conditional means and variance:
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And assuming E[ln x] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x), which yields
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  ftt rmE 1ln
Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) documented the discrete multifactor case for the CIR under
a different setup. Their example is mainly limited to a two factor under Longstaff and
Schwartz (1992) setup. Here, the aim is confined to a generalised version of a multifactor
model under the CIR with a k-dimensional vector of state variables. As in previous
Vasicek example, the generalised CIR multifactor case is specified as follows.
Starting with equation (2) and substituting the right hand term for (19) as well as (4)
which boils down to
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Same as for the Vasicek model the intention is to compute the present value recursively
using what is known from (2) for some guess of coefficients from (4). Since P(N)t+1 = 1
and A(N=0) = B(N=0)' = 0, which means it can be solve recursively, as for 1 period it
will imply A(N=1) = γ0 and B(N=1)' = γ1' and thus equating the short rate as described in
(3). Unfortunately this does not work because for it to work it would require γ0 = 0 and
γ1' to be a k × 1 elements equal to 1, which is not true empirically. So it is necessary to
modify the CIR case. To be more precise it will be necessary to sacrifice normality in
order to be able to let a parameter λ’s account for the discrepancies and thus enable the
CIR model fit the observed values.
As discussed earlier modifications to the Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) version are added
by replacing, rt f for (3) and replacing x t+1 for the CIR (1985) process already discussed in
(18).
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Rearranging and collecting terms so that the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt
andεt+1 are grouped, which would look something like this:
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Recalling (2), equation (22) has the following conditional moments,
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and
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Recalling (14), which is reproduced in (25) below,
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And now substituting (23) and (24) into (25) yields,
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt and lining up with (4) yields,
    xNBNANA k
i
i 


 

'
2
1
11
1
2
0  (27.a)
     21
1
2 ''
2
1''
2
11'1 x
k
i
i NBλINBNB  


 



 

(28.a)
Same as in previous Vasicek model, all is needed to do now is to replace (27) and (28)
into (5) and solve numerically by fitting the curve to the observed values by adjusting λ’s
for a given choice of maturities.
Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) do not account for (27.a) and (28.a). However, from their
univariate case it is possible to intuit that γ0 = 0 and γ1' is a 1 × k elements equal to 1
which is not realistic. The CIR process described in equation (18) is slightly different
whereby in their version (I –Φ) would be first order auto-regression coefficient φ. Under
this paper’s settings the use of the (I – Φ) brings it closer to the continuous time version
described under the Duffie and Kan (1996), Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010) class of
affine models.
However, notice that (27.a) and (28.a) only work if, and only if, γ0 = 0 and γ1' equals a 1
× k elements equal to 1. The problem stems from how (19) has been specified because γ0
is not zero and elements in γ1' are not one. So it will be necessary to change (19) and
sacrifice the possibility of making (19) equal the short rate under normality. Thus, (19)
will now look more like:
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Now if what was shown in (20) to (28) is re-performed under the above setup, (27.a) and
(28.a) would look more like
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Notice that now (27.b) and (28.b) does give the opportunity to solve by applying the
recursion as in (2). Since P(N)t+1 = 1 and A(N=0) = B(N=0)' = 0, and now A(N=1) = γ0
and B(N=1)' = γ1' which means that under (27.b) and (28.b) the model equals the short
rate as described in (3) for N = 1. This paper will use (27.b) and (28.b) when calibrating
the CIR model because the original (27.a) and (28.a) do not work for the reasons
explained above.
Section V. Generalised Multifactor Affine Term Structure Duffie and Kan
The Vasicek (1977) and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) are special cases of the
generalised multifactor affine term structure models which were first developed by
Duffie and Kan (1996) and translated into discrete time by Backus, Foresi and Telmer
(1996). The intention will, as for the previous models, include some of the developments
documented by Piazzesi (2010), Cochrane (2005), Singleton (2006) and Le, Singleton
and Dai (2010).
Under the generalised affine term structure state variables and the stochastic discount
factor are specified as follows.
  11   txttt xxxx  (29)
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tx xs (33)
 tiiti xssxs '10  (34)
Equation (29) describes the stochastic process of the independent state variables. This is
the usual mean reversing process whereby Δxt+1 is likely to be negative if xt is above its
mean and, is likely to be positive if xt is below its mean. xt and its mean are both k-
dimensional vectors. Φis a k × k matrix of diagonal elements Φi which represent the
speed of adjustment at which each of x it elements reverse to their means.σx is a diagonal
k × k matrix comprising the volatility of the state variables.εt+1 is a k-vector of shocks
moving x t away from its mean and with εi,t+1 elements being normally distributed with
mean zero and variance 1.
Equations (30) and (31) describe the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-
Telmer (1999) which introduces some changes to the already discussed version shown in
the Vasicek case equations (7) and (8), thus here with somehow a different setting, as
(30) now includes aσx term.
Equation (32) which was already discussed in the introduction in (3) will be replaced by
the short rate rt
f so that it would get closer to the Piazzesi (2010) results.
The selection of (31) obeys the only purpose of normalising the stochastic discount factor
so that it equates the inverse of the short rate.
Equation (33) and (34) describe the volatilities of the state variables. s(x) is a diagonal k
× k matrix with elements si(x). Notice that by doing so it is possible to generalise for both
Vasicek and the CIR cases. Because the Vasicek is a Gaussian process and CIR is a
square root process. With (34) enabling for both cases, thus s1i = 0 and s0i = 1 for the
Vasicek case, whereby the variance parameters inΣare free. Alternatively, if it is wished
to account for the CIR case, then set s1i = 1 and s0i = 0. Piazzesi (2010) and the celebrated
paper from Duffie and Kan (1996) as well as Dai and Singleton (2000) remember us of
the conditions required to obtain a unique solution to the stochastic differential equations,
and these comprise the Feller and the Lipschitz conditions, for which the reader is
125
encouraged to refer to Piazzesi (2010) page 706 for some examples on how this works.
As for our discussion this is not of crucial relevance to this research.
Replacing (31) into (30) and adjusting the signs accordingly yields
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Equation (35) has the following conditional means and variance:
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And assuming E[ln x] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x), which yields
  ftt rmE 1ln (36)
Backus-Telmer-Wu (1999) documented an affine case for two variables under a slightly
different setup. Now, similar to the previous Vasicek and CIR examples, the generalised
version follows.
This starts again with equation (2) and substitute the right hand term for (35) and (4)
which boils down to
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Same as for the Vasicek and CIR models the intention is to compute the present value
recursively using what is known from (2) for some guess of coefficients from [4]. Since
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P(N)t+1 = 1 and A(N=0) = B(N=0)' = 0, which means this can be solved recursively, as for
1 period would imply A(N=1) = γ0 and B(N=1)' = γ1' and by doing so it the short rate is
obtained as described in (3).
As discussed earlier modifications to the Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) version will be
added by replacing, rt f for (3) and replacing xt+1 for the general affine version process
described in (29).
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Accounting now for [33] and [34], [38] would now look more like
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Rearranging and collecting terms so that the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt
andεt+1 are grouped, resulting in (39) being
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And has conditional moments,
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and
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The implied present value of a fixed income security being
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So that substituting (41) and (42) into (43) yields
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Rearranging and collecting terms, with the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt
being grouped. Finally, lining up with (4) results in
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 (45)
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 (46)
Same as in previous Vasicek and CIR model, all is needed now is to replace (45) and (46)
into (5) and solve numerically by fitting the curve to the observed values by adjusting λ’s
for a given choice of maturities.
128
Backus-Telmer-Wu (1999) and Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) and (1996) document (45)
and (46) in somehow different setup. The pricing kernel described in (30) is normalised,
so that under log normal conditions the stochastic discount factor equates the short rate,
this is not so obvious in their case. A matrixΣof free parameters is also included in the
model similar to Duffie and Kan (1996), Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010), which is
not included in Backus-Telmer-Wu (1999) and Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) and (1996).
As in the previous cases, Backus-Telmer-Wu (1999) and Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998)
their versions show that γ0 = 0 and γ1' is vector of 1 × k elements equal to 1. Finally, also
the process described in equation (29) is slightly different whereby in their version (I –
Φ) would be first order auto-regression coefficientφ. Under our setting the use of the (I –
Φ) brings us closer to the continuous time version described under the Duffie and Kan
(1996), Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010) class of affine models. However, Piazzesi
(2010) does not account neither for λ’s nor the volatility of the stochastic discount factor
in a way that allows fitting the curve to observed yields.
Ideally, (45) and (46) would allow to identify back (16) and (17) as well as (27) and (28),
but this does not quite match because of the Σ'Σmultiplying both λ' and B(N)' terms in
(45) and (46). This is because of how the stochastic discount factor has been specified in
(30) and (31). Under this setup we differ to the stochastic discount factor under Vasicek
(1977) and CIR (1985) documented earlier in (7) and (19) mainly because in these
specifications it did not account for the volatilityσx as part of the stochastic discount
factor, as depicted in (30) and (31). This has been mainly for convenience only. Thus,
without loss of generality (45) and (46) are adapted slightly, thus yielding
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Notice that now when s0i is 1 and s1i is zero the model accounts for the Vasicek (1977)
case discussed in Section 3 and when s0i is zero and s1i is 1 the model accounts for the
CIR (1985) as discussed in section 4.
Section VI. Calibrating Under the Discrete Approach
This paper calibrates the Vasicek (1977) and the CIR (1985) using macroeconomic data.
The models discussed in sections 3 and 4, shown in (16) and (17) for the Vasicek process,
and (27.b) and (28.b) under the CIR approach are fitted using monthly Euro-Zone
Unemployment Rate, Euro-Zone M3, Euro-Zone Production Price Index and European
Commission Consumer Confidence Index, as per our discussion chapter 4 propositions 1,
2 and 4. Results are compared for estimated values of a(N) = A(N)∕N and b(N) = B(N)∕
N with those observed via OLS published in Jakas (2011). This empirical work is based
on monthly observations. EONIA, Euribor and German government yields have been
obtained from Bloomberg. Most of the data series is only available since 1999. The
period considered is from December 1999 until January 2010. This results in 122
observations. The yields are estimated under the restrictions (16) and (17) as well as
(27.b) and (28.b) mentioned above and compared with the observed data.
Figure 5-1 below shows the coefficients b(N)i for OLS, Vasicek and CIR for different
maturities. Vasicek and CIR show more persistence than OLS. Under OLS, coefficients
fall faster and die away as maturity increases. Notice under OLS only the unemployment
and producer prices show some persistence. In addition, they also exhibit a “humped”
shape which this paper is not capable to reproduce under Vasicek or CIR and confirm the
results seen on Backus, Telmer and Wu (1999). Not surprisingly, under the Vasicek as
well as CIR approach, the coefficients are almost identical both models estimate virtually
the same values. This is possible thanks to the use of more than one variable and the use
of λ’s to fit for the same maturities. The sign of the b(N)i coefficients are primarily
governed by the estimated parameters γ1i, which are -in turn- are estimated via OLS by
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regressing the EONIA with the four factors (Unemployment, PPI, M3 and Consumer
Confidence Index). Discussions on these results are shown in Jakas (2011).
Figure 5-2 shows that this behaviour is also observed for the coefficients a(N). In general,
it could be said that affine models exhibit coefficients which have a smoother behaviour
across maturities than those seen under the OLS approach. a(N) increases as maturities
become longer. Under the OLS approach a(N) is much steeper than those estimated under
the Vasicek and CIR, and becomes negative for the Euribor 3 months, 6 months and the 2
year German government.
Economically, results are interpreted as follows: An increase in unemployment results in
an increase in expected aggregate marginal utility with a the subsequent decrease in risk
free assets’ yields, as these are dear most in times of low consumption growth. An
increase in consumer confidence results in a decrease in expected aggregate marginal
utility growth and therefore, risk free yields are expected to increase as these assets act as
a hedge in times when consumer confidence is low. An increase production prices has
two implications, 1) an increase in production prices means that aggregate consumption
growth is high, and in times when aggregate consumption growth is high risk free assets
are dear less as these are negatively correlated with consumption growth, and investors
are less risk averse and prefer riskier assets. 2) Taylor rules show that central bank policy
will be to increase interest rates if production prices are expected to drift expected
inflation away from target levels. Subsequently, an increase in interest rates results in an
increase in yields, as financing becomes more expensive and margins between interest
income and funding expense are tighter. An increase in monetary aggregates is expected
to results in a fall in interest rates, as central banks conduct quantitative easing, yields fall
mainly because the cost of financing generate higher margins and competition in the
capital markets push bond prices up with the subsequent fall in yields. This behaviour is
explained mainly by an increase in margins which in turn increases demand in the bond
markets pushing prices up.
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Figure 5-1 Analysis of the b(N)i coefficients under OLS, Vasicek and CIR models.
Figure 5-2 Analysis of the Intercept a(N) coefficient under OLS, Vasicek and CIR models.
In order to analyse the models’ ability to fit the curves with various shapes this research
shows in figure 5-3 how the fitted curves look like at their flattest, mean or average, and
steepest levels. In order to do this first the EONIA’s historical highs, average and lows
are identified and, subsequently the corresponding values observed for the four factors
(unemployment, PPI, M3 and Consumer Confidence index). The model is capable of
reproducing the observed sample data. Results have interesting policy implications which
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are outlined as follows: 1) the yield curve is at its flattest level when the overnight rate is
at its highest value, unemployment is at its lowest level, production prices are at their
highest levels, money supply (M3) is tight and consumer confidence levels is at its highs.
And 2), when the yield curve is at its steepest the overnight rate is at its lowest,
unemployment rate is at its highest levels, production prices are low, money supply is lax
and consumer confidence level is the lowest.
Notice that an economy exhibiting the above mention behaviour of the yield curve would
suggest that the government could take advantage by issuing new debt at low financing
costs in times of low consumption growth in order to undertake countercyclical fiscal
policies without increasing distortionary taxation. In times of low consumption growth
risk free assets exhibit low yields and hence low financing costs. Alternatively, in times
of high consumption growth, when risk free assets exhibit high yields and thus prices are
low, governments should reduce debt growth outstanding via buy-back programmes and
thus reduce current refinancing costs. In fact, governments should under such scenario
take advantage of buying back at a low redemption price.
From a portfolio management perspective, in times when the curve is at its steepest, a
representative investor will have the incentive to undertake a flattening strategy such as
shorting the 2 year maturity bonds and long the 10 to 30 years, as the losses generated in
the 10 to 30 years will be more than offset by the profits on the front end. In times when
the curve is at its flattest, a representative investor will have the incentive to long the 2
year maturities and short the long end (10 to 30 years).
The front end of the curve is relatively similar across models. The different models show
discrepancies mainly on the long end. Hence, from the 10 year maturities onwards, OLS
fails to describe the movement of the curve when yields are above their average. The
observed, as well as the estimated via Vasicek and CIR describe a rather parallel shift
whereas OLS shows more a flattening movement once yields have reached their means
and are moving towards their flattest level.
In all cases it is shown that when the curve is at its flattest, yields are higher across the
yield curve and when the yield curve is at its steepest the yields are at their lowest levels.
All models agree with the observed yield curves that the front end is clearly more volatile
and has a greater range of values than the long end. When yields are increasing, the yield
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curve is expected to become flatter if yields are currently below their means and,
alternatively, when yields are falling, the yield curve is expected to become steeper if
yields are above their mean values. This is mainly because the volatility in the yield curve
is expected to fall as maturity increases. A possible way of describing this would be if it
is assumed that the volatility at any point of the yield curve somehow obeys that σ(N) =
σ(1) ∕N, thus the volatility and macroeconomic shock effects decrease as maturity
increases.
Figure 5-3 Fitting the yield curve
The predictive-ability of the models is of special interest to this research. The intention is
not only to explain economically the behaviour of the yield curve from a macroe conomic
perspective but also understand how macroeconomic variables contribute to predict
changes in the yield curve. Figures 5-4 and 5-5 show how the four factor Vasicek as well
as the CIR models are capable of fitting the yield curve behaviour as a consequence of
innovations in macroeconomic variables. The models are calibrated for the period starting
from December 1999 to January 2010 and compared the estimated yields to those
observed in the sample data. Results are encouraging, as fitted values are in line with the
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observable trends. Yields in the longer end are less predictable, compared to those seen in
the front end however they still exhibit a high explanatory power and forecast quite well
the underlying trends.
As maturities become longer, forecasts appear to be less convincing towards end of 2009
and beginning of 2010. However, even though not presented in figures 4-5, current data
shows that yields have indeed fallen during 2011 to historic lows, Schatz (2 years
German treasuries), Bobls (5 years German government) and Bunds (10 years German
government bonds) reached historic lows below 2% for Bunds and even negative yields
on less than 1 year Germany treasuries, thus showing that these models predicted in
advance lower yield levels.
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Figure 5-4 Vasicek fitted versus observed yields
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Figure 5-5 CIR fitted versus observed yields
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Section VII. Calibrating with Greek Government Bonds
In this section, we calibrate an affine term structure model under CIR with Greek
government bonds. The study was mainly dependent on the availability of yield data for
the period during Greek’s financial collapse as well as previous periods where Greece
enjoyed some stability. The model should be capable of accounting for all states of the
economy. Full statistics were only available for 2, 5, 10, 15 year bonds available in
Bloomberg historical data. The period used varies depending on the maturity, but overall
we considered the period June 2001 to April 2012. The macroeconomic variables have
been picked after surveying 50 market participants from various market leading financial
institutions. We picked the top three: Greek government budget deficit to GDP ratio,
Greek unemployment rate and Greek government debt to GDP ratio, as discussions in
chapter 4 propositions 3 and 4. Regression results show that all these factors were highly
significant and that OLS as well as affine models perform very well, despite the volatility
seen during the last two years.
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 below show the affine-CIR fitted versus the observed Greek
Government yields, which are quite encouraging despite market conditions. Figure 5-7
shows that observed values exhibit more volatility than the fitted ones the closer we get
to Greece’s default.
Figure 5-8 shows the OLS-fitted versus observed. The reason for doing this comparison
is mainly to show the differences stemming from a no-arbitrage approach with those
using the OLS-approach, which violates the no-arbitrage condition depicted in an affine
term structure model.
Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show that the affine-CIR as well as the OLS models can reproduce
the dramatic rise in yields shortly before Greece’s collapse. Not so lucky appear to be the
results seen for the 2 year yields which exhibits a slower growth rate compared to the
observed data. However, this is not so disappointing, as the model has been able to
account for a yield movement from 4% up to almost 50% levels. Remarkably, the 5, 10
and 15 years exhibit surprisingly good results, mainly because these have had a far lower
impact compared to the 2 year yields. This research shows that the macroeconomic
variables used for calibrating the model explain very well yield dynamics.
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In times of financial distress and when government bonds become risky assets, markets
focus their attention more to the ability of governments to repay in the future and ratios
such as debt-to-GDP as well as government deficit-to-GDP exhibit high explanatory
power, in contrast to the German bonds, where markets look here more into
unemployment as well as expected future consumption growth and less to debt-to-GDP
or deficit-to-GDP ratios, because here German bonds act as a hedge for times where
aggregate marginal utility growth is high and expected future consumption growth is low.
Figure 5-6 Greek government bond yield-curve CIR-fitted versus observed.
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Figure 5-7 Greek government bond yields, CIR-fitted versus observed time series.
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Figure 5-8 Greek Government Bonds OLS fitted versus observed time series.
In order to focus on the limitations of the model we analyse the ability of the model to
generate an average yield curve in times when the short yields are at their lowest and at
their highest levels. Figure 5-9 below shows different coefficients for the parameters
A(N) and B(N)i which have been estimated calibrating a space state vector observed when
the 2 year Greek Government yield was at its lowest level, at its mean and at its highest
level. We see that the model struggles when yields are at their highest levels. This should
not surprise the reader, as these levels of yields are observed shortly before the Greek
sovereign collapse and its subsequent default. Moreover, actually what is really
struggling here is the Broydn function in Matlab rather than the model. In this paper we
use this Matlab function to solve numerically equation (5) to adjust to observed yields
(and to restrictions documented in 27.b and 28.b) by adjusting the vector λ' explained in
previous sections. Parameters A(N) and B(N)i exhibit virtually identical patterns and
differ significantly only when yields are at their highest levels. Coefficients for Greek
government budget deficit to GDP are negative which means that an increase in this ratio,
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hence a deterioration of its finances with respect to GDP, results in a fall in yields. A
priori this might be seen as odd, but it makes sense if this is analysed together with the
other two coefficients, thus looking into the size and the sign of the coefficients for
unemployment and debt-to-GDP ratio. Unemployment and debt-to-GDP ratio show that
these coefficients would more than offset any positive effect from the fall in yields as a
result of an increase in the government deficit-to-GDP ratio.
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Figure 5-9 Greek Government Bonds Affine-CIR estimated.
Coefficients A(N)/N and B(N)i/N fitting equation (5) to observed yields, restricted to
(27.b) and (28.b) and when state vectors are x i;min; xi;mean; and xi;max.
Min Average Max
Table 5-1 shows some regression results. All variables used are very significant. OLS
confirms our observation under the affine-CIR, thus if governments similar to the Greek
case, engage in counter-cyclical fiscal policies that result in a deterioration of their
government deficit with respect to GDP might still observe a fall in yields however, this
is expected to be more than offset by an increase in yields as a consequence from a
deterioration in their debt-to-GDP ratio. This implies that governments can run deficits to
reduce unemployment only if the deterioration of its deficit does not result in a significant
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deterioration of their Debt to GDP ratio, as the deterioration of this ratio will more than
offset any positive effect stemming from their countercyclical fiscal policies. The reader
should notice that the signs of the coefficients (with the exception of the intercept) are in
line with the theoretical discussions in from Chapter 4, proposition 3.
Table 5-1 OLS Regression Results and Selected Diagnostics
State Variables Greek Government Sovereign Yields
State Variables 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years
Log Greek Gov. Deficit to GDP
Ratio
-23.53547
(t-stat: -3.68)
(P: 0.000)
-7.338331
(t-stat: -5.30)
(P: 0.000)
-3.093097
(t-stat: -6.25)
(P: 0.000)
-3.776979
(t-stat: -4.30)
(P: 0.000)
Log Greek Unemployment Rate 18.56715
(t-stat: 3.04)
(P: 0.003)
6.672775
(t-stat: 4.50)
(P: 0.000)
3.40174
(t-stat: 5.99)
(P: 0.000)
4.858906
(t-stat: 4.98)
(P: 0.000)
Log Greek Government Debt to
GDP Ratio
100.2863
(t-stat: 4.15)
(P: 0.000)
39.68417
(t-stat: 7.90)
(P: 0.000)
17.13523
(t-stat: 12.02)
(P: 0.000)
24.58802
(t-stat: 7.59)
(P: 0.000)
Intercept -461.3932
(t-stat: -4.18)
(P: 0.000)
-182.0015
(t-stat: -8.11)
(P: 0.000)
-77.10492
(t-stat: -
13.32)
(P: 0.000)
-113.5292
(t-stat: -7.81)
(P: 0.000)
Number of observations 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.5460 0.8158 0.8712 0.8183
Section VIII. Conclusions and Final Remarks
This paper documented some of the algebra and concepts seen in the continuous time
affine term structure literature and plugged them into the discrete time approach. Starting
point for this paper has been the celebrated papers from Backus, Foresi, Telmer (1996-
98). In addition, some of the developments seen on the continuous approach as
documented in Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006) and Duffie and Kan (1996) have been
explored and adapted to the discrete time approach.
This research focused mainly on the multifactor cases of affine term structure models, as
the weaknesses seen on the one factor models under Vasicek (1977) and CIR (1985) have
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been very well documented already in Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998). Novelty of this
research is that the multifactor affine term structure models under the Vasicek (1977) and
the CIR (1985) process were calibrated using observed Interbank and German sovereign
yields and European macroeconomic data as well as Greek sovereign yields. For the
European and German yield curve, we calibrate macroeconomic data such as Euro-Zone
Unemployment rate, Euro-Zone Production Price Index, Euro-Zone monetary aggregates
M3 and Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index. For the Greek yields curve we use
Greece’s sovereign budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, Greek unemployment rate and Greek
sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio. The results are encouraging and the models fit the observed
yields as well as give evidence of a reasonable predictive-ability. These results has been
supported by recent research as seen in the works of De Grauwe (2011a,b), Gros (2012),
Kopf (2011), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) as well as Beirne and Fratzscher (2013). We show
that for a government that enjoys a risk-free status, hence a government that experiences
small liquidity shocks, such as the German government, the state variables for calibrating
the bond yields can be the unemployment rate, consumer confidence index, the price
level and the monetary aggregate M3. On the contrary, if the government does not enjoy
the risk-free status, such as the Greek government, hence the government suffers from
large liquidity shocks, the state variables for calibrating the bond yields can be the debt-
to-GDP ratio, the government surplus-to-GDP ratio and the unemployment rate.
Main findings can be summarised as follows: In the case of the interbank rates and
German sovereigns, an increase in unemployment results in a fall in yields on risk free
assets and the curve is expected to steepen with front end yields falling faster than the
long end. An increase in production prices are expected to result in yield curve flattening,
with yields in the front end increasing at a faster pace than the long end. An increase in
monetary aggregate M3 is expected to result in yield curve steepening, with yields in the
front end falling faster than the long end. Finally, an increase in the consumer confidence
index is expected to result in yields flattening, with front end yields increasing faster than
the long end. This means that when the economy is booming risk free assets’ yields are
expected to flatten and when the economy is under recession risk free assets’ yields are
expected to steepen. From a portfolio management perspective, a representative investor
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would have incentives to short risk free assets in times when yields are at their steepest
levels and set a curve flattening strategy shorting the front end allocating greater weight
than to the long end. A more conservative strategy would be to short 2 years versus long
the 10 and 20 years onwards, as the profits from the front end are expected to outweigh
the losses on the long end.
For the case of Greek government bonds the model shows that if governments engage in
counter cyclical fiscal policies when unemployment is high, this will only be possible if
these policies do not result in a significant deterioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Governments that exhibit a positive correlation of their yields to aggregate consumption
growth need to ensure low deficits and debt burdens during booming periods so that they
can still have capacity to issue new debt for the rainy days.
From the Greek case this paper shows that a deterioration of government’s deficit-to-
GDP ratio results in a fall in yields. This is mainly because the increase in spending helps
to boom the economy. However, this is more than offset by the deterioration of its debt-
to-GDP ratio, thus a deterioration of the latter ratio will more than offset any positive
effects stemming from any budget-deficit-induced counter-cyclical policies.
We have learned that debt and deficit ratios can play a role in times of financial distress.
However, more research is needed in order to understand what can be done once it’s
already too late, thus once governments have not done their homework and run
unprecedented and unsustainable deficits, thus the question we should try to answer is:
what can be done in order to avoid distortionary taxations and aggressive fiscal discipline
that lead to more social unrest and further financial markets nervousness.
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6. The Yield Curve and Economic Fundamentals: A Continuous Time
Model
Section I. Introduction
Fear, as any other human emotion, is part of the market economy. However, this
does not mean that in even during such apparently irrational times, market behaviour
cannot be accounted for by econometric models. In fact, according to the results in this
essay, current, admittedly low yields seem to be explained by euro-zone macroeconomic
variables fairly well. It turns out, therefore, that observed yields are still being described
by a state space vector of macroeconomic variables. In the present study which was
published in Jakas and Jakas (2013), we apply the continuous time affine term structure
(CT-ATS) model to analyse euro-zone yield benchmark data. A novel approach, indeed,
since most empirical works so far have limited themselves to US data, test Fed policy and
Taylor’s (1993) rules, as in Christiano et al. (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2002)
Sims (1999) and Sims and Zha (2002), Piazzesi (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
and Evans and Marshall (1998, 2001). In addition, we show that it is possible to depart
from the usual maximum likelihood approach and show that other numerical methods
such as those published in Press et al. (1996) usually used in physics are capable of
compelling results.
Similarly, other authors have concentrated in testing expectations hypothesis as in
Mankiw and Miron (1986) or used yield curve models to identify central bank latent
targets as in Piazzesi (2001, 2002). Likewise Barr and Campbell (1997) and Campbell
and Viceira (2001) also apply the ATS models to determine the correlation of real, short
term yields with inflation and risk premium. Similar papers on inflation and risk premium
with index linked bonds were seen in Buraschi and Jilsov (2005), and Campbell and
Shiller (1991) with U.K. data mostly with two factor models.
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A different perspective is seen in Ang and Piazzesi (2003), where they address
whether macro variables add to our understanding of yields by looking at out-of-sample
forecasts of yields. The works from Aït-Sahalia (2002) and Aït-Sahalia and Kimmel
(2002) estimate multifactor models using closed form likelihood expansions and
emphasis is given more to the methodology rather than to the state variables used. Ang et
al. (2006) estimate a three-factor model based on a short rate, term spread, and GDP
growth, but again mostly confined to US data whereas our paper the short rate is treated
endogenously. Entering the short rate as an explanatory variable usually improves
goodness of fit, however we still need to know what influences the yield curve, and the
short rate is part of the yield. Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (1998 and 1996) present a
discrete approach of bond pricing mostly on US data and applied to the understanding of
the forward premium anomaly in foreign exchange prices.
In general, little has been done on Euro-Zone data with affine term structure
models apart from the papers seen in Jakas (2011 and 2012) confined to ordinary last
square (OLS) regressions and an affine discrete approach for testing Vasicek (1977) and
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) stochastic processes under a multifactor setup. Most of the
publications are either concentrated from an inflation or inflation risk premium
perspective or the data is confined only to a particular European country instead of a
euro-zone or Europe level. Looking into the works from Hördahl and Oreste (2010) they
mainly confine their work to a joint model of macroeconomic and term structure
dynamics to estimate inflation risk premia. While it is true that they look not only to US
data but also to euro data, their focus is not to model the European benchmark term
structure but the inflation risk premia. Other celebrated ECB working papers such as in
Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin (2007) are confined to show that micro founded dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities can be successful in
replicating features of bond yield data, however the work is based all on US data from the
Federal Bank of Saint Louis. e.g. to be more precise they use PCECC96 for consumption
and PCECTPI for prices. Amisano and Tristani (2007) focus on inflation not on term
structure. Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin (2004) confines the work solely to German data
and does not calibrate with European aggregated macroeconomic data in order to analyse
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from a euro-zone perspective. And there are many more previous to the creation of the
euro which are not worth mentioning here, as we confine our work to a euro zone
perspective using real data from the euro-area.
Our intention is to use the ATS model to link the fields of macroeconomics and
mathematical finance from a practitioner’s view, as we believe that the yield curve is an
integral part of a network of macroeconomic variables. Moreover, most of the empirical
work does not provide much discussion about the state variables used in those models. In
fact, most of the empirical work shows a rather poor performance from a practical
standpoint, mainly because even if the models are robust, theoretically speaking, they
performed poorly on the empirical arena, and not all state variables fit the models so well.
In contrast, in this work we have identified state variables which show that ATS models
can perform better and thus this paper opens the opportunity for better forecasts.
We confined our work to the assumption that risk-free government bonds satisfy
the Duffie-Kan (1996) class of affine models and we stick strictly to the methodology
published in Cochrane (2005) and Piazzesi (2010). Our purpose is not to develop a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, but to simply calibrate the benchmark
curve to observed macroeconomic data and show that low yields are explain by the data
using when applying this model.
We define the European Yield curve benchmark as the European Overnight Index
Average (EONIA) for the short rate, and the rest of the curve comprises the Euribor 3 and
6 months, and the 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 year German government yields. Furthermore,
we use the following state vectors: (i) unemployment rate, (ii) consumer confidence, (iii)
money aggregate ECB M3, and (iv) the production price index. We show that these state
variables reproduce the above mentioned benchmark yield curves remarkably well.
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Section II. The Model
In this section8 we will briefly outline the basics equations used in the present
paper. As was already mentioned, we will closely follow the approach in Piazzesi (2010)
and Cochrane (2005). Therefore, we assume that the bond price is given by the
approximation,
 xB  )N()N(Aexp)t,N(P T , (1)
where t denotes time, N the bond maturity and x is vector of the state variables.
Similarly, A and B are functions of maturity obeying the boundary conditions
 00)0()0(A B .
As is customary, the bond yield, i.e. )t,N(y , is obtained from Eq.(1) using the
equality,
N
)N(Ax)N(B
N
)t,N(Pln
)t,N(y j
jj 


, (2)
where ln denotes natural logarithm. Similarly, the risk-free interest or so-called short
rate -which in our case is the EONIA- is assumed to be a liner function of the state
variables,

j
jj0 xr  . (3)
where 0 and j are parameters in the model which, as is explained in the Appendix, are
obtained from a linear regression of state variables to the observed risk-free interest data.
As proposed by Piazzesi (2010) and Cochrane (2005), functions A and B can be
obtained using the so-called expectation approach. Accordingly, the expected change of
the bond price with an infinitesimal change of time dt is given by the equation,
8 This section has been written with the intellectual contribution of Prof. Dr. Mario Jakas and adapted to
some of the remarks given by Prof. Dr. Kenneth Singleton.
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where  is the discount factor, NdP denotes differentiation at constant maturity and
xEt represents the expectation operator (see Cochrane, 2005). Furthermore, the
equations governing the time evolution of the state variables and that of the discount
factor are given by the expressions,
  j2/1Tjj
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jjj,ii dzSdtxxdx xβ   , (5)
and,
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where jx is the average value of the state variable jx over the pertinent period of time
and, jdz is a  1,0 -normal distributed random variable. Similarly, 
k
kk,j
T
j xxβ , and
j,i , j,iS , j and k,j are additional parameters entering the model.
By introducing expression (1) into Eq.(4) and using equations (5,6) as well as
well-known properties of the random variables (see the Appendix), one may arrive to
equations,
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151
This system of ordinary differential equations can be solved by numerical means
and so, using Eq.(2), the bond yields are readily obtained.
Although a much more detailed description of the procedure used to calculate the
bond yields are produced in the Appendix, for the time being, suffices it to say that, in the
first place, the values of 0, j, j,i , j,iS , j and k,j are obtained by least-square-error
fittings of predictions in Eqs.(3,5) to available data. Secondly, the values of j,b are
calculated by resorting, again, to last-square-fitting of Eq.(2) to observed yields.
It must be noticed that, contrary to the assumptions in the previous paper by
Vasicek (1977) and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985), where either , or βare assumed to be
zero, in the present paper  and βare treated as free, fitting parameters and therefore
both can be different from zero. In addition to that, we have opted for assuming that
j,ij,iS  , where j,i is the Kroenecker’s delta function.
The results of numerically calculating the various expressions derived above
are presented and discussed in the following section.
Section III. Results and discussion
Yield calculations.
As was already mentioned, in this paper we analyse the behaviour of the EONIA,
3-and 6-month Euribor rate as well as those of the 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30-year German
government bonds. Likewise, as state variables we used the natural logarithm of the euro-
zone unemployment rate, the euro zone production price index, the ECB monetary
aggregate M3 index, and the EU consumer confidence index, which will be denoted as
URx , PPx , MAx and CCx , respectively. Notice that the EU consumer confidence index
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exhibits negative values which complicate the use of natural logarithms. In order to
overcome this we have simply added 100 to the observed values before taking logarithm.
The data, which are published on a monthly basis, span a period of time ranging from
December 1999 to January 2010. The aspects exhibited by the state variables are plotted
in Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1 State variables used in this essay.
Namely, the natural logarithms of the unemployment rate (
URx ), production price index ( PPx ), monetary
aggregate (
MAx ), and consumer confidence ( CCx ).
In the first place, we calculate the parameters connecting the EONIA rate r and
the aforementioned state variables as indicated in Eq.(3). After minimizing expression
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(A1) we find that the i-coefficient so obtained, reproduce the observed free-risk data
with an accuracy of the order of %4 relative error, per point.
Figure 6-2 Risk-free interest or short rate (EONIA) as a function of time (starting on Dec. 1999).
Open circles denote data, whereas the continuous line stands for the approximation in
Eq.(3) using four states variables (see text).
Such an agreement becomes evident in Figure 6-2, where expression (3) appears
to reproduce the main features of the EONIA rate remarkably well all over the entire
range of time. Only a handful of points however deviate from theoretical curve,
indicating that the majority of shocks in the EONIA are fairly well described by the
chosen state variables, which confirms the results published in Jakas (2011 and 2012).
The values of the coefficients in Eq.(3) that were used to plot the theoretical results in
Figure 6-2 are listed in Table 6-1. Notice that the linear coefficients are multiplied by the
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mean-value of the corresponding state variable in order to compensate for the differences
arising from the different absolute values of the state variables.
Table 6-1 Fitting coefficients in Eq.(3).
Linear coefficients, i.e. i 4,,1i  , multiplied by the mean-values of the state
variables, i.e. URx , PPx , MAx and CCx .
0 UR1 x PP2 x MA3 x CC4 x
0.13 -0.20 0.63 -0.61 0.068
According to the results in Table 6-1, it turns out that the risk-free rate is more
sensitive to euro zone production price and ECB monetary aggregate M3 indices rather
than to unemployment rate, and shows nearly no sensitiveness to consumer confidence.
Similarly, r appears to be negatively correlated with the monetary aggregate M3
whereas, r and the production price index is positively correlated. While r and
unemployment show a slightly negative correlation.
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Table 6-2 Value of the parameters entering the present calculations.
Excepting the means, which are directly obtained from data, all other figures are the result of the
minimizing procedure described in text. Indices relate to the state variables as follows: 1: EU
unemployment, 2: EU production price index, 3: ECB M3 and 4: EU consumer confidence.
1 2 3 4
ix - 2.13 4.60 8.81 4.48
ii,j x
1 1.9 2.0 0.95 2.2
2 0.94 4.7 0.67 0.53
3 0.23 0.35 1.2 0.66
4 1.1 0.54 1.3 3.3
xβTii  - 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.058
ii,j x 104
1 0.95 1.4 6.1 1.8
2 2.4 0.95 1.9 0.42
3 4.6 0.85 0.81 0.16
4 12.0 4.7 7.7 6.1
i104 - 1.9 2.6 0.46 3.4
xβiii,b  - -0.022 -1.9 1.9 1.3
In Table 6-2 we list the values of the most relevant parameters obtained after
performing minimization of expressions (A1-A4) and calculating the coefficients A and
B according to the procedure described in the Appendix. As we have already done in
Table 6-1, the differences arising from the different absolute values of the state variables
are somehow removed by multiplying j,i by jx , j,i by jx , and i,b by xβTii  .
One can observe that the off-diagonal elements in matrix “ jj,i x ” are not small
compared with those in the diagonal. This indicates that state variables are certainly
interrelated. By observing that the values exhibited by jj,i x and i are all comparable,
we can unambiguously conclude that the case analysed in this paper does not seem to fit
on any of the cases described in Vasicek (1977) and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985).
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Similarly, the results for xβTiii,b  clearly show that the random shocks in the
unemployment rate does have little or nearly no significant impact on shocking the bond
yields.
It must be mentioned however that the results in Table 6-2 are presented for the
sole purpose of recording the results of the present calculations. However, one should be
cautious about interpreting them since, according to our own experience some of these
results may change, depending on the initial guess used in the minimization procedure.
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Figure 6-3 Coefficients A(N)/N and B(N)/N in Eq.(2), obtained by fitting to Euribor and German
Government bonds.
It must be noticed that, in the legend of the lower figure, indices of coefficients iB were
replaced by abbreviation used for the corresponding state variables.
Once all the previous parameters are calculated one could obtain the bonds yields
using the expression in Eq.(2). We start by plotting the results of calculating the three-and
six-month Euribor rate. The results, which are plotted in Figure 6-4, show a remarkable
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agreement with data all over the whole range of time used in this paper. Our numerical
calculations deviate from data with a mean relative error of the order of fifteen per cent.
It must be mentioned though, that this is not at all an unexpected result since, in the light
of the good agreement already found for the EONIA rate in Figure 6-2, these two, short-
maturity bonds should be also well-described by the present model. This is so, because at
small N -values, N/A and N/B i are strongly dominated by the EONIA terms, namely
i.
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Figure 6-4 Three- and six-month Euribor rate.
Data appear as open symbols, whereas continuous lines denote theoretical approximation
given by Eq.(2).
Remarkably however, a fairly good agreement is found between data and
calculated yields for longer maturity bonds as those in Figure 6-5. There, one can see that
two-, five-, ten, fifteen, twenty and thirty-years maturity German Government bonds
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appear to compare with calculations fairly well. According to the results of our numerical
calculations, these bonds are reproduced within relative errors of the order of ten per cent.
Figure 6-5 Two-, five-, ten-, fifteen-, twenty- and thirty-year German Government Bonds.
Data are denoted as open symbols, and the results of calculating Eq.(2) appear as
continuous lines.
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Another interesting aspect of the present calculations is depicted in Figure 6-6. It
shows the mean-value of the Euribor and German Bonds taken over the period of time
spanned by the used data, i.e. form Dec. 1999 to Jan 2010, and then plotted as a function
of maturity N . The results show that, as is expected, the yield should increase with
increasing maturity though, at rates which are larger for short N ’s and becoming nearly
constant as maturity reaches values larger than, say, fifteen years.
Figure 6-6 Average bonds yield as a function of maturity.
Data appear as open circles, and calculations are denoted as a continuous line.
Theoretical limiting values (see text), i.e. r (3.1%) and  )/(100 NA (4.9%) are
indicated by dashed lines.
Interestingly enough, these average yields should have limiting values which can
be readily obtained from Eqs.(7a,b). For small maturities, one can readily verify that
0dN/dA  and ii dN/dB  , therefore, N)N(A 0 and N)N(B ii  . As a
163
consequence, according to Eq.(2) one has  
j
0
)n(
jjn x)t,0(y  , which after taking
average over time and taking into account Eq.(3) we may write
CAL
j
0jj rx)0(y   , where CALr stands for the mean-value of the EONIA rate
calculated using Eq.(3).
For a sufficiently large N , one has 0dN/dB i  . This implies that 1i k)N(B 
and, as a consequence, 2kdN/dA  , where 1k and 2k are two constant. Therefore
Nk)N(A 2 and, accordingly, as N approaches infinity, the leading term in calculating
the average bond yield will be N/)N(A , which can be denoted as   N/A .
As one can see in Figure 6-6, the two limiting values compare remarkably well
with the average yields of the bonds used in this paper. This result also agrees with the
known fact that bond yields approach asymptotically a constant value with an increase of
maturity. Similarly, since N/)N(BN/)N(A i for a large N , it means that, within
the approximations in this paper, large maturity bonds must be less sensitive to the state
variables an therefore, they will look nearly constant over time as one can observe in
Figure 6-5.
The Predictive power of the ATS-model
According to the approximation given by expression in Eq.(2), the bond yields
depend on the coefficients A and B and the state variable x . As we have already seen,
x must be evaluated at the time bonds are evaluated, i.e. nt , whereas A and B are
calculated from our knowledge of x over a certain range of time within the near past. In
other words, x provides all information relative to current state of the economy whereas
A and B carry information about the state variables averaged out over the near past.
Having said that, one may legitimately ask oneself: how actual must be the data used in
calculating A and B ? In this subsection, we calculate the bond yields by using A and B
164
obtained with previous state variables (excluding most recent ones), and only x assumes
the present value.
The results of calculating the bonds yields using this approach is plotted in Figure
6-7. We call them predicted values, although these are not strictly speaking predictions
since state variables are still the real ones, but the coefficients A and B are calculated
using data ranging from 48 to 24 months older than the most recent ones, i.e. those of the
122nd month.
Figure 6-7 Predicting Euribor and German bonds yields values using current state variables
However, coefficients A and B coefficients are calculated using data ranging from 48 to
24 months older than newest. Data are indicated by open symbols, predicted values are
denoted as dashed lines and calculated yields within fitting range appear as continuous
lines.
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As one can see, the so-called predicted values compare remarkably well with data.
Perhaps the worst agreement is observed for the 3 and 6 months Euribor rates and that of
the two-year German bond. To some an extend, this is not at all unexpected since, as we
have already stated, small-maturities bonds are more sensitive to current state variables
than larger ones.
Section IV. Policy Implications
From an asset pricing perspective, the present results are perfectly in line with the
theory. For example looking at parameter Ni /B from Figure 6-3, implies that an
increase in unemployment results in a decrease in the short rate with a rather steepening
effect along the yield curve, as the front end of the yield curve decreases faster than the
long end. This is mainly explained by the Taylor’s (1993) central bank policy rules as
well as by modern asset pricing theory. From a Taylor’s rule perspective, an increase in
unemployment represents a fall in output, and a fall in inflationary risks which would
lead to a fall in the policy rate. From the asset pricing theory side, an increase in
unemployment produces an increase in the expected future aggregate marginal utility
growth and hence it will cause a fall in the risk-free rate. In a similar fashion, it is
possible to explain the effects of changes in the EU consumer confidence index in the
yield curve. Since a decrease in this index represents an increase in aggregate marginal
utility growth with the subsequent fall in the risk-free rate and, from a Taylor’s rule
perspective, it can be interpreted as a decrease in inflationary risk. Likewise, an increase
in the production price index results in an increase in the risk free rate, as Taylor rules
would expect central bank policy reaction as a consequence of an increase in inflation
expectations. Finally, the monetary aggregate shows that an increase in the monetary
aggregate would result in a fall in the short rate, in line with the classical IS-LM
framework.
From a portfolio management perspective, the results in this paper show that
EONIA, Euribor and the German government yields are at their lowest levels when
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unemployment is high, consumer confidence is low, production price index is low and
lending is tight. A scenario that can be compensated by a central bank policy aimed at
increasing the monetary aggregate to stimulate growth. On the contrary, yields are at their
highest levels when unemployment is low, consumer confidence is high, production price
index is high and monetary policy is lax, and partially compensated by central bank
policy which tightens monetary aggregates and so, controlling inflation. When yields are
at their highest levels the yield curves are flat and the representative investor will have
the incentive to short the front end of the curve and take long positions in the long end of
the yield curve. Alternatively, in times when yields are at their lowest levels the curve is
at its steepest and a representative investor will have the incentive to take long positions
in short maturity risk-free assets and short the long end. Either way, the gains in the front
end are expected to more than offset losses in the long end. In addition, from a risk
management perspective the positions in the long end act as a hedge against downside
risks stemming from unfavourable and unexpected yield curve movements.
From a sovereign debt policy perspective, the previous analysis works differently,
in a way that largely depends on the debt-roll over schedule. If yields are at their lowest
levels, governments which enjoy the risk-free status should roll-over maturing bonds with
longer maturities in order to ensure that the roll-over of debt does not happen in times
when yields are high. In addition, in times when yields are high, which will coincide with
a booming economy, governments –whose issuances enjoy a risk-free status– will have
the chance to redeem short term issuances at lower prices and hence reduce the size of
their total debt outstanding. By doing so they would generate capacity to increase
indebtedness for the rainy days, thus in times when consumption growth is low and
government’s fiscal countercyclical engagement is desired.
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Section V. Conclusions and Final Remarks
This paper shows that the affine term structure model performs very well as long
as the state space variables selected have significant explanatory power over the short
rate, which in this case is the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA). Specifically,
this paper also shows that the state variables that can be used for this purpose are: (i) the
EU unemployment, (ii) EU production price index, (iii) monetary aggregate ECB M3,
and (iv) the EU consumer confidence index. These variables account for the EONIA rate
over a period of time ranging from Dec. 1999 to Jan 2011 remarkably well. In addition to
that, the proposed states variables not only are observed to work well during times of
financial stability, but they also perform very well during periods of extended financial
distress. We see that our calculations perform better on the front end of the yield curve
rather than on the long end. This seems to be the case because front end yields are more
sensitive to the state variables, whereas this dissipates as maturities become larger.
We have seen that yields are high in times when unemployment is low, consumer
confidence, M3 and the price levels are high. During times of boom this yield curve
exhibits a flat shape, with front end yields almost as high as the 30 year bonds and during
times of recessions, the yield curve shows a steeper shape with long term yields
exhibiting greater spreads versus short maturity bond yields. Our findings are thus in line
with modern asset pricing theory, provide evidence of Taylor’s (1993) central bank
policy rules as well as of classical IS-LM models.
Finally, results in this paper lead us to conclude that current yield curve levels are
indeed explained by current economic fundamentals and that its behaviour is in line with
economic theory. This refutes press headlines pointing to speculative effects of market
participants acting irrationally.
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Appendix: Bond yields calculations
The scheme used in this paper to obtain the bond yields can be summarised as follows, 9
i – Following Eq.(3), 0 and j are obtained by minimizing the mean square error
(MSE),
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This is carried out by the amoeba routine from Press et al. (1996), which can minimize an
N-dimension function without using derivatives. It could be interesting to explore the use
of so-called variance reduction techniques for bond pricing in affine models, as seen in
for example in Rostan and Rostan (2012).
ii – Next, we calculate j,i ’s by using Eq.(5) and assuming 0dz )n(i  . Therefore, we
have to minimize the expression,
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iii – Having obtained j,i , we calculate j and k,j by using Winner’s condition
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i  , where N denotes the number of time-steps spanned by used data.
Furthermore, since j,ij,iS  , j and k,j resulted from minimizing the expression,
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9 This section was possible thanks to the intellectual contribution from Prof. Dr. Mario Jakas.
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iii – Finally, the j,b ’s are calculated by finding the minimum of the expression,
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)N(yT . (A4)
To this end, Eqs.(7a,b) are integrated along maturity by using the routine ODEINT of the
Numerical Recipes package in Press et al. (1996). Obviously, such integration has to be
carried out several times during the minimization of 4T , which is performed by the
amoeba routine.
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7. Discrete Affine Term Structure Models Applied to the Government
Debt and Fiscal Imbalances
Section I. Introduction
This essay explores the use of discrete time affine term structure models applied to the
theory of the price level and debt management in order to study the optimal term
structure, and hence contribute to fiscal stabilisation policies and the optimal taxation
approach. This essay makes use of affine term structure models in a similar set up as seen
in the celebrated papers from Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998 and 1996) and Backus,
Telmer and Wu (1999). The essay applies the single and multifactor cases under Vasicek
(1977) taking into account some of the developments seen in the latest affine term
structure research such as Duffie and Kan (1996), Piazzesi (2010), Le, Singleton and Dai
(2010) and Singleton (2006).
Starting point in this essay is the flow identity under the fiscal theory of the price level as
seen in Cochrane (2001), Leeper (1995), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995, 1996) and Dupor
(1997). With respect to the optimal taxation approach, this essay is a contribution to some
of the developments achieved in Missale (1997), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008),
Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). The novelty of this essay is that uses
affine term structure models to describe the path at which surplus change and hence
affect the price level with the ultimately effect on yields. Hence, affine terms structure
models can be used to link the theory of the price level, debt management and optimal
taxation approach, in order to identify the optimal term structure.
An important critic to this essay is that no reference is being made to the vicious circle
existing between the increase in unemployment and the deterioration of government
surplus. Thus an increase in unemployment can lead to a subsequent adjustment in
government expenditure and in turn also result in a deterioration of economic agents’
expectations with further falls in agents’ revenues. Hence, no reference is made to the so-
called Keynes’ paradox of thrift (or paradox of saving, see: John Maynard Keynes, The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chapter 7, p. 84). However, the
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intention of this essay is not to specifically address this theory but rather to show that
affine term structure models can be used as an additional tool-kit for the analysis of
government’s structural deficits and their sensitivities to macroeconomic variables.
Hence, under this set-up ATSM is more a tool for diagnosing rather than for forecasting.
In addition, it is shown that though it works well for some countries such as Germany,
Italy, France, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, it does not work as well for Greece, as shocks
in unemployment are mean reversing with a low speed of adjustment and hence have –
statistically speaking– a low impact on Greece’s government surplus. However, this is
not enough reason for dropping the validity of the model. Instead, more research is
needed in order to determine what other variables apart from unemployment have an
impact on government expenditure, thus the use of ATSM on the analysis of government
deficits has a generous follow-up potential and the use of the unemployment rate variable
for this case is more exemplary than anything else.
Finally, the model assumes that macroeconomic variables follow a mean reversing
stochastic process which taking into account the latest developments in the European
sovereign debt crises, could question the validity of this proposition. In this essay, the
analysis has been limited to the mean reversing proposition mainly for convenience and
simplicity’s sake however, the affine term structure literature accounts for a rich variety
of stochastic processes which can include jump diffusions or links to extreme event
theory, which are rather part of a different paper.
The use of data since 2008 is for convenience only, as we link this data to inflation linked
financial instruments of various maturities and these are only available on its full since
2008 onwards. Before 2008, the financial markets were of the opinion that EMU would
guarantee all EU government bonds without distinction. For instance, before 2008, the
credit spreads of Greek bonds versus German treasuries were minimal. However, as
agents learn that this is not the case, GIIPS spreads widen and hence only then this essay
becomes relevant, thus only after this “structural” change. Therefore, is worth
differentiating between before and after 2008. This approach is in line with latest research
as seen in De Grauwe (2011a,b), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) as well as Beirne and
Fratzscher (2013).
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This essay is organised as follows: Section 2 basic and new concepts are introduced and
discussed; section 3 an affine terms structure model is introduced; section 4 a recursive
solution is presented for two possible scenarios: when the theory of the price level is at
work and when the theory is not at work; in section 5 and subsequent subsections the
model is extended in order to show the path of surplus shocks on total notional debt
outstanding; the path of shocks from total notional debt outstanding on the price level and
credit spreads and; the path of shocks stemming from government revenues and
government expenditure and its effect on primary surplus. Section 6 calibrates some of
the most relevant models already discussed in previous section with real data and present
results, section 7 discusses the policy implications of our findings and outlines main
conclusions and final remarks.
Section II. Recalling some basic concepts and introducing new ones
The flow identity depicts that surplus equals redemptions minus net new issuances.
11  NtNtNtNtNt BPBPS (1)
For )(NtS being the net primary surplus in t cumulated in period N,
)(N
tP being the
redemption price in t for a zero coupon bond with maturity N and remaining time to
maturity N= 0. )(NtB depicts the notional amount of a bond in time t with maturity N and
remaining time to maturity N=0. Analogously, )1( NtP being the price of a new zero bond
issued in t with remaining time to maturity N+1 and )1( NtB depicts the new bond’s
notional amount with remaining maturity N+1 in t. Notice that it is assumed that at
origination all bonds have same maturity profile, it is denoted with N and with N+1 in
order to differentiate when a bond is maturing or when a bond is a new issue, as for N=0
implies that )()( Nt
N
t BP are the maturing amounts and for N+1=1 implying that the new
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issue amount of )1()1(  Nt
N
t BP will matured in t+1 and, at that point, the maturity of the
bond will be N=0. The analysis should not be limited to total notional debt outstanding
and surplus, but also include all other assets in the economy for which the government
acts as a guarantor. This is because as these assets deteriorate together with surplus, the
government is also force to increase its issuance in order to support asset prices,
particularly those from the banking system. For the sake of simplicity the analysis here is
limited to surplus shocks, but the reader can also apply it to shocks to assets in the
banking system for which the government acts as a guarantor.
Equation (1) shows that if surplus 0)( NtS implies that )1()1()()(  NtNtNtNt BPBP , hence
the government is reducing total debt outstanding, as redemptions )()( Nt
N
t BP are greater
than the new bond issuances )1()1(  Nt
N
t BP . Alternatively, if surplus 0
)( NtS (thus is a
deficit) implies that )1()1()()(  NtNtNtNt BPBP which means the government is increasing
its total debt outstanding, as the new bond issuances )1()1(  Nt
N
t BP required to be greater
than redemptions )()( Nt
N
t BP in order to have enough funding to cover deficits.
Thus, a deterioration of the net primary surplus – hence an increase in the government’s
deficit – would require an increase in net new issues. An increase in net new issues is
necessary in order to roll over the maturing debt whilst still be able to cover the increase
in current financing requirements. Should the new issue price )1( NtP deteriorate, then the
government will be forced to increase the new-issue notional amount )1( NtB in order to
compensate for the fall in the price and thus be able to gather enough funds to pay back
redemptions )()( Nt
N
t BP and finance its deficit
)(N
tS .
It is assumed that the government only increases debt if it is strictly necessary, hence (1)
would imply that should )(NtS improve by exhibiting an increase in surplus, the
government would reduce total debt outstanding as a consequence of a decrease in its
funding requirements. If we think about investors’ expectations for a 1 period forward at
t+1, from equation (1) it is possible to intuit that the redemption price and redemption
amount are known values at time t. However and, what the market participants do not
know is the new issue cash equivalent of next debt roll-over in period t+1 of )1( 1
)1(
1




N
t
N
t BP .
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In fact, for the case of governments under financial distress investors are wary about their
ability to issue new debt in times of low consumption growth and thus might not believe
that they would obtain access to funds enough to redeem the maturing debt of )()( Nt
N
t BP
and finance their deficits )(NtS . The idea is that new issuances need to be sufficient so that
(1) equates without forcing the government to issue at unfavourable prices )1( NtP and
hence at a higher yield. Notice that the government avoids default by accepting lower
prices and increasing debt outstanding if necessary. In order to depict this more precisely,
(1) can be re-arranged, by moving )(NtS as an explanatory variable to the right hand side
and )1()1(  Nt
N
t BP to the left as endogenous, which can be specified as follows
N
t
N
t
N
t
N
t
N
t SBPBP  11 (2)
Which means that if 0)(  NtS , then inevitably   011   NtNt BP , as a result of a fall in
financing requirements.
The nominal price of a zero coupon bond will contain information about the price level as
well as information about the real interest rates. Assuming that the real interest rates
remain constant, it could be said that an increase in the price level will result in an
increase in yields with the subsequent fall in the bond price. A possible specification
could be
   
1
ln 11




N
PE
y
N
tN
t (3)
Taking into account that yields contain information about real interests and expected
inflation implies:
 





 
t
tr
t
N
t yy
11 ln (4)
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For )1( Nty being the nominal yield of the zero coupon bond with maturity N+1 comprising
the sum of the real interest rate rty and the rate of growth of the price level or inflation
being  tt 1ln . Notice that by normalising current price level t to 1 it makes no
difference if the level or change in the level is used. The relationship resulting from (4)
and (3) says that an increase in the price level would subsequently result in an increase in
nominal yields with the subsequent fall in the present value of a new issue and hence
increase government’s costs of financing.
However, governments cannot always influence monetary policy which means they
cannot determine the path of inflation, for instance, when central bank acts
independently. In this case (4.1) would require a modification, whereby yields are
obtained from a benchmark curve or short rate usually a risk free reference plus a credit
spread. This could be specified as follows:
   11   NtftNt ry  (5)
For 







1
)( ln
t
tr
t
f
t Eyr
Equation (5) describes the relationship between yields )1( Nty , the short rate
f
tr , real
yields )(rty and the spreads
 1N
t . Now, we know that the fiscal theory suggests that
governments’ choice of how to finance its debt play an important role on the
determination of the time path of the inflation rate. However, if government debt is issued
in a foreign currency or in a currency which governments’ have no or little control, then
the theory of the price level is less likely to be at work. Instead, governments’ choice of
how to finance its debt will have a subdued role on the determination of the time path of
the inflation rate but rather an important role in the determination of the time path of the
credit spread. This means that when the theory of the price level is at work, then (4)
describes best yields behaviour as a function of log price level changes and when
governments issue in a currency which they cannot control, equation (5) will best
describe yields behaviour.
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The ability of the government to issue new debt in t with maturity N+1without incurring
in a significant deterioration of its financing costs will depend largely on the market’s
view about government’s ability to raise new funds in a future date, let us say t+1, which
will also depend on the size of government’s deficit at t+1. Why? Because the market’s
appetite to lend today will depend on their view about getting their investment redeemed
in the future. To formulate this more precisely, I will adapt (2), and show that current
issue price depends on the market’s view about government’s ability to issue new debt or
to roll over the maturing one which will largely depend on the market’s expected future
government yields and thus government’s surplus, hence
     1111111111   NttNtNttNtNt SmEBPmEBPE (6)
Equation (6) shows that net present value of total debt outstanding in t with maturity N+1
and hence maturing in time t+1 should equal the net present value of the new bonds to be
issued in t+1 minus the present value of expected future surplus. This is because in this
model governments issue new debt in order to repay maturing one. For 1tm being the
stochastic discount factor which is related to one-period bond yields (or the short rate)
inversely as follows,
  11 ln  tt mEy (7)
Between equations (2) and (6) there are important theoretical differences which are worth
mentioning. Equation (2) says that the net present value of total debt outstanding depend
on current surpluses and current redemptions. If surplus deteriorates, the government is
required to rise more funding. However, (6) is instead saying that current bond prices
depend not only on the expected future surplus, but also on markets’ expectation on
government’s ability to issue new debt in the future, as the ability to issue new debt in the
future will determine the size of redemptions of maturing bonds. This is an important
difference, thus we are not saying anymore that the present value of total current debt
outstanding depends on the present value of expected future surpluses but that also
177
depends on expected future new bond prices. This means that in the hypothetical case
that despite that surplus is expected to deteriorate in the future, current bond prices can
still remain unaffected as long as the market continues to believe that the government will
still be capable of issuing new debt, and hence be able to roll over maturing debt. I will
show however, that this happens only if government’s deficit remains within sustainable
levels above which the bond becomes a risky asset and hence a Ponzi scheme.
Without loss of generality I will change (6) slightly as follows:
     111111111   NttNtNttNt SmEBPmEPE (8)
In equation (8) above, )1( NtB equals 1 so that for simplicity’s sake only
)1(
1


N
tB is left in the
expression. (8) shows that if   0111  Ntt SmE then current present value  1NtPE will equal
the net present value of total new issuances rolling over in t+1, which has been specified
as   11111  NtNtt BPmE and would imply that 111 NtB so that    1111   NttNt PmEPE .
Alternatively, if   0111  Ntt SmE , thus if the government incurs a deficit, then it would
necessarily need to be that 111 NtB .
Finally and recalling some basics, we know that the expected price at t with maturity N+1
of a bond that redeems at t+1 is usually specified as follows:
   NttNt PmEPE 111   (9)
And by applying natural logarithms yields:
     )(11)1( lnlnln NttNt PmP   . (10)
Equations (8) and (9) show that there are two ways of solving this, as the right hand side
of (8) also equals the right hand side of (9). This paper will start solution for equation (9)
and workout (8) thereafter. Solution for (9) would be rather straight forward, as solution
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for (8) requires a definition of the time path for each of the components such as surplus,
revenues, expenditure, total notional debt outstanding and the price level.
Section III. The theory of the price level and risk-free assets: the model
Equation (9) will be solved using an affine term structure model as in Backus, Foresi and
Telmer (1998) and a Vasicek (1977) stochastic process for the state variables.
As seen in most recent affine term structure literature log prices can be specified as a
linear function of a state vector 1tx as follows:
     11 'ln   tNt xNBNAP (11)
For A(N) being a scalar, B(N)' a 1×k vector of coefficients and 1tx a k×1 vector of state
variables. Note that the transpose of a vector or matrix is specified with a “ ' ”. Equation
(11) is only a guess, as the functional form is not known. However, the literature appears
to have generally accepted this as seen in Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006), Cochrane
(2005), as well as in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1996) and (1998) and seminal papers of
Duffie and Kan (1996).
From our guess shown in (11) we wish to find a closed solution and estimate the
parameters A(N) and B(N)'. These parameters are obtained by linking observable yields to
an observation equation describing the behaviour of a state space vector. This can be
done by combining equations (3) at t+1 with (11) which boils down to
   
11
'
  tNt xN
NB
N
NAy (12)
Thus the short rate could be specified as follows:
     111 '11   tt xNBNAy (13)
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Empirically, equation (13) would look like

110
1
1 '   tt xy  (14)
It is also needed to specify the stochastic process for xt+1 as well as for the stochastic
discount factor shown in (7). A good starting point is to use the pricing kernel à la
Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) which here is combined with the Vasicek (1977) process.
A possible specification would be like:
  11   txttt xxxx  (15)
  1)1(1 'ln   ttt λym  (16)
Equation (15) describes the stochastic process of the independent state variables. This is
the usual mean reversing process whereby 1 tx is likely to be negative if tx is above x
and, is likely to be positive if tx is below its mean x . tx and x are both k-dimensional
vectors. Φ is a kk matrix of diagonal elements Φi which represent the speed of
adjustment at which each of tix , elements reverse to their means. x is a diagonal kk 
matrix comprising the volatility of the state variables. 1t is a k-vector of shocks moving
tx away from x and with 1, ti elements being normally distributed with mean zero and
variance 1.
Equation (16) is the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998),
however here with somehow a different setting, as (15) was originally the univariate
Vasicek (1977) case. In this essay we transform this specification and adapt it for the
multifactor case of a k-dimensional vector of state variables as in Jakas (2012). Same as
in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998)δis specified as follows:
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Clearly, specification (17) is fortuitous, the only aim is to normalise the stochastic
discount factor so that it becomes the inverse of the short rate. Notice that with (17), now
(16) has the following conditional means and variance:
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And assuming E[lnx] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x), which yields
  )1(1ln tt ymE  (20)
It would be assumed that the price level t is a function of total notional debt outstanding
)(N
tB and total debt outstanding increases as
)( N
tS deteriorates, hence as surplus turns into
deficit. Finally, )( NtS depends on the state vector 1tx , so that macroeconomic shocks
affecting government surplus will have an effect on the price level only if surplus shocks
increase total debt outstanding and ultimately affecting the price level. These
relationships could be specified as follows:
 











1
210
1 ln
t
tr
tt Eyy  (21)
   *10 , NtNtNtNtt SSBB  (22)
   tNtNtNtNtNt xSSSSB  10*,  (23)
 ttNt xxS '10  (24)
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Equation (21) is nothing but a way of estimating the unobservable parameters specified in
(4), thus the coefficient for the real interest rate rty and the coefficient for the expected
inflation are estimated via observed inflation-linked swap data. Equations (22) and (23)
are our empirical interpretation of the theory of the price level linked to the short rate.
Hence, here we describe that a deterioration of government’s budget deficit beyond a
certain unobservable limit results in a systematic increase in governments total debt
outstanding and hence in an increase in the price level t , as this theory is at work when
central bank is not fully independent and governments are able to monetise their deficits.
Notice that for the case where the theory of the price level is not at work because the
government does not have control over the monetary policy, it would imply that (21) and
(22) need to be adapted to account for the credit spreads. In this case, (21) and (22) are
transformed to (25) and (26) as specified below. Notice that the use of this numbering for
the equations is fortuitous, as the intention is to call the reader’s attention to the idea that
(25) and (26) are a derivation of (21) and (22). If the theory of the price level is not at
work it is because governments cannot decide over the path of inflation and instead any
increase in deficits result in a deterioration of the credit spreads, instead of an increase in
the price level.
   *10)1( , NtNtNtNtt SSBB   (25)
  Nttttrtt BEyy )1(212101 ][    (26)
For   11 ln][   tttt EE  being the expected inflation obtained from inflation-linked
(IL) swaps.
Notice that (26) proposes a possible way of estimating (5), under the assumption that the
true risk free is observable from IL-Swap data. Substituting (22) in (21) (or (25) in (26)
and then continue the complete chain of substitutions through (22) to (24) it is possible to
show that yields are a function of a state space which I summarised below

tt xy '10
1   (27)
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Equations (21) to (27) will depend on the difference between the level of )(NtS and an
unobservable sustainable *)( NtS shown in (23). Thus for any level of government deficit
where   0)(1  Ntt SE and 0*)( NtS restricted to   *)()(1 NtNtt SSE  it would result in
01  and 01  , which implies that the fiscal theory of the price level is at work and
thus any shocks in aggregate demand that results in a deterioration of government
finances as a consequence of such surplus shocks will affect the price level and result in
an increase in yields. Therefore, the short rate is governed by (27) and not by (14). If the
price level is not at work and if surplus shocks have an effect in the total debt
outstanding, the same logic applies but instead (21) and (22) are replaced by (25) and
(26) because government’s choice of how to finance its debt has an effect on the
determination of the path of credit spreads and not on the determination of the path of
price level.
Notice that for any   *)()(1 NtNtt SSE  would result in 01  and 01  , which means that
any expected deficit within a given level of sustainability will have no effect on the price
level and hence the fiscal theory of the price level would be subdued so that the short rate
will be governed by (14) instead of (27). When the short rate is governed by (14) instead
of (27) only then it could be said that the government bond acts as a hedge for times
when aggregate marginal utility growth is high and government bond prices are
negatively correlated to aggregate consumption growth. On the contrary, if the theory of
the price level rules, government bond prices will be positively correlated to aggregate
consumption growth mainly because a deficit that is perceived as unsustainable is
expected to have an effect on the price level. If governments cannot monetise their
deficits any deterioration of their surplus will only be financed with increases in total debt
outstanding which will not generate inflation but increases on the credit spread.
When the fiscal theory of the price level is at work, the government bond is considered a
risky asset and hence there would be no difference between contingent and non-
contingent bond payoffs, as they would all be contingent to the price level or the credit
spreads. However, if the fiscal theory of the price level is not at work, the government
bond is risk-free and the difference between contingent and non-contingent bonds does
mater.
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Section IV. Solving when the theory of the price level is at work and when is not
When the theory of the price level is at work the signs of the coefficients depicted in (27)
will rule. However, when the theory of the price level is subdued, the signs of the
coefficients will be governed by (14). For which the solution assuming that (27) holds for
a set of coefficients specified in (12) boils down to:
     



  

2
1
2
0 ''2
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'1 x
k
i
i NBλxNBNANA  (28)
     INBNB '''1 1 (29)
If the reader is interested in the algebra on how to obtain equations (28) and (29), please
refer to Appendix, Section I.
The solution is obtained by computing the present value recursively using (10) for some
guess of coefficients from (11). Since 1)(1 NtP and A(N=0) = B(N=0) ' = 0, which means
this can be solved recursively, as for 1 period would imply A(N=1) = ψ0 and B(N=1) ' =
ψ1' which means that equals the short rate as described in (27). Now for any set of state
variables the resulting yield curve can be computed. As this author is trying to compute
the coefficients for maturity N, all is needed is to use (10) to compute the present value of
an N+1 maturity bond.
All is needed is to line up (28) and (29) into (12) and solve numerically by fitting the
curve to the observed yields by adjusting λ’s for a given choice of maturities. Parameters
ψ0 and ψ1i are free and obtained empirically via OLS and the signs for parameters B(N)i
in (12) depend on ψ1i.
When the theory of the price level is not at work, equations (28) and (29) change, and this
is because equation (14) is at work instead of equation (27) and by applying the same
algebra discussed in Appendix Section I it would yield:
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     
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
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i NBλxNBNANA  (30)
     INBNB '''1 1 (31)
When governments issue in a foreign currency or in a currency in which they have no or
little control the theory of the price level is less likely to occur, however, the same forces
which have an effect on surplus shocks will result instead in an increase in the credit
spreads. So that in a similar fashion to equations (21) to (27) to obtain (28) and (29)
replacing the price level for the credit spread as endogenous variable would give us
similar analytical results. All is needed is to account for (25) and (26).
Thus, macroeconomic shocks that result in a deterioration of government’s net primary
surplus beyond a sustainable level can result in increases in total notional debt
outstanding which ultimately either result in increases in yields due to increases in the
price level or results in increases in yields due to deterioration of the credit spreads.
Either ways result in higher yields and hence in a further deterioration of government
finances.
Section V. Solving by analysing fiscal shocks on surplus debt rollover risk
In order to solve equation (8) it is required to have a model describing the behaviour of
the effects of: 1) surplus shocks on total notional outstanding; 2) the effects of
innovations in total notional debt outstanding on the price level or credit spreads and; 3)
modelling the path of government surplus by analysing macroeconomic innovations on
government revenues and government expenditure. So this section will be organised in
three subsections, outlining the above mentioned points.
Section V.I. The effects of surplus shocks on total notional debt outstanding
This chapter would make use of affine terms structure models to describe the path of
surplus shocks and its effect on total notional debt growth.
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   )( 11)( NttNt BEgBE   (32)
Where )(NtB being the current notional debt outstanding in time t which is expected to
grow at 1tg resulting in a total nominal debt at t+1 equal to  )( 1NtBE  . Equation (32)
describes the path at which )(NtB would need to grow from t to t+1, for which a growth
kernel will be used similar to a pricing kernel as used in the affine term structure
literature.
Thus 1tg will be assumed that is a sort of growth kernel at time t+1 for period N = t+1 so
that if 11tg it would imply that nominal debt increases during period t to t+1, if
11 tg it would imply that nominal debt decreases between t to t+1. Rearranging (32) as
a function of current total notional debt outstanding would yield
    NttNt BgEBE 111  (33)
Using the natural logarithm notation (33) would look like
     11 lnlnln   tNtNt gBB (34)
Now we need to specify  )( 1ln NtB  and  1ln  tg for which a similar expression will be
used as in Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998) and which for simplicity’s sake and without
loss of generality has been specified as follows
  1)1(21 2
1ln   ttt λbλg  (35)
1
10
)1(
tt sb   (36)
For λdepicting the sensitivities at which  1ln  tg changes due to shocks in 1t .
Equation (35) is fortuitous, the notation is on purpose so that under normality  1ln tgE
equals )1(tb . In equation (36) )1(tb represents the debt growth rate in 1 year as a
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consequence of surplus shocks, 0 and 1are coefficients and )1(ts depicts the one
period government’s cumulated total primary surplus in time t.
Under these assumptions a government’s total notional debt outstanding is expected to
grow as follows
 NbBB tNtNt   11)()( 1 exp (37)
For simplicity’s sake and without loss of generality it is assumed .1)( 1 NtB Applying
natural logarithms to (37) and rearranging yields
   NtNt BNb 11 ln
1
  (38)
It is also assumed that
    11)( 1ln   tNt sNBNAB (39)
Notice that the functional form shown in (39) is only a guess that works quite well when
plugging (39) in (38), which results in
  1
1
)(
1   tNt sN
NB
N
NAb (40)
The final assumption here is that surplus 11ts follows a Vasicek (1977) process as
follows
  1)1()1()1()1( 1   tststt ssss  (41)
Equation (41) says that surplus will have a mean reversing AR(1) behaviour. Equation
(41) describes the stochastic process of the government primary surplus. This is the usual
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mean reversing process whereby 11ts is likely to be negative if 1ts is above its mean
and, is likely to be positive if 1ts is below its mean. If on average surplus is zero, the
adjustment will depend fully on 1ts . For which the solution for the coefficients in (40)
would look like:
     2)1(0 2
11 ss NBsNBNANA    (42)
    111  NBNB (43)
For a detail algebra on how to get to (42) and (43) the reader should refer to Appendix
Section II.
Section V.II. The effect of changes in total notional debt outstanding on the price level
and credit spread
In a similar fashion to previous chapter, this part of the paper will make use of affine
terms structure models to describe the path of shocks on notional debt outstanding and its
effects on the price level. The path of the price level can be specified as follows:
   )( 1)( 1)( NtNtNt EE    (44)
Where  )( 1)( NtNtE   being the price level in time t which is expected to grow at )( 1Nt
resulting in an expected future price level at t+1 equal to  )( 1NtE  . Equation (44)
describes the path at which )(Nt would need to grow from t to t+1. For )( 1Nt being the
growth kernel at t+1 for N = t+1 so that if 1)( 1 Nt it would imply that the price level
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increases during period t to t+1, if 1)( 1 Nt it would imply that the price level decreases
between t to t+1.
Rearranging (44) as a function of current price level yields
    NtNtNt EE 111    (45)
Using the natural logarithm notation (45) would look like
     )( 1)( 1)( lnlnln NtNtNt    (46)
Now we need to specify  )( 1ln Nt and  )( 1ln Nt  for which a similar expression will be
used as in previous chapter which for this case could be specified as follows
  1)1(21 2
1ln   ttNt λλ  (47)
)1(
10
)1(
tt b  (48)
For λdepicting the sensitivities at which  )( 1ln Nt  changes due to shocks in 1t . )1(t
represents the price level growth rate in 1 year as a consequence of changes in total
notional debt outstanding, 0 and 1 are coefficients and )1(tb depicts the government’s
one year growth on total notional debt at time t. And again, as in previous chapter, the
notation is on purpose so that under normality  )( 1ln NtE   equals )1(t .
 NtNtNt   11)()( 1 exp  (49)
For simplicity’s sake it is assumed .1)( 1 Nt Applying natural logarithms to (49) and
rearranging yields
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  )(11 ln1 Ntt N   (50)
If )()( 1
N
t
N
t  implies that the price level for period N is expected to increase which
means that 1)( Nt and  011 t . If on the contrary )()( 1 NtNt  implies that the price
level for period N is expected to decrease which means that 1)( Nt and  011  t .
It is also assumed as in similar fashion to previous sections:
    )1( 1)( 1ln   tNt bNBNA (51)
Plugging (51) in (50) results in the inflation curve as a function of short term (e.g. one
year) growth in total debt outstanding:
  )1(
1
)(
1   t
N
t bN
NB
N
NA (52)
The final assumption here is that total notional debt outstanding )1(tb follows a Vasicek
(1977) process as follows
  1)1()1()1()1( 1   tbtbtt bbbb  (53)
Equation (53) says that changes in total notional debt outstanding will have a mean
reversing AR(1) behaviour. This is a Vasicek (1977) stochastic process whereby the term
 )1()1( tb bb  is likely to be negative if )1(tb is above its mean )1(bb and, is likely to be
positive if )1(tb is below )1(bb . If on average the change in total notional debt outstanding
is zero, the adjustment will depend fully on )1(tb . For which the solution for the
coefficients in (52) would look like:
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     20 2
11 bb NBbNBNANA    (54)
    111  NBN (55)
Details refer to Appendix Section III.
Section V.III. Modelling Government’s net primary surplus as a function of state
variables
In a similar fashion to previous chapters, this section deals with the use of affine terms
structure models to describe the path of macroeconomic shocks on government revenues
and government expenditure. This is crucial, as macroeconomic shocks can have
different paths for revenues as well as for expenditure and need to be studied separately.
Structural deficits can result from problems arising from these differences.
 tNttNtNt xGxS )()()(  (56)
Equation (56) says that total cumulated surplus during holding period N at time t denoted
)(N
tS equals total government revenues cumulated during N at time t which is denoted as
tNt x)( less government expenditure tNt xG )( . Notice that we denote that government
revenues as well as government expenditure are both a function of a 1k state space
vector tx of macroeconomic variables. For simplicity’s sake and to save some effort in
the notation we will omit this in the following equations however, the reader will see that
these variables will continue to be a function of vector tx .
Cumulated government revenues and government expenditures path from t to t+1 can be
specified as follows:
   )( 1)( 1)( NtNtNt EE    (57)
   )( 11)( NtNtNt GEgGE   (58)
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Equation (57) describes  )( 1)( NtNtE  as being the government revenue in time t which is
expected to grow at )( 1
N
t resulting in an expected future revenue level at t+1 equal to
 )( 1NtE  . Equation (57) describes the path at which  )( NtE would need to grow from t to
t+1. In similar fashion, equation (58) describes the growth path for government
expenditure at which NtG would need to grow from t to t+1. For
)(
1
N
t and )( 1Ntg  being the
growth kernels at t+1 for N = t+1 so that if e.g. 1)( 1 Nt it would imply that the revenue
level increases during period t to t+1, if 1)( 1 Nt it would imply that the revenue growth
decreases between t to t+1. The same would apply for the growth in government
expenditure )( 1
N
tg  . Rearranging (57) and (58)
    )( 11)( 1)( NtNtNt EE   (59)
    )( 11)( 1)( NtNtNt GgEGE  (60)
Using the natural logarithm for (59) and (60) yields
     )( 1)( 1)( lnlnln NtNtNt    (61)
     )( 1)( 1)( lnlnln NtNtNt gGG   (62)
Now we need to specify  )( 1ln Nt ,  )( 1ln Nt  ,  )( 1ln NtG  and  )( 1ln Ntg  for which same
notation will be used yielding
  1)1(2)( 1 2
1ln   ttNt λλ   (63)
tt x10
)1(   (64)
  1)1(2)( 1 2
1ln   tgtgNt λgλg  (65)
tt xg 10
)1(  (66)
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For λδand λg depicting the sensitivities at which )( 1Nt or )( 1Ntg change due to shocks inεt+1.
)1(
1 t represents the revenue growth rate in 1 year explained by innovations in
macroeconomic state vector x t and the same for )1(tg which in this case describes the
government expenditure growth in 1 year which is also a function of macroeconomic
state vector xt. And for 0 , 1, 0and 1 being coefficients obtained empirically, e.g. via
OLS.
Under these assumptions the revenues and expenditure are expected to grow as follows
 NtNtNt   11)()( 1 exp  (67)
 NgGG tNtNt   11)()( 1 exp (68)
For simplicity’s sake it is assumed 1)( 1 Nt and 1)( 1 NtG . Applying natural logarithms to
(67) and (68), and rearranging yields
   )(1 ln1 NtNt N    (69)
   )(1 ln1 NtNt GNg   (70)
It is also assumed that
    1')( 1ln   tNt xNBNA  (71)
    1')( 1ln   tGGNt xNBNAG (72)
For A(N)τand A(N)g being scalars, B(N)'τand B(N)'g being k1 vectors of coefficients
and xt+1 a 1k vector of state variables.
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From our guess shown in (71) and (72) we wish to find a closed solution and estimate the
parameters A(N) and B(N)', and hence by plugging (71) in (69) and (72) in (70) results in:
 
1
'
)(
1   tNt xN
NB
N
NA  (73)
 
1
'
)(
1   tGGNt xN
NB
N
NA
g (74)
From (73) and (74), and recalling (56) boils down to
)(
1
)(
1
)(
1
N
t
N
t
N
t gs    (75)
)(
110
)(
1
N
t
N
t sy    (76)
The final assumption here is that the state space vector xt follows a Vasicek (1977)
process already discussed in (15) and now reproduced below for convenience as follows
  11   txttt xxxx  (77)
Equation (77) says that the state space vector with elements x i,t+1 will have a mean
reversing AR(1) behaviour. For which the solution for the coefficients in (73) and (74)
would look like:
     2''0 2
1
1 xNBxNBNANA    (78)
    '1''1   INBNB (79)
     2''0 2
1
1 xGGGG NBxNBNANA   (80)
    '1''1  INBNB GG (81)
For details on how to obtain (78) to (81) the reader should refer to Appendix, Section IV.
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In order to depict how this works let us assume an economy where the only source of
income is from employment and if the individuals are not employed they receive a
transfer from the government. For simplicity’s sake, we will assume that unemployment
is a valid state variable which describes well shocks on government revenues and on
government expenditure. For instance, if unemployment decreases, government revenues
increase, but also expenditure decreases, as there are less unemployed and hence less
payment transfers from the government and therefore surplus improves. However, if
unemployment deteriorates, government revenues decrease too, as there is less taxable
income. At the same time, expenses increase, as there are more unemployed and hence
more transfer payments from the government to households.
If, let’s say the constant terms in (73) and (74) are   0 NNANNA G  ,
 0NNB G  0NNB  for allN , and tx being the unemployment rate, this will
imply that an increase in unemployment has results in a deterioration of government
surplus and that this might have an effect for various periods. The size and the sign
(positive or negative) of the 1-period shock are dependent on the coefficients estimated as
described in (64) and (66) However, because the term is being divided by N, this means
that shocks dissipate as N becomes greater. With this model it is possible to study
persistence of these shocks along N which is largely dependent on  which is nothing
else but the speed of adjustment of a state variable such as unemployment towards its
mean from tx to x . The closer  is to 1 the faster the adjustment, but the closer  is to
zero the greater the persistence of these shocks in affecting government surplus for
various periods. Here, it is possible to have state variables which have offsetting effects
in period 1. However, if they differ in persistence, hence on the size of it could result
in cumulating deficits mainly because on the long run one variable causes persisting
negative effects on surplus.
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Section VI. Empirical Analysis
We analyse Bloomberg and Eurostat monthly data mostly from the period August 2008
to September 2012. As we are trying to link macroeconomic data with financial markets
data such as inflation-linked swap yields, we are very much dependent on its availability.
For the case of European inflation-linked swaps we only observe a complete inflation
curve for all maturities in the Euro-Zone since August 2008 which leaves us only with 50
data points. We use the data since 2008 in order to take into account the conclusions from
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), who suggest that there is a structural change, as a
consequence of what they refer to as a “wake-up call” or De Grauwe and Ji (2013) idea
of investors neglecting some of the economic fundamentals of GIIPSs countries, previous
to 2008.
Before the affine term structure models are calibrated, this section will start first by
plotting the EONIA, the inflation as well as the real interest rates from 1 year inflation-
linked swaps. The intention is to study how movements in inflation and real interest rates
explain movements in the short rate.
In a second stage, we will regress via OLS, the EONIA rate to the inflation as well as the
real interest rates from 1 year inflation-linked swaps following discussions on (4).
Subsequently we will repeat this exercise for European and German government yields of
various maturities. We will show that results are consistent across maturities.
In a third stage, we will repeat this exercise for Greek and Spanish government yields and
show that though the fitted values appear to follow some of the movements in the yields,
results are not as encouraging as for the European and German yields. However, we will
show that we can remediate this by regressing (26), hence by incorporating the spread of
these yields to the German benchmark in the regression as a third state variable. By doing
so we can show the reader that inflation and real interest rates do not suffice as
explanatory variables for non-benchmark yields, as there is a credit risk component
which appears that needs to be taken into account when modelling Spanish and Greek
yields.
In a fourth stage, we attempt to replicate the behaviour of governments total debt
outstanding by using the price level, which for simplicity’s sake we use as proxy the
196
production price index (PPI) for the respective countries. Here, we regress (22) as the
intention is to analyse how the stochastic path of governments’ total debt outstanding can
be used as a state variable when modelling the time path of the price level. In this section
we also show an example of fitting for the two year Spanish government yield using
Spanish cumulated government deficit and Spanish unemployment rate as state variables.
The final piece of the analysis introduces the use of affine term structure models for: 1) to
generate an inflation curve (or so-called the “breakeven inflation” curve) using as state
variable government’s total debt outstanding; 2) likewise we generate the average spread
curves for Spanish and Greek government yields and analyse the coefficients B(Ni)Ni for
various maturities using as state variables Spanish and Greek governments’ total debt
outstanding and; 3) we present and example where we will calibrate an affine model as
specified in (73) and (74) using as a state variable the country’s unemployment rate and
analyse the coefficients B(Ni)Ni to show how affine term structure models can help
understand how innovations in the unemployment rate are useful for determining the time
path of governments’ revenues and expenses and hence ultimately contribute to the
understanding of the effects that innovations in macroeconomic variables have on
governments’ deficits.
Figure 7-1 below shows the EONIA, the inflation and the real interest rate from a 1 year
inflation-linked swap. Only by looking at the data it is possible to see the effects of
expected inflation and real interest rate movements on the short rate (EONIA). These
components can be used as proxies, in order to replicate the identity described in equation
(4).
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Figure 7-1 Development of the EONIA, breakeven inflation and real interest rate observed from
Euro 1 year inflation swap.
This is a possible observation of the various variables discussed in equation (4).
Figure 7-2, replicates the EONIA which has been obtained by regressing equation (4).
The EONIA is the proxy for the nominal short rate and proxies for the real interest rate as
well as for the inflation rate are the 1-year real yield and the breakeven inflation observed
from the 1-year Euro inflation-linked (CPI) swaps. The reader can appreciate that the
fitted values fit remarkably well the observed data.
Figure 7-2 Replication of EONIA using as state variables the real interest rates and the breakeven
inflation rates from observed inflations swaps data.
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Figure 7-3 replicates the European government benchmark yields which have been
obtained by regressing equation (4) for different maturities. The European government
benchmark yields are here used as proxy for the nominal risk-free rates for various
maturities. In addition, the proxies for the real interest rates as well as for the inflation
rates are the corresponding 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30-year real inflation-linked swap yields
and the breakeven inflation rates which are observed from these same swaps. The reader
can appreciate that the fitted values replicate remarkably well the observed data. This is
the beauty of the availability of inflation-linked financial data, as it gives the possibility
to segregate inflation expectations and expectations on real yields.
Similar to figure 7-3, figure 7-4 replicates the same regression for the German
government benchmark yields and results are just as encouraging. These results are
notably better than those seen in Jakas (2011, 2012, 2013b) and Jakas and Jakas (2013),
as these empirical results show that inflation swap data performs better than the usual
monthly survey data.
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Figure 7-3Figure 3. Bloomberg EU Government Yields (Bloomberg Index), observed vs. fitted using
observed breakeven inflation and real interest rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI) Swap curve.
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Figure 7-4 Bloomberg German Government Yields (Bloomberg Index), observed vs. fitted using
observed breakeven inflation and real interest rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI) Swap curve.
Figures 7-5 and 7-6 replicate the Greek and Spanish government benchmark yields which
have been obtained by regressing equation (4) in a same fashion as we did for figures 7-3
and 7-4. Not surprisingly, real yields and inflation have less predictive power on Greek
and Spanish benchmark yields compared to the European or the German government
benchmark yields. The reason is the existence of a credit spread as these are risky assets.
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Figure 7-5 Bloomberg Greek Government Yields, Observed vs. Fitted using observed breakeven
inflation and real interest rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI) Swap curve.
The 20 years is not available in Bloomberg, so we have omitted this piece in our analysis.
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Figure 7-6 Bloomberg Spanish Government Yields, Observed vs. Fitted using observed breakeven
inflation and real interest rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI) Swap curve.
The 20 years is not available in Bloomberg, so we have omitted this piece in our analysis.
We will include the credit spread to equation (4) as discussed in (5) and as specified in
(26), by doing so the fitted values show remarkable improvements as shown in Figures 7-
7 and 7-8. Figures 7-7 and 7-8 replicate the Greek and Spanish government benchmark
curves which have been obtained by regressing nominal yields to a state space vector
comprising real yields, breakeven inflation and the spreads to the German benchmark.
These results are obvious, as Spanish and Greek government bonds –amongst other
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peripherals have had a credit risk component due to liquidity constraints in line with
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013).
Figure 7-7 Fitting by incorporating the spread as in equation (26). Bloomberg Greek Government
Curves, Observed vs. fitted using the observed credit spreads, breakeven inflation and real interest
rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI) Swap curve.
The 20 years is not available in Bloomberg, so we have omitted this piece in our analysis.
Credit spreads are calculated as the difference to the German Benchmark.
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Figure 7-8 Fitting equation (26). Bloomberg Spanish Government Curves, Observed vs. Fitted using
the observed credit spreads, breakeven inflation and real interest rates from the Euro Inflation (CPI)
Swap curve.
The 20 years is not available in Bloomberg, so we have omitted this piece in our analysis.
Credit spreads are calculated as the difference to the German Benchmark.
The theory of the price level suggests that an increase in total debt outstanding can lead to
increases in the price level. Figure 7-9 shows PPI from EU, Germany, Spain and Greece,
observed versus fitted values obtained by regressing equation (22). These time series
show that levels in governments’ total debt outstanding can be used as explanatory
variables in order to explain changes in the price level, as increases in the price level is –
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statistically speaking– positively correlated to government’s total notional debt
outstanding.
Figure 7-9 Fitting equation (22). Replication of Production Price Indices (PPI) for the Euro-Zone,
Germany, Spain and Greece. Observed vs. Fitted values using the observed total government debt
outstanding available in Bloomberg.
Deficits and unemployment can result in deterioration in government yields. The theory
of the price level suggests that the net present value of a bond or the yield must reflect the
net present value of expected future surpluses. If unemployment and surplus (deficits)
deteriorate, then this should be observed in the short term yields. Figure 7-10 tries to
replicate this relationship. Though it is possible to replicate the trend, we are not capable
of replicating the volatility observed which appears to increase as yields become greater.
Now, it is worth being cautious in making conclusions with figure 7-10, as the size of the
sample is rather small and government deficits and unemployment are interrelated
variables.
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Figure 7-10 Replication of 2y Spanish Government yield applying two factors, Spanish cumulated
government deficit and unemployment rates: Observed vs. Fitted values.
Figure 7-11 replicates the average Euro Breakeven Inflation curve by calibrating equation
(52). It is possible to produce the average inflation curve (left quadrant) but it is not
possible to replicate a reasonable time series that fits well the observed data (right
quadrant). The fitted data is much less volatile which shows this requires further research.
However, and despite this deficiency, it should be mentioned that the model is still
capable of fitting the underlying upward trend.
Figure 7-12 replicates the spreads for Spanish and Greek government bonds. On average,
we observe that the Spanish spreads show a “normal” upward-sloping, except the front
end (2 years) exhibiting lower spreads. Spreads are constant between 5-years and 30-year
maturities. The average Greek government spread curve gives a completely different
view. The downward-sloping shows that the yields in the front end are more risky than
the rest of the curve. This is because the market’s view is that the Greek government will
not be capable or raising new funds in order to pay the 2-year maturing bonds. The
issuance is a Ponzi scheme and speculation is focused solely on the ability of the Greek
government to convince core European partners on a bail out. In this case the theory of
the price level is not at work, as aggregated European inflation is influencing very little
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the deterioration in the underlying yields and is rather a credit risk element, as a
consequence of liquidity innovations resulting from solvency shocks.
Figure 7-11 Euro Breakeven Inflation observed vs. affine fitted values.
(Left) Replication of the Euro Breakeven Inflation observed vs. affine fitted values, using
equation (52). (Right) 1Year Euro Breakeven Inflation observed vs. fitted.
Figure 7-12 Spanish and Greek Government Spreads affine fitted.
Replication of the Spanish and Greek Government Spreads for each maturity bucket vs.
Affine Fitted values, using equation (52) and replacing )( 1
N
t (inflation) for )( 1Nt (credit
spread).
Figure 7-13. Shows how the NNB /)( coefficients which depict the sensitivity of
changes in the credit spread )( 1
N
t as a consequence of changes in total debt outstanding
and the effect is diluted as the maturity increases, which makes sense because in times
when default risk is high, the markets believe that the issuer will default first on the
issuance that is just about to mature, thus where debt-roll-over risk is high. Interestingly,
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comparing the parameters NNB )( estimated for Spain with those estimated for Greece
it is possible to observe the magnitude of how sensitive is Greece to changes in total debt
outstanding.
Figure 7-13 Affine term structure sensitivities of the Spanish and Greek Government Spreads
Affine term structure sensitivities of the Spanish and Greek Government Spreads for each
maturity bucket vs. Affine Fitted values, using equation (52) and replacing )( 1
N
t
(inflation) for )( 1
N
t (credit spread).
Figure 14 and 15 we show a cumulated expense versus income ratio for German, Spanish
and Greek governments and the cumulated expense and income levels. Here, we try to
capture discussion seen in equations (75) and (76). This idea is taken from the popular
cost-income ratio used in the corporate finance literature, however we are particularly
interested in its cumulated value as an indication of debt growth. For figure 7-14 and 7-15
we cumulate for values starting since 2001 (chart on the left) and 2008 (chart on the
right). The cumulated expense to cumulated income ratio shown in figure 7-14 can be
specified as follows 
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For the case of Spain and Greece, there is a clear deterioration of this ratio particularly
since 2008, as GDP falls, with the subsequent fall in tax revenues, increase in
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unemployment and thus further increase in Government expenses. We can see here we
move from a relatively stable ratio and then moving towards higher levels since 2008.
The case of Spain is interesting as the ratio has been in better shape compared to
Germany throughout the decade (chart on the left) however, the data also show that if we
instead cumulated from 2008 onwards (chart on the right), the ratio exhibits similar levels
as those seen in the Greek case. No doubt we see that in case of macroeconomic shocks
influencing surplus result in a deterioration of this ratio and unless this trend is reversed
the gap remains thereafter for several periods. The developments since 2008 onwards is
in line with the fact that cumulated deficits are in line with a deterioration of the credit
spreads. Figure 7-15 is not less impressive, as the gap between cumulated expenses to
cumulated government revenues or income increases at a faster pace for Greece and
Spain compared to the German case.
Figure 7-14. Cumulated government expenses to cumulated government revenues ratios (cost-
income-ratios) for Germany, Spain and Greece.
IMF Quarterly data, cumulative since 2001 (left) and 2008 (right) respectively.
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Figure 7-15. Cumulated government expense and cumulated government revenues for Germany,
Spain and Greece.
IMF Quarterly data, cumulative since 2008.
We calibrate the model discussed in section V.III by using unemployment rate as the
state variable tx influencing government revenue and expenditure for Germany, Ireland,
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and France. Hence, using one factor version of equations
(78) to (81) and restricted to (64), (66), (73) and (74). Figure 7-15 summarises the results
obtained for coefficients NNB )( and NNB G)( which describes the growth path in
government’s tax revenues and government’s expenditure for various quarters as a
consequence of shocks in the unemployment rate. In all countries we observe that an
increase in unemployment results in a deterioration of government’s surplus. For all cases
in figure 7-15, unemployment exhibits persistence, thus shocks in unemployment remain
for long periods of time and therefore has long lasting effects on governments’ revenues
and expenses. This is attributed to the autocorrelation coefficients of the lagged term in
equation (77) specified aswhich are very close to zero. There are only subtle
differences between countries mostly when it comes to the size of the sensitivity of
government’s deficits to innovations in unemployment. For the cases of Ireland, Spain,
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Portugal and Greece, and increase in unemployment results in government expenditure
increasing at a faster pace than revenues. Thus we can see that increases in
unemployment result in fiscal imbalances that last various periods. It is possible to see
that this gap is significantly large for Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Unemployment appears
to have a lesser role for Greece’s budgetary constraints, as Greece is a rather special case
with respect to unemployment, as the initial debt level is likely to have played a more
important role, as discussed in Chapter 1, Section VI. Alternatively, in the case of
Germany, increases in unemployment result in government revenues falling at a faster
pace than government expenditure thus, unemployment also has a negative effect on its
surplus but mainly because the decrease in revenues has greater damaging effect on its
fiscal imbalances than the increase in expenditure due to higher transfer payments to
those unemployed. It is also possible to observe that the government reduces on
expenditure when unemployment grows, presumably, in order to adjust fiscal imbalances
however this adjustment appears only to partially offset the decrease in tax revenues,
hence resulting in an overall deterioration of the German government surplus. Italy
exhibits a similar result to Germany however the difference here is that the gap is tighter
and that the unemployment rate despite exhibiting less persisting effects on Italy’s
government surplus the initial shock is larger than in for the Germany government.
France exhibits a so-called “normal” case, thus an increase in unemployment results in a
decrease in revenues and an increase in expenditure, closer to discussions in section V.III.
212
Figure 7-16 Sensitivities of Tax Revenues and Expenditure to Unemployment rates.
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Note on Figure 7-16: B(N)τ/N and B(N)G/N coefficients calibrated with unemployment
rate figures for Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and France using one
factor version of equations (78) to (81) and restricted to (64), (66), (73) and (74) using
quarterly data for tax revenues and unemployment from Eurostat and ECB Data
warehouse.
Section VII. Policy Implications, Conclusions and Final Remarks
This paper is an attempt to link term structure models, the theory of the price level
to debt dynamics and fiscal imbalances. This paper starts calibrating a state space vector
for breakeven inflation and real yields observed from inflation linked swap data and
results were encouraging. We can observe that they do a poorer job for Spanish and
Greek bonds however we remediated this by incorporating the credit spreads. It shows
that inflation has lower predictive ability on these yields and most of the movement is
captured in the credit risk component, as fitted values improved significantly when
incorporating the spread to German benchmark yields in the model.
We understand that if governments need to provide counter-cyclical policies in
times when aggregate marginal utility growth is high and hence, when consumption
growth is low, this will largely depend on their ability to issue new debt without
exhibiting a deterioration of their financing costs. We have seen that increases in total
debt outstanding can lead to higher inflation and higher yields, but for the governments
where this appears not to be significant, such as for instance, Spain or Greece, the
increases in higher levels of total debt outstanding translate in higher spreads rather in
higher inflation. We see that either ways financing becomes more expensive. The
German case is different, because greater levels of total debt outstanding do not translate
in a deterioration of their cumulated surplus. This, we believe, can be attributed to the
idea that in times of low consumption growth German yields are indeed low so that the
Government can issue more debt without incurring higher financing costs and undertake
counter-cyclical policies. This assertion has testable implications and hence could be part
of future research or follow-ups. However, as Germany has a greater stake in European
institutions than their periphery counterparts, it is natural that investors might speculate
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with the idea that German bonds are more likely to be backed by accommodative ECB
policies than the periphery or GIIPSs bonds.
From our analysis using an affine term structure model, we observed that
increases in unemployment, for instance, generated a gap between revenues and expenses
that was significantly tighter for the case of Germany compared to the cases of Ireland,
Spain and Portugal. Therefore, it appears that the German government budget is less
sensitive to innovations in unemployment and hence cumulated government surplus
remains relatively unaffected when controlling for this state variable compared to Ireland,
Spain and Portugal. We understand that for these countries is more difficult to undertake
countercyclical policies in the same as Germany can, mostly because we observe that
during periods of financial distress issuing new debt becomes more expensive, as surplus
deteriorates most.
In addition, we have observed that the front end is very sensitive to innovations in
increases on government’s total debt outstanding, possibly because investors perceive
that that is the first tranche that the issuer is likely to default. It should be mentioned that
few governments exhibit low financing costs in times when aggregate marginal utility
growth is high. In fact this demonstrates that governments should run stress tests to their
budgets and secure liquidity reserves by running orthodox fiscal policies during
economic booms and issuing long term debt enough to cover eventualities in case of a
stressed scenario that would have extraordinary deteriorating effects on their budgetary
deficits. This implies ensuring long periods of enough liquidity reserves for the case
when several short term tranches mature and hence avoid debt roll-over risk, thus the risk
of not being able to issue enough new debt at low financing costs in order to redeem the
maturing one.
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Appendix Chapter 7
I. Solving when the theory of the price level is at work and when is not
Here it is shown how to get to the solution. Starting first with equation (10) and
substituting the right hand term for (16) and (11) which boils down to:
     11)1(1 ''ln   tttNt xNBNAλyP  (I.1)
In order to solve recursivelyδis replaced by (17), and to be able to account for the theory
of the price level )1(ty is replaced by (27). In addition, 1tx is also replaced for (15) to
account for the Vasicek (1977) process, which all boils down to:
       1110
1
21 '''
2
1
ln 

   txtttt
k
i
i
N
t xxxNBNAλxP  (I.2)
The constant terms and the terms multiplying xt andεt+1 are grouped, so that at the end it
would look something like this
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The right hand side of equation (10) which has now developed to (I.3) has the following
conditional moments,
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and
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Recalling that the implied present value of a fixed income security yields
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Substituting (I.4) and (I.5) into (I.6) yields
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt and lining up with (11)
yields,
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i NBλxNBNANA  (I.8)
     INBNB '''1 1 (I.9)
The solution is obtained by computing the present value recursively using (10) for some
guess of coefficients from (11). Since 1)(1 NtP and A(N=0) = B(N=0) ' = 0, which means
this can be solved recursively, as for 1 period would imply A(N=1) = ψ0 and B(N=1) ' =
ψ1' which means that equals the short rate as described in (27). Now for any set of state
variables the resulting yield curve can be computed. As this author is trying to compute
the coefficients for maturity N, all is needed is to use (10) to compute the present value of
an N+1 maturity bond.
All is needed is to line up (I.8) and (I.9) into (12) and solve numerically by fitting the
curve to the observed yields by adjusting λ’s for a given choice of maturities. Parameters
ψ0 and ψ1i are free and obtained empirically and the signs for parameters B(N)i in (12)
depend on ψ1i.
When the theory of the price level is not at work, equations (I.8) and (I.9) change, and
this is because equation (14) is at work instead of equation (27) and by applying the same
algebra discussed in (I.1) to (I.7) it would now yield
     



  

2
1
2
0 ''2
1'1 x
k
i
i NBλxNBNANA  (I.10)
     INBNB '''1 1 (I.11)
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II. Solving the coefficients A(N+1) and B(N+1) assuming innovations in
government surplus influence changes in total notional debt outstanding
I will solve (33) recursively starting with equation (34) and substituting terms for (35),
(36), (39) and (41), and operating results in
      
1
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)1()1()1(
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N
t
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

(II.1)
Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying 1ts and those multiplying
1t boils down to
      
  1
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N
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(II.2)
Equation (II.2) has the following conditional mean and variance:
       )1(12)1(0 12
1
ln ts
N
t sNBλsNBNABE   
   2ln λNBBVar sNt  
Recalling normality as in (37) and substituting
     NtNttNtNt gBVargBEBE 1111 lnln2
1lnlnln   (II.3)
Substituting the above conditional moments in (II.3) yields,
   
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(II.4)
Rearranging and grouping the constant terms and the terms multiplying 1ts as well as
lining up with (39) yields,
      22)1(0 211 λλNBsNBNANA ss    (II.5)
    111  NBNB (II.6)
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Equations (II.5) and (II.6) are resolved recursively using what is known from (34)
restricted to (39) and (40). Since it has been assumed that 1)( 1 NtB , and A(N=0) = B(N=0)
= 0, which means this can be solve recursively, as for 1 period would imply A(N=1) =
0 and B(N=1) = 1 which means that equals the 1 year debt growth rate )1(tb
described in (36). Now for any set of surplus shocks the resulting nominal debt
outstanding can be computed.
Equations (II.5) and (II.6) also contain the parameter λ which is quite handy for adjusting 
to observable data. If this is not desired, still the researcher can set λto zero for which
(II.5) and (II.6) would be
     2)1(0 2
11 ss NBsNBNANA    (II.7)
    111  NBNB (II.8)
III. Solving the coefficients A(N+1) and B(N+1) assuming that changes in total
notional debt outstanding influence the price level or credit spreads
I will solve (44) recursively starting with equation (46) and substituting terms for (47),
(48), (51) and (53), and operating results in
      
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(III.1)
Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying )1(tb and those multiplying
1t boils down to
         1)1(120)( 12
1ln   tbtbNt λNBbNBλbNBNA 
(III.2)
Equation (III.2) has the following conditional mean and variance:
       )1(120)( 12
1ln tb
N
t bNBλbNBNAE    (III.3)
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   2)(ln λNBVar bNt   (III.4)
Recalling normality for (46)
     )( 1)( 1)( 1)( 1)( lnln2
1lnlnln Nt
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t VarEE    (III.5)
Substituting (III.3) and (III.4) in (III.5) yields,
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Rearranging and grouping the constant terms and the terms multiplying as well as lining
up with (51) yields,
      22)1(0 211 λλNBbNBNANA bt   (III.7)
    111  NBNB (III.8)
Equations (III.7) and (III.8) are resolved recursively. Since it has been assumed that
.1)( 1 Nt and A(N=0) = B(N=0) = 0, which means this can be solve recursively, as for 1
period would imply A(N=1) = 0 and B(N=1) = 1 which means that equals the 1 year
price level growth rate )1(t described in (48). Now for any set of notional debt
outstanding the resulting price level can be computed and by doing so it is possible to
study inflationary shocks or credit spreads – for the case where the government does not
control monetary policy.
Equations (III.7) and (III.8) also contain the parameter λwhich, as already mentioned, is
quite handy for adjusting to observable data. If this is not desired, still the researcher can
set λto zero for which (III.7) and (III.8) would be
     20 2
11 bb NBbNBNANA    (III.9)
    111  NBN (III.10)
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IV. Solving the coefficients A(N+1) and B(N+1) assuming net primary surplus is a
function of a state vector of macroeconomic variables
I will solve (59) and (60) recursively starting with equation (61) and (62), and
substituting terms for (63) to (66) as well as (71), (72) and (77) and which results in
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying x t and those multiplying εt+1
boils down to
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Equations (IV.3) and (IV.4) have the following conditional mean and variance:
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(IV.6)
   2'')(ln  λNBVar xNt  (IV.7)
   2'')(ln gxGNt λNBGVar   (IV.8)
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Recalling normality for (61) and (62) yields:
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Substituting (IV.5), (IV.6), (IV.7) and (IV.8) in (IV.9) and (IV.10) respectively yields,
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Rearranging and grouping the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt as well as
lining up with (71) and (72) yields,
      22'''0 211   ix λλNBxNBNANA  (IV.13)
    '1'1   INBNB (IV.14)
      22'''0 211 iggxGGGG λλNBxNBNANA   (IV.15)
    '1'1  INBNB GG (IV.16)
Equations (IV.13) to (IV.16) are resolved recursively. Since it has been assumed that
1)( 1 Nt and 1)( 1 NtG , and A(N=0)τ,G = 0 and for B(N=0)'τ,G would result in a vector with
all elements being equal to 0, which means this can be solve recursively, as for 1 period
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would imply A(N=1)τ,G = [α0, β0] and B(N=1)'τ,G = [α1, β1'] which means that equals the
1-year revenue growth rate )1(t and 1-year expenditure growth rate )1(tg , restricted to
(73) and (74). Now for any set of macroeconomic state variables the resulting surplus can
be computed and by doing so it is possible to study surplus shocks resulting from
innovations in macroeconomic variables.
Equations (IV.13) to (IV.16) also contain the parameters λδand λg which, as already
mentioned, is quite handy for adjusting to observable data. If this is not desired, still the
researcher can set λδand λg to zero for which (IV.13) to (IV.16) would be
     2''0 2
1
1 xNBxNBNANA    (IV.17)
    '1''1   INBNB (IV.18)
     2''0 2
1
1 xGGGG NBxNBNANA   (IV.19)
    '1''1  INBNB GG (IV.20)
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8. The Term Structure, Latent Factors and Macroeconomic Data: A
Local Linear Level Model
Section I. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to apply a local level model as seen in Commandeur, Koopman
and Ooms (2011) to yield curve dynamics in a similar fashion to the latent factor
approach described in the paper by Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and
following the contributions from Diebold and Li (2006). The first stage of this analysis is
to use a local level model -with other unobserved components- in order to identify latent
factors such as the level, the slope and a seasonal factor. Subsequently, on a second stage,
the model links macroeconomic data to these latent factors. Here, the intention is to
model the latent factors using the same macroeconomic data as those in Jakas (2011 and
2012) and Jakas and Jakas (2013), and trying to understand which unobserved
components are influenced most by the macroeconomy. This model differs from that of
Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006), as they use a state space model which nests a
VAR in order to identify the latent factors such as level, slope and curvature. They then
expand the model by incorporating three macroeconomic variables to the state vector. In
contrast, in this essay the local level approach is used to identify the latent factors in a
state space model and, in a second stage, these latent factors are modelled using
macroeconomic data. In addition, since the local level model is used, we incorporate the
seasonal component in lieu of the curvature. It could be said that the approach used here
is closer to the works of Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin (2002)
however, this research uses different European data and focused on European yields
instead of US data to calibrate the models. In a first step this research departs from the
no-arbitrage approach, as our intention is to estimate the latent factors via a state space
model with an observation equation depicting the level, slope and seasonal components.
In a second step an affine term structure model is calibrated with the unobserved states or
latent factors in a similar set up as in Jakas (2012). In contrast to Jakas (2012) and Jakas
and Jakas (2013) the affine model is calibrated with the latent factors instead of
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macroeconomic data. It should be said that some of the empirical literature in no-
arbitrage such as in Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998), Duffie and Kan (1996) and Dai
and Singleton (2000), do not link latent variables to macroeconomic data or when they do
so, empirics have been mostly limited to the short rate. In addition, this paper segregates
money markets from capital markets and by doing so performance improves significantly
for longer term maturities. This is a reasonable approach, as it could be considered that
there are two markets governing the yield curve, somehow contradicting the no-arbitrage
approach. The reason for taking this approach is mainly because traders and fixed income
strategists make a difference between the two, as liquidity risks and market conventions
are different. Notwithstanding, an affine term structure model is calibrated with latent
factors and despite results are encouraging for money market yields they are observed to
be less impressive for long term maturities.
The chapter is organised as follows: section II presents the local linear level model and
the no-arbitrage approach; section III presents discussion of results; section IV an affine
term structure model is calibrated using the latent factors estimated in previous section;
section V presents some discussion on policy implications; and VI outlines main
conclusions and final remarks.
Section II. Yields’ unobserved components
In this section we specify yields as a state space model with an unobserved state or
transition equation which is linked to an observation or measurement equation. This state
space model nests a local level model with a stochastic slope and a stochastic seasonal
component. We define the following state and observation equations following the
notation from Commandeur, Koopman and Ooms (2011),
tttt ξvuu   11 , (1)
ttt ζvv  1 , (2)
tt,t,t,t, ωγγγγ  32111 , (3)
,γγ t,t, 112  (4)
123  t,t, γγ , (5)
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ttttt εγvuy  ,1321  , (6)
where  2σ,0NIDξt  ,  20 σ,NIDζt  ,  20 σ,NIDωt  , and  20 σ,NIDεt  ,
NID(x,2) being a normal independent-distributed variable with mean x and variance2
(>0). Equation (6) is the observation or measurement equation for ty , namely, the yield
of a zero coupon bond with a given maturity at time t. As shown below for the
multivariate case, yields will be assumed to be a function of these latent variables or
unobserved states, which comprise: (i) the linear trend or level tu , (ii) the stochastic
slope tv and (iii) the stochastic seasonal component t,γ1 .
We estimate the unobserved states and parameters by maximum likelihood using a
Kalman (1960) filter, which can be specified as follows,
,ttt εθzαz  1 (7)
,ttt ηφzβy  1 (8)
where,
tz : 15vector of unobserved state variables;
tε: 15 vector of state-error terms;
ty : 1n vector of observed endogenous variables depicting the yields;
tη : 1n vector of observation-error terms and,
α,β, θand φ: nn parameter matrices.
Combining equations (1) to (8) in matrix form yields
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Notice that in the matrix αwe applied the usual constraints for a local level model with a
stochastic slope and a stochastic seasonal component as seen in Commandeur, Koopman
and Ooms (2011). Despite that we use monthly data, we set the number of season s to 4.
This will not be an issue mainly because we let the seasonal component to remain
flexible thanks to the random error term tω . In addition, θis diagonal as this ensures
that random error terms remain uncorrelated, notice that the diagonal elements in θare
set to one in order to allow the components of tε in Eq. (10) to be free parameters. This
is a standard assumption as seen in the no-arbitrage literature (see Piazzesi, 2010; Dai and
Singleton, 2000; or Duffie and Kan, 1996; or Backus, Foresi and Telmer, 1998). For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, we can also assume that all components in
vector tηφ are free parameters in the model. By doing so, we follow the local level
model as in Commandeur, Koopman and Ooms (2011) and depart from the local level
model presented in Drukker and Gates (2011). Finally, we apply a constraint to the
coefficients in the measurement equation t,y1 , however we let all other parameters in
matrix βfree, this does not necessary have to be the case, however it does not affect our
analysis and simplifies the estimation. In addition, by letting β free for the rest of the
maturities it is possible to observe or account for the existence of a term structure effect.
We compute maximum likelihood using the diffuse Kalman filter with the De Jong
(1988, 1991) method for estimating the initial values, as our model is non-stationary. For
convenience, we have also applied the optimization algorithm Newton-Raphson
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technique instead of the Marquart and Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman, as seen in the works
from Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006).
In a second stage we estimate via OLS, the effects of macroeconomic data on the latent
factors. The macroeconomic data used are the natural logarithms of Euro-Zone
Unemployment, Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index, ECB M3 levels and Euro-Zone
Production Price Index, thus a possible specification could be.
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where  21 0 ut, ,NID   ,  22 0 vt, ,NID   and  23 10  ,NIDt,  .
We will perform estimations (1-12) twice. Firstly, for Money Market yields: EONIA;
Euribor 3M, Euribor 6M, 2 and 5 year German Government Benchmark and, secondly,
for the Capital Markets yield curve comprising the 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 year German
Government Benchmarks. The yields and the macroeconomic data are on a monthly
basis available in Bloomberg and as of end of month. The period considered is from
December 1999 until January 2010, hence resulting in 122 observations.
Linking Latent Factors with a no-arbitrage term structure model
The expected price at t with maturity N+1 of a bond that redeems at t+1 is usually
specified as follows,
 NttNt PmEP 111   , (13)
where 1NtP is the price of a zero coupon bond of maturity N+1 at time t, 1tm being the
stochastic discount factor and NtP 1 being the price of the same bond at t+1. By applying
natural logarithms one has,
     )( 11)1( lnlnln NttNt PmP   . (14)
Whereby log prices are related to yields and this can be described as follows,
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As seen in most recent no-arbitrage affine term structure literature log prices can be
specified as a linear function of a state vector 1tx as follows:
     11   tNt 'NNAPln xB , (16)
where A(N) is a scalar, B(N)' a 1×k vector of coefficients and 1tx a k×1 vector of state
variables, which for this case k=3 for the level, slope and seasonal components. Note that
the transpose of a vector or matrix is specified with a “ ' ”.
From (16) it is possible to find a closed solution and estimate the parameters A(N) and
B(N)'. These parameters are obtained by linking observable yields to an observation
equation describing the behaviour of a space state vector. This can be done by combining
equations (15) and (16) at t+1 for any maturity, thus yielding,
 
11   t
)N(
t N
'N
N
NA
y x
B
. (17)
Intuitively, the short rate could be specified as follows,
  111 11   t)(t 'Ay xB . (18)
Empirically, equation (18) looks like,
110
1
1   t
)(
t ay xa . (19)
However, from the restrictions in (11) it is possible to set 00 a and  1111 a . In
addition, the state space vector xt is calibrated as follows,
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The stochastic processes for xt+1 and for the stochastic discount factor shown in (13) can
be specified similarly to the pricing kernel à la Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998) which here
is combined with the Vasicek (1977), for which a possible specification would be like,
  11   txttt εσxxΦxx , (21)
  111   t)(tt 'ymln ελ . (22)
229
Equation (21) describes the stochastic process of the independent state variables. Where
tx and xare both 3-dimensional vectors. Φ is a 33 diagonal matrix, i.e. Φi,i = Φi,
which represent the speed of adjustment at which each of t,ix elements reverse to their
means. xσ is a diagonal 33 matrix comprising the volatility of the state variables. 1tε
is a ( 13)-vector of shocks moving tx away from xand with 1t,i elements being
normally distributed with mean zero and variance unity.
Equation (22) is the stochastic discount factor as seen in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998),
however here with somehow a different setting, as (22) was originally the univariate
Vasicek (1977) case and this paper calibrates using latent factors instead of the short rate.
In this paper and similar to Jakas (2012), the multifactor case of a 3-dimension state
variable is used. Furthermore, same as in Backus-Foresi-Telmer (1998), δis specified as
follows,
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Clearly, specification (23) is fortuitous, the only aim is to normalise the stochastic
discount factor so that it becomes the inverse of the short rate. Notice that with (23), now
(22) has the following conditional means and variance,
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where  321 'λ . Therefore, assuming E[ln x] = µ(x) + 1∕2σ2(x) it yields,
  )1(1ln tt ymE  .
Here it is shown how to get to the solution. Starting first with equation (14) and
substituting the right hand term for (22) and (16) one obtains,
     1111   tt)(tNt 'NNA'yPln xBελ . (24)
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In order to solve recursivelyδis replaced by (23) and 1ty is replaced by (19). In addition,
1tx is also replaced for (21) to account for the Vasicek (1977) process. In sum one has,
       1113
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t 'NNA''Pln εσxxΦxBελxγ . (25)
Notice that 0a does not appear in Eq. (25) because 00 a . The constant terms and the
terms multiplying xt andεt+1 are grouped, thus yielding,
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(26)
where I denotes the ( 33 )-identity matrix. The right hand side of equation (25), which
has now developed into (26), has the following conditional moments,
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and,
    211 xNtt 'N'PlnmlnVar σBλ  . (28)
Bearing in mind that the implied present-value of a fixed income security yields,
        NttNttNt PmVarPmEPE 11111 lnln2
1lnlnln 
  . (29)
By substituting [27] and [28] into [29] one obtains,
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Rearranging the constant terms and the terms multiplying xt and lining up with (16)
yields,
     



  

2
3
1
2
2
1
1 x
i
i 'N''NNANA σBλxΦB  , (31)
   ΦIBaB  'N'N 11 . (32)
The solution is obtained by computing the present value recursively using (14) for some
guess of coefficients from (17). Since 101 
)(
tP , A(0) = 0 and B(0)' = 0, which means
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this can be solved recursively, as for one period would imply A(1) = 0 and B(1)' = 1a
which means that equals the short rate as described in (19). Now for any set of state
variables the resulting yield curve can be computed. As this author is trying to compute
the coefficients for maturity N, all is needed is to use (17) to compute the present value of
an N+1 maturity bond. So all we have to do is to replace (31) and (32) into (17) and solve
numerically by fitting the curve to the observed yields by adjusting λfor a given choice
of maturities, recalling that parameters 0a and 1aare restricted to discussion in (11) and
(19).
Section III. Discussion of Results
Tables 8-1 and 8-2 show the coefficients and standard errors obtained from the state
space model discussed in equations (1) to (11) for Money Market yields (comprising the
maturities ranging from EONIA to 5 years) and for Capital Market yields (hence, the
maturities ranging from 5 years to 30 years). Notice that it is reasonable to let an
overlapping between 2 years and 5 years, as it is generally accepted that between these
maturities often Capital and Money Market instruments act as substitutes. Both tables
show that the coefficients are very significant with the exception of the seasonal
component for the case of the Money Markets, as the seasonal component appears to be
significant only for the case of the Capital Markets curve.
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Table 8-1 Money Market Curve: EONIA, Euribor 3M, Euribor 6M, 2Yr and 5 Yr German Govy
Bond.
Level tu Slope tv Season t1
EONIA 1 1 1
Euribor 3M 1.042
(.0108)
1.7072
(.2309)
.1453
(.1585)
Euribor 6M 1.0636
(.0107)
1.4985
(.2346)
.0375
(.1644)
BRD 2 Years 1.018
(.0143)
-.9528
(.2650)
.0005
(.1608)
BRD 5 Years 1.1148
(.0233)
-2.9520
(.4203)
-.0945
(.2291)
2
;;  vu (state) .0333
(.0048)
- -
2
y (observation) .0655
(.0049)
- -
ˆ 3.0781 -.0460 .0023
ˆ 1.1236 .1691 .1935
Note: With the exception of the seasonal component all other parameters are very significant with p-values below 0.05, thus P>|z| = 0.
Tables 8-1 and 8-2 also show that for both yield curves –hence the Money Market as well
as the Capital Market yield curves- the coefficients for the Level tu increases with the
maturity. Interestingly, the coefficients for the Slope factor tv in the Money Market
curve exhibit different behaviour to increasing maturities with respect to those seen for
the Capital Market curve. The coefficients for tv in the Money Market curve starts with a
positive value and becomes negative for the 2 years onwards thus is decreasing.
However, the coefficients for tv in the capital market curve increase as maturities
become longer.
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Table 8-2 Capital Market Curve: 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 year German Govy Bonds.
Level tu Slope tv Season t1
BRD 5 Years 1
-
1
-
1
BRD 10 Years 1.1242
(.0098)
3.3261
(.2345)
1.0536
(.1971)
BRD 15 Years 1.1921
(.0143)
4.4612
(.3414)
1.1864
(.2864)
BRD 20 Years 1.2360
(.0177)
5.3056
(.4228)
1.1558
(.3334)
BRD 30 Years 1.2541
(.0174)
5.257
(.4159)
1.0366
(.3343)
2
;;  vu (state) .0305
(.0045)
- -
2
y (observation) .0065
(.0006)
- -
ˆ 3.6729 .0129 .0197
ˆ .6855 .1493 .1717
Note: All estimates very significant with p-values P>|z| = 0.
The seasonal component t,1 for the Money Market curve is insignificantly close to zero,
and for the capital markets curve is significantly close to one.
Figure 8-1 shows the latent factors (level, slope and seasonal components) as well as the
EONIA and 5 year German Government bond. By comparing the top left hand chart
which shows the levels for the money and capital markets with the bottom right hand
chart which shows the EONIA and the 5 year German Government yield, it is possible to
recognise that the level is possibly the most relevant parameter as it appears to follow
almost the same stochastic path. The top right hand chart showing the time path for both
slopes which vary mostly between -0.25 and +0.25 and breach these boundaries towards
around pre and post Lehman’s collapse. The capital markets slope appears to lag the
money market slope at the beginning of the series and exhibits rather smoother
turnarounds. The seasonality component for both time series seems stationary with no
apparent trend.
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Figure 8-1 Latent Factors Level, Slope, Curvature and rates for Money Markets and Capital
Markets rates.
Figures 8-2 and 8-3 show fitted versus observed values obtained by running the state
space model described in (1) to (11). The fitted values seem to follow quite close the
observed yields. These results are encouraging, as they are very similar to those seen in
Jakas (2011, 2012) and Jakas and Jakas (2013). Not surprisingly, this stems from the fact
that the latent factors estimated do a good job in replicating the yields, as most of the
effect comes from the Level, which shows a very similar behaviour to the EONIA rate. In
addition, it can be seen that as maturities become larger the model performs poorer, but
still better than the results seen in Jakas (2012) and Jakas and Jakas (2013), where solely
macro data were used for calibrating the model. As maturities become longer, the Capital
Market Level is likely to be more influential than the Money Market Level, thus
suggesting that there are long term components evidencing a different structure between
the front and the long end of the curve. This improvement is mostly due to the fact that
the yield curve has been segregated between money and capital markets and hence latent
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factors for longer maturities are different, as they carry information which is more
relevant to yields on the long end, whereas latent factors influencing the short end have
less predictive ability on long end yields.
Figure 8-2 Fitted Versus Observed Money Market Yields.
It should be mentioned that most of the research has been focused on yields up to 10 year
maturities. Models fitting yields in the short end up to 10 years always perform better
than for those trying to fit longer maturities such as 20 and 30 years. If the state space for
the capital markets is run by dropping from the model the 5 years and leaving only the
maturities comprising 10, 15, 20 and 30 years the fitted values become even closer to the
observed long end yields. This effect is mostly attributed to the fact that the front end of
the curve appears to have less information influencing yields on the longer maturities.
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Figure 8-3 Fitted Versus Observed Capital Market Yields.
Tables 8-3 and 8-4 show the OLS (robust) results as discussed in (12). Recalling that the
Level tu is the most important factor governing the yields, the macroeconomic data
influencing this factor is analysed in this section. Table 8-3 and Table 8-4 show that
coefficients for the macroeconomic factors influencing the Level, Slope and Seasonal
components is smaller for capital market latent factors compared to money market latent
factors. In fact, the signs of the coefficients only seem to be in agreement for the case of
the Level. For the Slope factor, only the consumer confidence coefficients are similar in
size and exhibit the same sign. For the Seasonal component the coefficients for
unemployment and consumer confidence exhibit same signs however, they differ in size
significantly.
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Table 8-3 OLS (robust) results of Money Market Latent factors versus Macroeconomic data.
Level tu Slope tv Season t1 ˆ
Ln Unemployment -9.655936
(.5953772)
-1.348114
(.1271292)
.4216055
(.301257)
2.1329
Ln PPI 18.67764
(2.140462)
3.700983
(.7038401)
1.658626
(1.0074)
4.6036
Ln ECB M3 -8.055411
(.7723205)
-1.299466
(.2410876)
-.1551028
(.3770993)
8.8127
Ln Con. Conf. Index -1.070341
(.556391)
-.9127945
(.1554375)
-.1715393
(.1920829)
4.4767
Intercept 13.47607
(5.312529)
1.323285
(1.304486)
-6.404112
(2.249984)
R-squared 0.9267 0.7702 0.2578
Table 8-4 OLS results of Capital Market Latent factors versus Macroeconomic data.
Level tu Slope tv Season t1 ˆ
Ln Unemployment -4.60098
(.5729704)
.4937988
(.1106354)
.083843
(.2393815)
2.1329
Ln PPI 2.715887
(2.305689)
-2.10111
(.3090523)
-1.455954
(1.062349)
4.6036
Ln ECB M3 -2.710198
(.7925468)
.7113546
(.1122904)
.3672107
(.378095)
8.8127
Ln Con. Conf. Index .9895847
(.4375565)
-.8902952
(.084333)
-.9289367
(.2541476)
4.4767
Intercept 20.46274
(4.951114)
6.344468
(.8901571)
7.462491
(2.146008)
R-squared 0.8047 0.8633 0.3356
The theoretical interpretation of the effects of the macroeconomic data on the Slope and
Seasonal component factors are left for the reader to go through the exercise. However,
the interpretation of the level is less challenging, as it appears to be pretty much in line
with economic theory. For example table 8-3 and 8-4 show that increases in
unemployment rate results in a fall in yields. This makes sense as the yield curve studied
is the risk free curve and hence if unemployment increases, expected aggregate
consumption growth is expected to be lower with the subsequent fall in risk-free asset
yields. On the other hand, a fall in unemployment is expected to decrease inflationary
pressures so that central banks have no reason for keeping policy rates high and hence are
likely to introduce rate cuts. In same fashion, if the price level PPI increases this is
expected to result in an increase in the short rate as a consequence of central bank policy,
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but also an increase in the price level is expected to rise the overall level of interest rates,
mostly, in order to compensate investors for the loss in value on real money balances. An
increase in money supply M3 is expected to result in a fall in interest rates, as seen in the
classical IS-LM models. The sign of the consumer confidence index is not as expected by
the theory. In addition, the coefficient does not appear to be very significant and its
contribution to the overall variance is negligible.
Figure 8-4 shows the latent factors, which are the level, the slope and seasonal
component and their empirical counterparts. Here, the empirical counterparts differ to
those of Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) as in this research the yield curve is
segregated into money markets and capital markets. Notice that by doing so it is possible
to account for different behaviours of the level in the front end and the level in the long
end of the curve. For both cases the level fits very well the observed empirical
counterparts. Correlations between Money and Capital Market levels tu with their
empirical counterparts (EONIA+…+5Y)/6 and (2Y+…+30Y)/6 is of 0.93 and 0.88
respectively. The correlation between the money and capital market levels with current
inflation  1212 ln)ln(ln  ttt PPIPPIPPI is of 0.34 and 0.06 respectively. Similar to
Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) we link yield levels with inflation, as suggested
by the Fischer equation, as seen also in prominent macro-finance literature such as
Hördahl, Tristani and Vestin (2003) and Rudebusch and Wu (2003), amongst others.
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Figure 8-4 Level, slope, seasonal components and their empirical counterparts.
For the case of the slope, it can be shown that in both cases it is possible to replicate very
well the trend however Money Market slope is less volatile than its empirical counterpart.
Interestingly, the slope for the Capital Market follows a similar pattern to that of its
empirical counterpart. Correlations between Money and Capital Market slopes tv with
their empirical counterparts (Euribor3M-EONIA) and (5Y-2Y) is of 0.14 and 0.78
respectively. The correlation between the money and capital market levels with current
unemployment is of 0.57 and 0.53 respectively. So these results appear to be in support
tu representing interest rates levels for money and capital markets and tv being the slope
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which seems to be more relevant for the Capital Market and less relevant for the Money
market curve. The seasonal component is rather inconclusive, as for the Money Market
the empirical counterpart is much more volatile, particularly during the Lehman collapse.
Somehow a better picture is observed for the Capital Markets seasonal component
however still, they do not seem to match as nicely as it did for the level or the slope
factors.
So far, this paper has concentrated in applying a local level model with a stochastic slope
and a stochastic seasonal component with no feedback. Thus, innovations in the latent
variables do not feed back to the macroeconomy. This assumption can be tested via a
basic VAR model, orthogonal impulse response functions as well as the forecast error
variance decompositions and the classical Granger Causality test, all of these will be
taken care of in this section.
Results for lag selection
For the lag order selection criteria for a series vector autoregressions of order 1, a
prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian
information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC)
are used. According to our results, the FPE and AIC selected 2 lags, and SBIC and HQIC
selected 1 lag for the Money Markets curve. So for simplicity’s sake and following the
theoretical advantages of using SBIC and HQIC over FPE and AIC, as discussed in
Lütkepohl (2005, 148-152) 1 lag is selected for the VAR. For the Capital Markets curve
the SBIC and HQIC selected 4 and 1 lags accordingly. Here, in order to keep consistency,
the lags selected have also been of 1 order.
Tables 8-5 and 8-6 show VAR results for the coefficients and standard errors for the
Money Market and Capital Market latent factors with the respective macroeconomic
variables. The macroeconomic variables used exhibit a significant autocorrelation to their
one-period lags and appear not to be a function of the other macroeconomic or latent
factors. On the contrary, the latent factors do seem to be influenced by some of its own
lags, as well as by lagged macroeconomic data. For the reader’s convenience, coefficients
which are significantly different from zero have been bold highlighted. According to the
VAR results, there appears to be very little feedback from latent factors to the
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macroeconomy and a rather significant feedback from the macroeconomy to the latent
factors. This does not mean that there is no feedback at all from latent factors to the
macroeconomy, but rather that this feedback is weaker. This is a striking result, as it
would appear that interest rate levels provide little feedback to the macroeconomy
according to the period and variables analysed.
Figures 8-5 and 8-6 show the orthogonalised impulse response functions and, they seem
to confirm this view. These results are in line to those seen in Jakas (2011) and in line
with the VAR results, which suggests that little or no feedback is observed between latent
factors and the macroeconomy, however there is a clear statistical relationship from
lagged macro variables to the latent factors particularly to the level.
Table 8-5 VAR results of Money Market Latent factors versus Macroeconomic data.
lnUt-1 lnPPIt-1 lnM3t-1 lnCCt-1 Level
1tu
Slope
1tv
Season
1,1 t
Intercept
LnU t 1.007
(.0274)
-.1177
(.0650)
.0385
(.0256)
-.1051
(.0143)
.0074
(.0028)
-.0092
(.0102)
.0038
(.0044)
.6337
(.1336)
LnPPI t -.0270
(.0157)
.9863
(.0372)
.0049
(.0146)
.0462
(.0082)
-.0047
(.0016)
.0083
(.0058)
.0003
(.0025)
-.1130
(.0764)
LnM3 t -.0531
(.0187)
.1021
(.0444)
.9559
(.0174)
.0012
(.0097)
-.0050
(.0019)
.0094
(.0069)
-.0053
(.0030)
.0470
(.0911)
LnCC t -.0738
(.0595)
.0794
(.1410)
-.0366
(.0553)
1.015
(.0311)
-.0131
(.0061)
-.0156
(.0222)
.0100
(.0096)
.0830
(.2895)
Level
tu
-1.2932
(.4520)
5.7258
(1.0709)
-1.828
(.4207)
.9297
(.2356)
.8646
(.0465)
-.6903
(.1688)
-.1798
(.0730)
-11.2878
(2.1988)
Slope
tv
.0765
(.1868)
1.292
(.4426)
-.3223
(.1737)
-.0614
(.0974)
.04016
(.0192)
.6247
(.0698)
-.0715
(.0301)
-3.140
(.9087)
Season
t1
1.8691
(.5679)
-.3229
(1.3452)
.8502
(.5284)
-.3829
(.2961)
.2130
(.0585)
-.4671
(.2120)
.0437
(.0917)
-8.9613
(2.7621)
Note: Sample: 2000m6 - 2010m1; No. of obs = 116; all equations significant with P>chi2 at P-values of 0.0000; All equations with
R-sq > 0.91 except for season at 0.36 , and LnUt = Euro-Zone Unemployment rate; LnPPIt = Euro-Zone Production Price Index;
LnM3t = ECB M3 Money Aggregate and, LnCCt = Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index.
242
Table 8-6 VAR results of Capital Market Latent factors versus Macroeconomic data.
lnUt-1 lnPPIt-1 lnM3t-1 lnCCt-1 Level
1tu
Slope
1tv
Season
1,1 t
Intercept
LnU t .9861
(.0174)
.0261
(.0531)
-.0018
(.0190)
-.0865
(.0161)
.0098
(.0024)
.0222
(.0139)
.0076
(.0052)
.2763
(.1667)
LnPPI t .1667
(.0102)
.9456
(.0310)
.0184
(.0111)
.0477
(.0094)
-.0041
(.0013)
.0057
(.0081)
-.0051
(.0030)
-.0784
(.0974)
LnM3 t -.0371
(.0123)
.0257
(.0376)
.9793
(.0134)
-.0033
(.0114)
-.0052
(.0016)
-.0163
(.0099)
.0079
(.0036)
.1833
(.1181)
LnCC t .0395
(.0395)
-.2772
(.1202)
.0874
(.0430)
1.003
(.0365)
-.0115
(.0053)
-.0351
(.0316)
-.0178
(.0117)
.4482
(.3774)
Level
tu
-.5870
(.2156)
-.8975
(.6563)
.0902
(.2352)
.4419
(.1993)
.8358
(.0291)
.2504
(.1727)
-.6970
(.0640)
3.2088
(2.0599)
Slope
tv
.1872
(.0951)
-.2362
(.2896)
.1164
(.1038)
-.3608
(.0879)
.0319
(.0126)
.7204
(.0762)
.0794
(.0282)
1.1639
(.9091)
Season
t1
.3303
(.3049)
.6967
(.9279)
-.0833
(.3325)
-.1485
(.2818)
.1340
(.0412)
.7537
(.2443)
.2891
(.0905)
-3.0001
(2.9124)
Note: Sample: 2000m6 - 2010m1; No. of obs = 116; all equations significant with P>chi2 at P-values of 0.0000; All equations with
R-sq > 0.92 except for season at 0.46, and LnUt = Euro-Zone Unemployment rate; LnPPI t = Euro-Zone Production Price Index;
LnM3t = ECB M3 Money Aggregate and, LnCCt = Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index.
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Figure 8-5 Impulse Response Functions for Money Market Latent and Macroeconomic variables.
Note: “M3” for ECB M3 Money Aggregate; “Cons.Conf.” as Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index; “PPI” for Euro-Zone Production Price Index and “Unemp.” for Euro-Zone Unemployment Rate.
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Figure 8-6 Impulse Response Functions for Capital Market Latent and Macroeconomic variables.
Note: “M3” for ECB M3 Money Aggregate; “Cons.Conf.” as Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index; “PPI” for Euro-Zone Production Price Index and “Unemp.” for Euro-Zone Unemployment Rate.
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In light of the above results, a Granger Causality test is performed. Here it is possible to
observe in tables 8-7 and 8-8 below that feedback from latent factors to the macro
variables exist. The test though does not tell us the size of these feedbacks. For example,
in the case of Money Market yields (see table 8-7) it is possible to see that Consumer
Confidence and the Level granger-cause unemployment rate and PPI, amongst others (see
bold font in columns lnCCt-1 and Levelt-1). It can also be seen that monetary aggregate
M3 is granger-caused by unemployment, PPI and the Level (with p-values: 0.005, 0.021
and 0.009 respectively). Consumer Confidence is only granger-caused by the Level (with
a p-value: 0.032). The Level is granger-caused by all macro and latent factors. The Slope
is granger-caused by PPI, the Level and by the Seasonal component (with p-values:
0.004, 0.037 and 0.018 respectively). Interestingly, the Seasonal component is granger-
caused by the unemployment rate, the Level and the Slope (with p-values: 0.001, 0.000
and 0.028 respectively). The Granger Causality test using Capital Market latent factors
have the following discrepancies with respect to the Money Market latent factors; 1) PPI
does not granger-cause M3 (p-value: 0.495), 2) PPI, M3 and the Slope do not granger-
cause the Level (p-values: 0.172, 0.701 and 0.147, respectively), 3) Unemployment and
Consumer Confidence index granger-cause the Slope, 4) PPI does not granger-cause the
slope and 4) Unemployment does not granger-causes the seasonal component.
Table 8-7 Money Markets Granger Causality test.
For Prob > chi2, so that if below p-values ≤0.05 the Ho “Excluded variable does not granger cause the
equation of the endogenous variable” is rejected.
Excluded
Equation
lnUt-1 lnPPIt-1 lnM3t-1 lnCCt-1 Level
1tu
Slope
1tv
Season
1,1 t
All
LnU t - 0.070 0.132 0.000 0.008 0.365 0.388 0.000
LnPPI t 0.085 - 0.735 0.000 0.004 0.152 0.883 0.000
LnM3 t 0.005 0.021 - 0.894 0.009 0.175 0.075 0.000
LnCC t 0.214 0.573 0.508 - 0.032 0.481 0.297 0.000
Level tu 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.014 0.000
Slope tv 0.682 0.004 0.064 0.528 0.037 - 0.018 0.000
Season t,1 0.001 0.810 0.108 0.196 0.000 0.028 - 0.000
Note: LnU t = Euro-Zone Unemployment rate; LnPPIt = Euro-Zone Production Price Index; LnM3t = ECB M3 Money Aggregate and,
LnCC t = Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index.
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Table 8-8 Capital Markets Granger Causality test.
For Prob > chi2, so that if below p-values ≤0.05 the Ho “Excluded variable does not granger cause the
equation of the endogenous variable” is rejected.
Excluded
Equation
lnUt-1 lnPPIt-1 lnM3t-1 lnCCt-1 Level
1tu
Slope
1tv
Season
1,1 t
All
LnU t - 0.624 0.927 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.138 0.000
LnPPI t 0.155 - 0.097 0.000 0.003 0.481 0.090 0.000
LnM3 t 0.003 0.495 - 0.769 0.002 0.100 0.030 0.000
LnCC t 0.318 0.021 0.042 - 0.030 0.268 0.129 0.000
Level tu 0.006 0.172 0.701 0.027 - 0.147 0.000 0.000
Slope tv 0.049 0.415 0.262 0.000 0.013 - 0.005 0.000
Season t,1 0.279 0.453 0.802 0.598 0.001 0.002 - 0.000
Note: LnU t = Euro-Zone Unemployment rate; LnPPI t = Euro-Zone Production Price Index; LnM3t = ECB M3 Money Aggregate and,
LnCC t = Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index.
In summary, it could be said that there is a clear effect from the macroeconomy to the
yield curve and from the yield curve to the macroeconomy however, from what we have
learned from VAR tables 8-5 and 8-6 and impulse response figures 5 and 6, feedback
from the yield curve to the macroeconomy seems to be weak.
Figures 8-7 and 8-8 show the Cholesky forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) to
orthogonal shocks. Here, it is also possible to observe that orthogonal shocks cause
permanent effects on some of the latent and macro factors. For example, shocks on
consumer confidence index (second row) has permanent effects on PPI, unemployment,
the slope and the level, thus these shocks do not die away, but in turn persist in time.
Interestingly, own variable orthogonal shocks, thus auto-shocks, in some factors appear
to have permanent effects too or exhibit persistence, as they appear to last several periods
before they die away (see for example the diagonal charts in figures 8-7 and 8-8 below,
for instance, see the consumer confidence index and the seasonal component diagonal
charts). Another interesting outcome is that the level, the slope and the monetary
aggregate M3 have weak impact on the price level (PPI). This can be seen –presumably-
as a result of the ECB being successful in anchoring long term inflation expectations at
low levels. The price level seems to be mostly influenced by orthogonal shocks on
consumer confidence index which in turn seems to be independent of all other factors.
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Figure 8-7 Forecast Variance Decomposition to Cholesky orthogonal shocks for Money Market latent and macroeconomic variables.
Note: “M3” for ECB M3 Money Aggregate; “Confid.” or “Confidence” as Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index; “PPI” for Euro-Zone Production Price Index and “Unemp.” or “Unemployment” for
Euro-Zone Unemployment Rate.
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Figure 8-8 Forecast Variance Decomposition to Cholesky orthogonal shocks for Capital Market latent and macroeconomic variables.
Note: “M3” for ECB M3 Money Aggregate; “Confid.” or “Confidence” as Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence Index; “PPI” for Euro-Zone Production Price Index and “Unemp.” or “Unemployment” for
Euro-Zone Unemployment Rate.
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Interestingly enough, a Johansen test for cointegration has been also performed for
both the Money Markets as well as the Capital Markets latent factors applying a
vector error correction model of two lags on the Level, Slope, Season, and
unemployment rate, M3, PPI and Consumer Confidence index. The results show that
Money Markets exhibit at least four cointegrating equations and that Capital Markets
exhibit three cointegrating equations. This suggests that the latent factors and
macroeconomic variables used are highly cointegrated.
Section IV. Calibrating an Affine Term Structure Model with Latent Factors
In this section an affine term structure model is calibrated with the money market
latent factors discussed in previous sections and entered into equations (13) to (32).
Thus a no-arbitrage model is fitted by calibrating the state vector with the latent
variables: obtained from the local level model. Figure 9 below shows that the affine
approach to yield curve modelling seems to fit quite well the observed yields, even for
the 10 year maturities. However, this deteriorates as the maturity gets longer as seen
also in most of the empirical research. Clearly, these results suggest that short term
components in the yield curve (money market level, slope and season) which have
high predictive power on the front end of the curve, exhibits a diminishing predictive
power as maturities become larger. It could also be interpreted that the front and the
long end of the curve are governed by different factors which appear not to have much
in common, thus casting some doubt on the use of a no-arbitrage model for these
maturities spectrum. The results shown in figure 8-9 seem to support the approach of
breaking the yield curve in two types of markets: the money markets and the capital
markets. For money markets being the yields governed by short term latent factors,
hence comprising the maturities from overnight (EONIA) to 2-5 year German Govies,
and for capital markets being the yields governed by long term latent factors, hence
for maturities ranging from 2-5 years up to the 30 year German Govies. Figures 8-10
and 8-11 show the average yield curve fitted using the affine term structure model and
the coefficients for equation (17) discussed in section 2. Here it can be seen that all
coefficients are positive and decrease as maturities get closer to the 30 years (or 360
250
months), with the exception of the A(N)/N which increases as maturity becomes
larger.
Figure 8-9 Yield curve fitted with an affine term structure model using latent factors as state
variables.
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Figure 8-10 Yield curve fitted with an affine term structure model using latent factors as state
variables.
Figure 8-11 Fitted coefficients NNA i /)( and N/)N(B i as in equation (17).
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Section V. Policy Implications
In light of these results, it appears that capital and money markets as well as
the ECB seem to react to changes in macroeconomic variables which in turn result in
movements in the level, the slope and the seasonal components of yields. However,
the data give the impression that yields exhibit a rather limited or timid feedback on
the wider economy, in support of the local level model with no feedback instead of a
VAR model as seen in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006). Therefore the ECB, in
terms of its Policy Rate and monetary aggregates, can only ensure interest rates are
low in times when consumption growth is low in order to not make things worse, but
according to the data and period analysed, there is no evidence that innovation in
yields create a response from macro variables, similar to the results seen in Diebold,
Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006). In addition, our results confirm that the level is the
most important factor contributing to yield curve movements followed by the slope,
and that this is the case for both the money as well as for the capital market yields. In
times of high consumption growth, thus when consumer confidence is high and
unemployment is low, the central bank is expected to increase interest rate levels in
order to anchor long term inflation to low levels. However, the data does not support
the existence of a significant feedback from yields’ latent factors to PPI, but a rather
one-way effect from PPI to yields’ latent factors only. Therefore it appears that in
times of low consumption growth, central banks can only limit their action to low
interest rates in order to ensure that the economy does not deteriorate further, as there
appears to be little evidence of interest rates influencing the wider economy.
However, we remain cautious about our results, as the number of variables used for
determining the state of the economy has been limited to four.
Section VI. Conclusions and Final Remarks
In this paper a local level model with a stochastic slope and a stochastic
seasonality have been calibrated using European yields. The analysis involved the use
of the state space methodology to a structural equation model which, in state space
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terminology was to estimate an unobserved state or latent factors being the level, the
slope and the seasonality to an observation or measurement equation linking the
observed yields to the unobserved latent factors. The results confirm the views of
Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and, provide strong evidence of
macroeconomic effects on yields however and, weaker evidence of yield curve effects
on the macroeconomy. This essay has also explored the possibility of breaking the
yield curve in two: the money market and the capital market yield curves. It has been
shown that by doing so results are more encouraging than those seen in the no-
arbitrage experiences. In addition, a discrete time affine term structure model (hence
no-arbitrage) has been calibrated with the level, the slope and the seasonal component
and both, the local level model as well as the no-arbitrage term structure model
performed quite well in explaining yield curve movements. However, similar to most
of current literature, the explanatory power diminishes as maturities become larger.
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9. Conclusion and Final Remarks
The aims and objectives of this thesis –outlined under chapter 1- are to link
empirically term structure dynamics to economic theory. In the process of doing so,
this set of essays has explored the use of term structure models in order to link
macroeconomic data to European government bond yields. Results were compared to
the outcomes seen in classical IS-LM models, consumption asset pricing theory and
Taylor Rules. This work also shows how term structure models can be used for other
purposes, not only for modelling yields but also for modelling innovations in
governments’ revenues as a result of shocks on –for instance– in unemployment rate.
In the preceding paragraphs, a summary of our conclusions is presented.
Chapter two presented slight adjustments to the classical consumption based asset
pricing model by introducing in the utility function unemployment data and survey
data such as consumers’ confidence index. The incorporation of a monetary aggregate
has also been extensively discussed in this chapter and its inclusion in the model
appears to us to be robust enough. This chapter has also tested empirically a term
structure model which has been adapted to the above mentioned data departing
somehow from the no-arbitrage approach. We have shown that using current
theoretical developments and a few state space variables such as European
unemployment data, the European Consumers’ Confidence Index, European
Production Price Index (PPI) and a monetary aggregate such as ECB M3 for Europe,
it is possible to explain yield curve movements with strikingly very good results.
Unemployment and consumer confidence index have exhibited a shift and a slope
effect on the yield curve, for front-end yields moving faster than in the long end
resulting in steepening or flattening effects. Production price index has a twist effect
on the yield curve (flattening or steepening of the curve) which results in lower-end
yields shifting in opposite directions to the long end. This empirical work shows that
yields are negatively correlated to money supply, as expected in classical IS-LM
models. And that money supply exhibits a slope effect, with the lower end of the
curve shifting faster than the longer end. In the light of these results, we suggest that
further analysis is needed to understand what other variables or mechanisms are
governing the longer end of the curve, as for the lower end our results show that the
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variables used have very high predictive ability already. In addition, we also suggest
further research on cross-sectional data across non-EU countries. In this essay we
have used macroeconomic data to explain yield curve movements and we show that
GIIPS yields are more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks compared to the German
benchmark. In fact, we see that most of the GIIPS bond yields –in contrast to the
German benchmark- exhibit positive coefficients for the unemployment rate,
indicating that GIIPS-governments’ cost of financing will be penalised when
unemployment increases. This means that these governments cannot undertake
counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus by issuing new debt in times of low consumption
growth and high unemployment.
In Chapter 3 some algebra was presented and analysed, and shown step by step how to
get to the no-arbitrage approach. This chapter is of interest to academics involved in
teaching affine term structure models under the continuous time approach. The affine
term structure models developed in this chapter start with the basic pricing equation,
the pricing equation for asset returns and the holding period returns. The chapter also
explains the relationship of bond prices and Ito’s lemma and finally the fundamental
pricing equation for fixed income securities is obtained, as this expression is later
required for the definition of an affine term structure model. Discussions are linked to
prominent research such as Piazzesi (2010) and results are compared to those of
Cochrane (2005) and Duffie and Kan (1996). Here, we have learned that there are still
some conceptual differences in the literature which requires further attention that goes
beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, for instance, we point out the fundamental
differential equation of bonds or fixed income securities. We have shown that
depending on the assumptions, the closed solutions lead to different results for the
calculations of the parameters NNA /)( and NNBi /)( .
Chapter 4 explores the use of macro-finance models in order to explain the links of
macroeconomics and the state vector used for calibrating a term structure model.
Some of the findings in Chapter 4 are applied to the models discussed in chapters 5, 6,
7 and 8. Here it is worth mentioning that in order to link macroeconomic policy to
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term structure dynamics the use of a macro-finance model would help the researcher
select state variables that are supported by economic theory. This chapter also shows
that when an asset becomes riskier, investors are looking into the solvency profile of
the issuer rather than inflation and monetary policy data. For instance, the Greek
government cannot finance its self by influencing the time path of inflation and central
bank monetary aggregates. Therefore, in this chapter we have learned that if the bond
is a risk-free asset, hence, solvency shocks on the issuer are small (as for the case of
German government bonds) the state vector will comprise the natural logarithms of
unemployment rate, natural logarithms of consumer confidence index (as in
proposition 1); natural logarithms of monetary aggregate levels and natural logarithms
of the price level (modified proposition 2). If the bond is risky (solvency shocks for
issuer are large), the model will be calibrated with the natural logarithms of
unemployment rate, natural logarithms of government surplus to GDP ratio and
natural logarithms of total government debt to GDP ratio (proposition 3).
Chapter 5 some of the algebra and concepts seen in the continuous time affine term
structure literature are plugged into the discrete time approach. Starting point for this
paper has been the celebrated papers from Backus, Foresi, Telmer (1996-98). In
addition, some of the developments seen on the continuous approach as documented
in Piazzesi (2010), Singleton (2006), Le, Singleton and Dai (2010) and Duffie and
Kan (1996) have been explored and adapted to the discrete time approach. This
chapter focused mainly on the multifactor cases of affine term structure models, as the
weaknesses seen on the one factor models under Vasicek (1977) and CIR (1985) have
been very well documented already in Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998). Novelty of
this research is that the multifactor affine term structure models under the Vasicek
(1977) and the CIR (1985) process were calibrated using observed Interbank and
German sovereign yields and European macroeconomic data as well as Greek
sovereign yields. For the European and German yield curve, we calibrate
macroeconomic data such as Euro-Zone Unemployment rate, Euro-Zone Production
Price Index, Euro-Zone monetary aggregates M3 and Euro-Zone Consumer
Confidence Index similar to previous chapters. For the Greek yield curve we use
Greece’s sovereign budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, Greek unemployment rate and Greek
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sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio. In this chapter we show that our results are in line with
our analysis from chapter 4. The results are encouraging and the models fit the
observed yields as well as give evidence of a reasonable predictive-ability. Main
findings can be summarised as follows: In the case of the interbank rates and German
sovereigns, an increase in unemployment results in a fall in yields on risk free assets
and the curve is expected to steepen with front end yields falling faster than the long
end. An increase in production prices are expected to result in yield curve flattening,
with yields in the front end increasing at a faster pace than the long end. In contrast to
the OLS model from chapter 2, that reproduces a twist with front-end yields moving
in opposite direction to long-end. This is an effect that the affine models struggle to
reproduce. An increase in monetary aggregate M3 is expected to result in yield curve
steepening, with yields in the front end falling faster than the long end. Finally, an
increase in the consumer confidence index is expected to result in yields flattening,
with front end yields increasing faster than the long end. This means that when the
economy is booming risk free asset yields are expected to flatten and when the
economy is under recession risk free asset yields are expected to steepen. From a
portfolio management perspective, a representative investor would have incentives to
short risk free assets in times when yields are at their steepest levels and set a curve
flattening strategy shorting the front end allocating greater weight than to the long
end. A more conservative strategy would be to short 2 years versus long the 10 and 20
years onwards, as the profits from the front end are expected to outweigh the losses on
the long end. For the case of Greek government bonds the model shows that if
governments engage in counter cyclical fiscal policies when unemployment is high,
this will only be possible if these policies do not result in a significant deterioration of
the debt-to-GDP ratio. Governments that either exhibit a positive correlation of their
yields to aggregate consumption growth or cannot monetise their deficits need to
ensure lower deficits and debt burdens during booming periods so that they can still
have capacity to issue new debt for the rainy days. Governments in this sense need to
assess, if they are subject to large or small solvency shocks. From the Greek case this
chapter has shown that a deterioration of government’s deficit-to-GDP ratio results in
a fall in yields. This is mainly because the increase in spending helps to boom the
economy. However, this is more than offset by the deterioration of its debt-to-GDP
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ratio, thus a deterioration of the latter ratio will more than offset any positive effects
stemming from any budget-deficit-induced counter-cyclical policies, in line with
proposition 3 from chapter 4. We have learned that debt and deficit ratios can play a
role in times of financial distress.
Chapter 6 shows how to apply a continuous time affine term structure model. We
show that our model performs very well as long as the state space variables selected
have significant explanatory power over the short rate, which throughout this thesis
has been the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA). Specifically, this paper
confirms that the state variables that can be used for this purpose are: (i) the EU
unemployment, (ii) EU production price index, (iii) monetary aggregate ECB M3, and
(iv) the EU consumer confidence index, in line with the findings discussed on
previous chapters. These variables account for the EONIA rate over a period of time
ranging from Dec. 1999 to Jan 2011 remarkably well. In addition to that, the proposed
states variables not only are observed to work well during times of financial stability,
but they also perform very well during periods of extended financial distress. We see
that our calculations in the continuous time approach are consistent with our findings
applying the discrete approach and that calculations perform better on the front end of
the yield curve rather than on the long end. This seems to be the case because front
end yields are more sensitive to the state variables, whereas this dissipates as
maturities become larger. In summary, we have learned that yields are high in times
when unemployment is low and when consumer confidence, M3 and the price levels
are high. During times of boom the EU benchmark yield curve exhibits a flat shape,
with front end yields almost as high as the 30 year bonds and during times of
recessions, the yield curve shows a steeper shape with long term yields exhibiting
greater spreads versus short maturity bond yields. Our findings are thus in line with
the discrete approach from chapter 5 and with modern asset pricing theory, and they
provide evidence of Taylor’s (1993) central bank policy rules as well as of the
classical outcomes seen on IS-LM models. In this chapter, the intention has been to
show that current yield curve levels are indeed explained by current economic
fundamentals and that its behaviour is in line with economic theory.
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Chapter 7 discussed the use of affine term structure models in order to explain links
between term structure and the theory of the price level. We have learned that it does
not matter if the theory of the price level is at work or not. Mainly because either ways
any deterioration of the cumulated surplus or deficit leads to higher financing costs
either via inflation or via increases in the credit spreads to the benchmark curves. We
have also learned that the front end is where the risk lies as seen for the Greek yield
curve. Clearly, if for a given government its yields are not seen as a market
benchmark and therefore exhibit increasing yields in times when aggregate marginal
utility is high and consumption growth is low, or if the government does not control
monetary policy, then the governments must avoid deficits and fund counter-cyclical
policies with reserves for this purpose. Reserves must be financed via long end of the
curve 20- to 30-year maturity bonds. Only those governments lucky enough to enjoy
the so-called risk-free status are allowed to issue in the front end, as an increase in the
financing costs due to increases in total debt outstanding are more than compensated
by falls in the short term rate. This can only work when governments’ solvency
shocks are small. However, for those governments’ exhibiting intermediate of large
solvency shocks any deterioration on their fundamentals will result in a deterioration
of their financing costs. This chapter also shows how useful affine term structure
models can be for modelling the effects of macroeconomic variables on governments’
revenues. For instance, as an example we show how the effect of innovations in the
unemployment rate has on governments’ fiscal imbalances. Governments which are
more sensitive to macroeconomic risks affecting their fiscal imbalances are likely to
exhibit higher spreads if they run deficits, thus limiting their ability to counter-cyclical
policies in times when consumption growth is low and aggregate marginal utility is
high.
In Chapter 8 a local level model with a stochastic slope and a stochastic seasonality
has been calibrated using European yields. The analysis involved the use of the state
space methodology to a structural equation model which, in state space terminology
was to estimate an unobserved state or latent factors being the level, the slope and the
seasonality to an observation or measurement equation linking the observed yields to
the unobserved latent factors. The results confirm the views of Diebold, Rudebusch
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and Aruoba (2006) and, provide strong evidence of macroeconomic effects on yields
however and, weaker evidence of yield curve effects on the macroeconomy. This
essay has also explored the possibility of breaking the yield curve in two: the money
market and the capital market yield curves. It has been shown that by doing so results
improve significantly compared to those seen in the no-arbitrage experiences. In
addition, a discrete time affine term structure model (hence, in absence of arbitrage)
has been calibrated with the level, the slope and the seasonal component and both, the
local level model as well as the no-arbitrage term structure model performed quite
well in explaining yield curve movements. However, similar to most of current
literature, the explanatory power diminishes under the no-arbitrage approach as
maturities become larger. This can be improved by breaking the yields in two (money
market yields and capital market yields), unfortunately at the expense of violating the
no-arbitrage condition.
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